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i 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is a history of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
Britain, between 1942 and 1985. Specifically, it is focused upon the group of leading 
agencies linked to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella body for joint 
emergency fundraising established in the 1960s. The thesis explores the role of these 
NGOs in building up an expansive and technocratic disaster relief industry in Britain, in 
which they were embedded as instruments for the delivery of humanitarian aid. This was 
problematic, as many principal aid agencies also wished to move away from short-term 
disaster relief, to focus upon political advocacy connected to international development 
instead. It is argued that, despite this increasing political focus, humanitarian NGOs were 
consistently brought back to emergency relief by the power of television, the lack of 
public support for development, and the interventions of the British government. Aid 
agencies also actively contributed to this process, as they used apolitical disaster relief to 
generate public support and drive institutional growth in a crowded marketplace. This 
analysis complicates linear narratives of a transition from emergency relief to 
development aid in post-war British humanitarianism, instead presenting the period as 
characterised by competing and contradictory trajectories. This challenges conceptions of 
NGOs as bottom-up agents of civil society, by highlighting their competitive tendencies 
and complex interconnections with the mass media and the state. The rise of NGO 
humanitarianism also sheds light on broader trends in contemporary British history, such 
as changing patterns of political engagement, the character of modern activism, and the 
legacies of empire in the post-imperial period. 
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Introduction 
 
Humanitarianism is big business in contemporary Britain. Within the international aid and 
development sector, the leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are all 
household names, characterised by massive resources, professionalised bureaucracies, and 
global reach. In 2012, the five largest British aid agencies generated a combined income 
of over £1 billion, with Oxfam alone raising £385.5 million.
1
 The British public donates 
ever-increasing amounts to international aid, moved by emotional fundraising appeals and 
powerful media reports of distant suffering. Substantial funding also flows into the sector 
from government and other official donors, reflecting the close relationship that has 
developed between aid agencies and the state. The sheer size and professionalism of 
humanitarian NGOs today represents a significant departure from how these organisations 
started out many decades earlier, as small amateur bodies staffed by volunteers, dwarfed 
by official actors in size and relevance. 
 The massive scale of the humanitarian sector is particularly evident in the 
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella body currently comprised of 13 
leading humanitarian NGOs. The DEC functions as a co-ordinating mechanism for 
disaster fundraising, making joint appeals to the public through the mass media for 
donations to support relief work. The DEC is supported in this task by close relations with 
the television broadcasters (in particular the BBC and ITV), the press, high-street banks, 
British Telecom, the Post Office, and a range of corporate entities that provide facilities 
                                                             
1 The five agencies referred to for their 2012 incomes are the British Red Cross (£200.1 million), Christian 
Aid (£95.5 million), Islamic Relief UK (£132 million), Oxfam (£385.5 million), and Save the Children 
(£283.7 million), for a combined income of £1.097 billion. See: British Red Cross Society, Trustees' Report 
and Accounts 2012 (London: British Red Cross, 2012), p.26; Christian Aid, Annual Report and Accounts 
2011/12 (London: Christian Aid, 2012), p.34; Islamic Relief, 2012 Annual Report and Financial Statements 
(Birmingham: Islamic Relief, 2012), p.20; Oxfam, Annual Report & Accounts 2011/12 (Oxford: Oxfam, 
2012), p.44; Save the Children Fund, Changing the World for Children: Annual Report 2012 (London: Save 
the Children Fund, 2012), p.30. 
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and services without charge. Founded in 1963, the DEC has expanded and 
professionalised over time, and its fundraising power is impressive. The Committee's 
status was emphatically demonstrated by an appeal for the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
which raised a remarkable £392 million in public donations to be shared among the DEC 
members.
2
 
 This thesis explores this impressive rise of the British humanitarian NGO sector in 
the period between 1942 and 1985, specifically focusing upon the involvement of leading 
aid agencies in responding to major overseas emergencies. While this was not the starting 
point in the history of non-state humanitarianism, it was in the 1940s that the modern aid 
regime is widely seen as beginning to take shape. The devastation caused by the Second 
World War gave rise to a new generation of humanitarian organisations, including 
Christian Aid and Oxfam in Britain. The rate at which international NGOs were founded 
dramatically increased in the aftermath of the war, and continued to rise in the decades 
that followed.
3
 The conflict also resulted in Western governments assuming authority for 
co-ordinating humanitarian aid, reflecting the broader enthusiasm for state planning which 
characterised the period. As a result, humanitarianism entered a new phase of governance, 
in which aid agencies formed one part of a larger apparatus.  
 It will be shown that the expansion and rise to prominence of the sector over the 
decades that followed was driven by a perpetual cycle of major disasters in the global 
South. Responding to these humanitarian crises granted the leading NGOs access to the 
media, legitimacy, infrastructure, and a popular fundraising base. This process was 
                                                             
2 As of April 2014, the DEC has made a total of 63 broadcast appeals since its first appeal in 1966, and is 
comprised of 13 member agencies: Action Aid, Age International, the British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care 
International, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, Oxfam, Plan, Save the Children, Tearfund, 
and World Vision. For more on the contemporary DEC, see: http://www.dec.org.uk/ [accessed 31 March 
2014]. 
3 Colette Chabbott, ‘Development INGOs’, in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.), Constructing World 
Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 (Stamford, CA: Stamford University 
Press, 1999, pp.222-248), p.227. 
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embodied by the Disasters Emergency Committee. Created by the five largest 
organisations as a means to harness the power of television and dampen inter-agency 
competition, the DEC generated ever-increasing amounts of income and publicity for its 
members from 1966 onwards. The fundraising success of the Committee also helped 
shape popular conceptions of humanitarian NGOs, as emergency appeals in the media 
relied upon simplistic accounts of humanitarian philanthropy and provocative images of 
human suffering as a means to engage the public. The role of NGOs in responding to 
disasters was reinforced by the building up of a more complex and technocratic 
humanitarian infrastructure by the British government from the 1970s onwards, in which 
the DEC members were embedded as instruments for the delivery of relief. This also 
marked a closer integration of aid agencies with the state, paving the way for dramatic 
increases in official funding of NGOs in subsequent decades. This investigation ends with 
the substantial humanitarian response to famine in Ethiopia in 1984-85, which includes 
the iconic Band Aid and Live Aid fundraising events. Ethiopia has been presented as a 
major epochal event in the history of humanitarian action. The intensive media coverage 
and massive public donations generated by television images of famine is widely seen as a 
turning point for charitable fundraising, resulting in the rise of the professionalised and 
competitive aid industry we recognise today. 
 This growth of NGOs on the basis of emergency also overlapped with the sector 
taking up the cause of long-term economic and political development in the global South. 
This began in the early 1960s with organisations such as Christian Aid, Oxfam and War 
on Want recasting themselves as ‘development agencies’. Taking up the international 
development agenda also prompted a realisation that facilitating long-term change would 
require tackling the broader structural processes that created and perpetuated global 
poverty and injustice. Development-oriented NGOs thus gradually became more 
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committed to a political advocacy role from the 1960s onwards, which aimed to mobilise 
public opinion in support of lobbying against the structural causes of distant suffering. As 
this advocacy agenda evolved and became more sophisticated, major goals included 
lobbying for increases in official aid, cancelling Third World debt, highlighting the 
unethical practices of multinational corporations, and reforming structural inequalities in 
the global economic system. Growing emphasis on advocacy also encouraged the voicing 
of a critique of humanitarian aid from within the NGO community. This critique argued 
that short-term disaster relief did not contribute to these political goals, did not educate the 
public on the real causes of distant suffering, and arguably undermined this kind of 
campaigning altogether by perpetuating reductionist and problematic stereotypes of 
disaster victims. 
 This thesis thus explores how and why the sector came to be characterised by a 
significant paradox. Although many of the principal agencies self-identified with long-
term development and advocacy, their continued growth and popularity was due to a 
public association with apolitical disaster relief. It will be argued that this apparent 
contradiction can be attributed to a number of key, interconnected factors. The 
institutional and technological development of television brought a new immediacy to 
distant suffering, stimulating public empathy and generating donations to aid agencies. By 
contrast, the public was far less responsive to the undramatic complexities of long-term 
development, and aid agencies consistently struggled in their attempts to mobilise popular 
support for political advocacy work. The British government also played a crucial role in 
this process, politically containing and co-opting aid agencies through co-funding 
arrangements and charitable regulations. While these forces all worked to restrict the 
advocacy ambitions of the sector, it will also be shown that the leading NGOs were 
themselves actively complicit in this process. Despite an increasing political focus, NGOs 
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were consistently driven by short-term institutional impulses, returning to short-term 
charitable relief as an effective way to maintain public support and drive fundraising in a 
crowded humanitarian marketplace.  
 This introduction will elaborate these key issues in greater detail. It begins by 
setting out how this investigation fits into a broader literature relating to NGOs and 
international aid. Of particular importance is the relationship between aid agencies and 
emergency relief; the taking up by NGOs of long-term development and political 
advocacy; and the importance of the mass media to humanitarian action. It also discusses 
how a historical investigation of the humanitarian sector contributes towards 
understanding broader trends in contemporary British history.  
 The approach taken in this thesis is influenced by a burgeoning field of 
international history, which explores how non-state actors have contributed to 
transnational movements and networks, interacting with official institutions to shape new 
forms of governance. This literature, and the issues it raises for a study of national NGO 
sector, is also surveyed and placed into context. This discussion is also supplemented by a 
historical overview of the emergence of modern humanitarian NGOs, from their origins in 
colonial missionary activity to the rise of the modern aid regime in the 1940s, to provide a 
historical background for the central investigation. 
 
 
NGOs and Disaster Relief 
The historical development of humanitarian NGOs is deeply intertwined with large-scale 
emergencies. Many prominent international aid agencies were created in response to the 
two World Wars, including Save the Children (1919), Oxfam (1942), and Christian Aid 
(1944). David Korten's famous typology of NGOs refers to ‘first generation’ organisations 
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as geared towards helping people in crisis through the provision of immediate first aid, 
food and shelter.
4
 NGOs have progressed significantly in their philosophies and 
programming over time, in Korten's terms passing through successive ‘generations’ of 
evolution to become more advocacy-oriented. However, the sheer scale of the 
contemporary humanitarian system attests to the continuing relevance of emergencies to 
aid and development organisations. Mark Duffield refers to the modern NGO movement 
expanding on the basis of the state of ‘permanent emergency’ which exists among the 
world’s most vulnerable populations.5 
 However, there is also a long-standing critique which calls into question the entire 
practice of humanitarian aid as advanced by NGOs. This critique has been articulated 
from within the sector since the 1960s, although it has become more populist in recent 
years. Much of this literature focuses upon the unintended and harmful consequences that 
can arise from NGOs providing emergency relief, despite their benevolent intentions. This 
critique began after the involvement of NGOs in the Nigerian Civil War in the late 1960s, 
as the channelling of assistance into the secessionist state of Biafra also arguably 
prolonged the conflict by sustaining the Biafran military effort.
6
 This critique has 
continued to develop as NGOs have responded to successive complex emergencies. More 
recently, Fiona Terry (associated with M decins Sans Fronti res) speaks of a ‘paradox of 
humanitarian action’. That is, while humanitarianism aims to alleviate suffering, it can 
inadvertently sustain conflict, and thus prolong the suffering it claims to address. Terry's 
                                                             
4 David Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (West Hartford, CT: 
Kumarian, 1990); John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding 
International Development Cooperation (London: Zed, 2003), pp.144-146. 
5 Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007), pp.74-75. 
6 Alan R. Booth, ‘The Churches in the Nigerian War’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 12:6 (April 
1970, pp.184-188), p.188; see also: Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism under fire - non-profit 
organizations and international development (Ottawa: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995), 
pp.102-106; Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (London: 
Villiers, 1997, pp.72-77. 
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analysis is heavily influenced by the experiences of aid agencies in Rwanda in 1994, 
where thousands of génocidaires crossed the border to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and become refugees and beneficiaries of humanitarian aid.
7
 
 The longevity of this critique renders the continued involvement of NGOs in relief 
operations problematic. The underlying implication is that there are deeper, institutional 
impulses that have driven aid agencies towards their current prominence in the 
humanitarian aid system. A number of commentators have highlighted the financial and 
organisational benefits made available to NGOs by continued involvement in major 
emergencies. Indeed, many observers refer to the existence of an aid ‘industry’, 
deliberately evoking notions of commercial activity and market dynamics which would 
appear opposed to traditional ideals of humanitarian altruism. For instance, Thomas G. 
Weiss argues that ‘like entrepreneurs’, humanitarian NGOs are ‘concerned with image 
and marketing strategies in an expanding global business’ that ‘over the past two decades 
has become increasingly competitive with a glut of suppliers vying for their share of the 
market’.8 Fiona Terry similarly depicts this development as a phenomenon of the post-
Cold War period: 
 ‘The expansion of humanitarian activity at the end of the Cold War and the proliferation 
 of NGOs has created a veritable ‘aid industry’. Larger global budgets for humanitarian 
 aid... and the readiness of aid organisations to expand the notion of ‘humanitarian’ activity 
 beyond the provision of life-saving relief into areas of postconflict peace-building and 
 reconstruction have opened up new markets for Western commercial interest, and aid is 
 becoming an enterprise’.
9
 
 
A number of authors, many of whom have been employed within the humanitarian sector, 
depict contemporary NGOs along these lines, suggesting that they are motivated by 
                                                             
7 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (NY: Cornell University Press, 
2002). 
8 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Business (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p.3. 
9 Terry, Condemned to Repeat?, p.236. 
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organisational self-interest and power as much as they are by altruistic impulses.
10
 
Alexander Cooley and James Ron refer to the ‘NGO scramble’, to describe how the 
competitive pressures and marketisation inherent to the transnational humanitarian sector 
negatively impacts upon the work of NGOs. For Cooley and Ron, these forces work to 
prolong ineffective aid projects, subvert the long-term goals of NGOs, and create an over-
reliance on official aid donors.
11
 A particularly visceral critique has been made by Linda 
Polman, a former NGO field worker. A polemical attack upon the aid industry as a whole, 
Polman argues that the rapid expansion of non-governmental humanitarianism in recent 
years has also permitted a proliferation of unqualified, unprofessional and unethical aid 
agencies. The pressures of increased competition between organisations leads them to 
exaggerate and manipulate the media as they compete for contracts and donations.
12
  
 This populist critique also chimes somewhat with academic scholarship on the 
prominence of NGOs in the contemporary aid industry. For instance, James Fearon argues 
that an ongoing rise in the number of reported disasters can be at least partly attributed to 
an expansive and competitive global humanitarian sector. For Fearon, this sector has 
engaged in successful ‘task expansion’ by conceptualising more emergencies as 
warranting increased humanitarian assistance.
13
 What this all points to is that the 
phenomenal growth of humanitarian NGOs cannot be attributed solely to benevolent 
intentions. David Rieff captures this complexity neatly, stating that: 
 ‘Anyone who saw, as I did, the grotesque display of humanitarian agencies' flags flapping 
 alongside each other in eastern Zaire like so many corporate flags in some business park 
 in Purchase, New York, or San Jose, California, realized there was more going on than the 
                                                             
10 See, for instance: Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and 
International Charity (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in 
Famine and War (London: Earthscan, 2001). 
11 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action’, International Security, 27:1 (Summer 2002, pp.5-39). 
12 Linda Polman, War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times (London: Viking, 2010). 
13 James D. Fearon, ‘The Rise of Emergency Relief Aid’, in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), 
Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp.49-72). 
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 simple desire to help. The struggle to stamp out cholera, get the shelters built, and dig the 
 pit latrines was simultaneously a struggle for market share’.
14
 
 
This notion that ‘there was more going on than the simple desire to help’ is a phenomenon 
that should be interrogated further. Portraying humanitarian organisations in this light 
renders accounts of international NGOs as value-driven harbingers of global civil society 
problematic.
15
 Instead it raises pressing questions concerning how the financial and 
institutional expansion of NGOs has been driven by competitive rivalries and material 
incentives. Despite a long-standing critique of humanitarian aid, aid agencies may have 
continued to respond to overseas emergencies as a means to mobilise the public and 
generate funding. This in turn suggests that the relationship between NGOs and their 
supporters has been constructed and sustained through simplistic media representations of 
disasters. The depiction of humanitarian organisations as overly-reliant on official funding 
also raises challenging implications for how NGOs have contributed to, and been 
incorporated into, broader systems of governance. These issues all require sustained 
historical analysis. As the substantial literature on contemporary humanitarianism makes 
clear, a complex and expansive aid industry has come to the fore in the post-Cold War era. 
However, there is still much that we do not know about how this apparatus emerged and 
took shape historically, and the extent to which humanitarian NGOs actively shaped it.  
 These lines of inquiry build on theoretical insights advanced by a number of 
prominent scholars. A particularly influential and widely-cited account of NGOs and 
emergency aid has been put forward by Alex de Waal, who probes why famine in Africa 
persists despite decades of humanitarian relief operations. For de Waal, the only lasting 
                                                             
14 David Rieff, ‘Charity on the Rampage: The Business of Foreign Aid’, Foreign Affairs (February 1997), 
available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52653/david-rieff/charity-on-the-rampage-the-business-
of-foreign-aid [accessed 31 March 2014]. 
15 A well-known example of this approach is Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond 
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
10 
 
solution to famine is a political contract between governments and populations, as 
successfully implemented in India. However, he argues that a ‘humanitarian international’ 
of NGOs, academics, consultants, and lobbyists has instead systematically intervened in a 
non-political, philanthropic manner which has prevented such political solutions from 
being realised: 
 ‘...the struggle against famine has become professionalized and institutionalized. 
 Technical mastery - especially in public health - is important. But these processes 
 represent a leaching of power from those who suffer famine. Generalized, 
 internationalized responsibility for fighting famine is far less valuable than specific, 
 local political accountability. The struggle against famine cannot be the moral property 
 of humanitarian institutions’.
16
 
 
For de Waal, the ‘humanitarian international’ therefore resembles a technocratic elite, in 
which NGOs are directly implicated as part of a self-perpetuating disaster relief industry 
concerned primarily with its own expansion. Furthermore, by intervening in a 
systematically non-political manner, NGOs have also depoliticised emergencies, by 
reconceptualising their political causes as technical problems requiring technical 
solutions. This image of NGO humanitarianism as a depoliticising force is a powerful 
critique, as it would also suggest that NGOs are actively preventing more structural 
solutions to global suffering from being realised.  
 A number of authors have presented similar arguments. John Hannigan writes that 
disasters and disaster response have a long history as being treated as non-political in 
nature, an ‘illusion’ which has been promoted and reinforced by UN agencies, the 
International Red Cross movement, and NGOs.
17
 Craig Calhoun argues that a discourse of 
‘emergencies’ has become central to international affairs, which is fundamentally 
                                                             
16 de Waal, Famine Crimes, p.5. 
17 John Hannigan, Disasters Without Borders: The International Politics of Natural Disasters (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2012), pp.9-11. 
11 
 
managerial and depoliticising as it situates disasters outside of ‘normal’ politics. This 
managerial perspective skirts democratic decision-making and promotes an apolitical 
form of humanitarian response.
18
 The humanitarian community therefore continues to 
have an aversion to political involvement, which is equated with ‘nonfeasance, 
malfeasance, incompetence, corruption and/or obstructionism’.19 
 Similar accusations have been targeted at the entire international aid system. A 
particularly influential critique of the ‘development industry’ has been made by James 
Ferguson, an anthropologist of development projects. Ferguson uses a case study of 
official aid in Lesotho to argue that the ‘development apparatus’ functions as not simply a 
‘machine for eliminating poverty’, but as a ‘machine for reinforcing and expanding the 
exercise of bureaucratic state power which incidentally takes “poverty” as its point of 
entry’. Alongside this institutional effect is a ‘conceptual or ideological effect of 
depoliticising both poverty and the state’.20 Poverty is subsequently reduced to a technical 
problem requiring technical solutions, negating calls for structural change. For Ferguson, 
the development apparatus therefore functions as an ‘anti-politics machine... 
depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, 
all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of 
expanding bureaucratic state power’.21 
 For Ferguson, the logic and rationale of ‘development’ instinctively functions to 
fulfil its ‘instrument-effect’ of depoliticising poverty, creating a certain type of 
consciousness and style of intervention regarding the ‘underdeveloped’ world. This 
                                                             
18 Craig Calhoun, ‘A World of Emergencies: Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Order’, 
Canadian Review of Sociology, 41:4 (November 2004, pp.373-395). 
19 A. Cooper Drury et al., ‘The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995’, 
The Journal of Politics, 67:2 (May 2005, pp.454-473), p.454. 
20 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development”, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power 
in Lesotho (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 1990), pp.255-256. 
21 Ibid., p.xv (emphasis added). 
12 
 
permits the perpetuation of certain bureaucratic interests, which veil their agenda behind a 
technocratic language of expertise. Heavily influenced by Foucauldian notions of 
governmentality, Ferguson’s critique is of crucial importance. Yet it is restricted to 
official aid agencies, and largely avoids the non-governmental sector. Indeed, writing in 
1990, Ferguson reflects the spirit of the times when he implies that non-state actors may 
prove to be a viable solution to the dilemmas of official development: 
 ‘The state is not the only game in town. The more interesting, and less explored, 
 possibility is to seek out  the typically non-state forces and organizations that challenge 
 the existing dominant order and to see if links can be found between our expertise and 
 their practical needs as they determine them.’
22
 
 
If NGOs have also been incorporated into the broader governmentality of this 
‘development apparatus’, then it is reasonable to argue that NGOs reproduce this ‘anti-
politics machine’ and the relations of power it conceals. Janet Townsend conceptualises 
development NGOs in this way, arguing that these organisations have come to form a 
coherent ‘transnational community’. The knowledge economy of this community is 
largely top-down, with governability functioning as a greater priority to donors than 
effective poverty reduction. This ‘new managerialism’ and accompanying audit culture 
imposes demands on NGOs that work against them ‘listening’ to the very populations 
they aim to assist.
23
 There are clear parallels between this ‘transnational community’ and 
de Waal's depiction of a ‘humanitarian international’. Indeed, de Waal emphasises that the 
collective he is referring to ‘is a sub-group of the larger aid and development industry’.24 
 There is a need to uncover and demonstrate this depoliticising process in action. 
Humanitarian NGOs have a long history of deliberately presenting themselves as 
                                                             
22 Ibid., pp.286-287. 
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2002, pp.829-839). 
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apolitical, which dates back to the founding principles of the Red Cross movement. It will 
be argued that the creation of the Disasters Emergency Committee in 1963 consolidated 
and institutionalised this approach to humanitarianism in Britain, and through its publicity 
the DEC deliberately and consistently presented itself as a non-political actor. This was an 
image primarily constructed for the public, but it was also presented to the television 
broadcasters who provided the DEC with airtime, and the British government, who often 
worked closely with the Committee. For instance, a 1967 DEC appeal for the Middle East 
urged viewers to ‘forget politics’, and instead ‘help the tired, hungry, homeless, torn 
victims of the six-day war’.25 This is inherently problematic, as over the same period, the 
majority of the DEC members were also aspiring to become more overtly political in their 
development campaigning and advocacy work. This study examines this contradictory 
tension at length, and what this reveals about the nature of non-governmental 
humanitarianism. 
 This issue of political engagement is crucial, as at the same time that NGOs were 
becoming more radical in their developmental campaigns, they were also co-ordinating 
more closely with the state to implement relief. A wide body of literature has argued that 
in the contemporary period NGOs have become deeply entwined with state institutions, as 
a result of an over-reliance on official financing to implement aid and development 
programmes. The amounts of humanitarian assistance channelled from official sources 
through NGOs today are substantial. In 2009, 17 percent of the funds channelled into the 
humanitarian system by donor governments went directly to NGOs. Furthermore, NGOs 
also receive substantial amounts of this funding indirectly via the specialist UN 
agencies.
26
  
                                                             
25 Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘Middle East appeal’, The Guardian, 27 June 1967, p.14. 
26 Weiss, Humanitarian Business, p.72. 
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 In Britain, there is a well-established relationship between the NGO sector and the 
government, and the Department for International Development (DFID) now routinely 
delivers significant amounts of its substantial overseas aid budget through leading aid 
agencies.
27
 Reliance on official funding has been interpreted by commentators as evidence 
that NGOs have effectively become subcontractors for neoliberal governments, who have 
privatised out their responsibilities for relief and poverty reduction to non-state actors.
28
 
This in turn has raised concerns about the potentially negative impact of official support 
upon the accountability, independence, legitimacy and performance of NGOs.
29
 Mark 
Duffield argues that while NGOs define themselves as  ‘non-governmental’, since the 
1990s they have increasingly been absorbed into a ‘mutual web of overlapping objectives’ 
which connects them with donor governments, recipient states, intergovernmental 
agencies and Western militaries. For Duffield, the NGO community is no longer external 
to the state, but has instead ‘reinvented itself as intrinsic to its reconstruction and power 
projection’.30 
 While the enmeshing of NGOs with the state appears self-evident today (in 2013 
Oxfam received almost half of its annual income from ‘government and other public 
                                                             
27 Department for International Development (DFID), Statistics on International Development 2013 
(London: DFID, 2013), available at: 
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Social Movements Programme Paper Number 23 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, 2006). 
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15 
 
authorities’31), there has been little published on how this took root historically. The 
relationship between the DEC members and the state is an important theme throughout 
this investigation, which is analysed systematically in chapters 3 and 4. Particular 
attention is paid to the 1970s, as it was during this decade that the government initiated a 
radical overhaul of its machinery for disaster relief, accepting new responsibilities for a 
more effective humanitarian response. A specialist Disaster Unit was subsequently created 
within the Ministry of Overseas Development (a predecessor to DFID), to provide a ‘focal 
point’ for all issues connected to humanitarian aid.32 The Disaster Unit pioneered a more 
professionalised and technocratic approach to emergency relief within Whitehall. 
Crucially, the Unit also deliberately targeted closer integration of its work with the NGO 
sector, using the DEC as a vehicle. This drive to draw upon the capacity of the sector 
reflected a broader official recognition of non-state actors, and the Unit increasingly 
utilised the DEC agencies as instruments to deliver humanitarian aid in a variety of 
contexts. This co-ordination raised the legitimacy of the DEC members, and provided 
them with a further source of income. It also effectively contained and co-opted the 
development NGOs, as they were enrolled into an emerging technocratic relief system and 
directed away from non-relief activities. 
 
 
NGOs and the Politics of Long-Term Development 
The growth and expansion of an NGO disaster relief industry suggests a problematic 
relationship between emergency work, and the broader involvement of the majority of the 
sector in long-term development. The evolution of NGOs towards taking up international 
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development is commonly located in the 1960s, as a series of UN-led initiatives 
influenced the philosophy and approach of a number of organisations.
33
 Becoming 
‘development agencies’ also drew NGOs further into the international aid system, as they 
co-ordinated more closely with UN institutions and donor governments. In Britain, the trio 
of Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want all became leading proponents of development 
in the 1960s, increasingly committing to solving the root causes of global hunger and 
poverty. In the process, these organisations also began a process of gradual internal 
politicisation, as they realised that rural development projects alone would not bring about 
lasting change. Instead, there was also a need for policy change by governments and 
multilateral institutions, to provide increased opportunities to developing nations within 
the international economic and political system. 
 Taking up international development hence also led to the emergence of a political 
advocacy agenda for NGOs. As Barbara Rugendyke summarises, the term ‘advocacy’ is 
generally used by NGOs to refer to campaigning designed to change public opinion, and 
lobbying which targets the ‘structures, policies and practices which institutionalise 
poverty and related injustice’. In practice campaigning encourages public support for 
lobbying, and all advocacy work is therefore geared towards bringing about positive and 
permanent change in the global South.
34
 Furthermore, advocacy is generally taken to be 
‘self-evidently of a political nature’, in that it is targeted at the root causes of overseas 
hunger, poverty, and suffering.
35
 David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji define advocacy as 
specifically working towards long-term policy change to address these structural causes, 
                                                             
33 See, for instance: Clare Saunders, ‘British Humanitarian, Aid and Development NGOs, 1949-Present’, in 
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35 Deborah Eade, ‘Preface’, in Deborah Eade (ed.), Development and Advocacy (Oxford: Oxfam, 2002, 
pp.ix-xvi), p.x. 
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rather than simply ‘speaking out to alert people of a problem in order to raise funds to 
support operational work’.36 
 The evolution of NGO advocacy work over time has been documented, beginning 
with relatively untargeted campaigning in the 1960s. This has developed into a more 
sophisticated and professionalised approach in recent years, that focuses on specific issues 
and actors, such as debt relief, international finance, trade, and multinational 
corporations.
37
 Kevin Watkins states that the goal of ending poverty requires a 
‘fundamental redirection of policy on the part of other foci of power, including the UN, 
international financial and trade organisations, transnational corporations, official aid 
donors, and NGOs’.38 In working towards these goals, NGOs have increasingly engaged 
in global alliances and transnational advocacy networks which mobilise a multitude of 
actors in pursuit of common objectives. A prominent example of this type of advocacy 
was the Jubilee 2000 campaign, a transnational coalition of churches, NGOs, trade unions 
and other civil society actors which aimed to raise awareness of Third World debt. Jubilee 
2000 has been described as ‘the most successful industrial-country movement aimed at 
combating world poverty for many years, perhaps in all recorded history’.39 This 
momentum later resulted in the Make Poverty History campaign of 2005, which also mass 
mobilised transnational civil society in support of global justice. Specifically, Make 
Poverty History aimed to secure policy commitments from the G8 governments for debt 
relief, increased aid, and international trade reforms. In Britain alone, the Make Poverty 
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History Campaign had 540 organisations connected to it, and development NGOs such as 
Christian Aid and Oxfam played a leading role.
40
 
 The massive scale of the contemporary relief industry thus appears problematic in 
the context of this distinct NGO advocacy agenda, as the latter implies a shift in focus 
away from traditional emergency aid. As Deborah Eade summarises, advocacy is driven 
by ‘the realisation that development and humanitarian relief projects will never, in and of 
themselves, bring about lasting changes in the structures which create and perpetuate 
poverty and injustice’.41 This study therefore seeks to explore why the British 
humanitarian NGO sector built up a substantial apparatus for apolitical disaster relief, 
when many principal aid agencies wanted to de-emphasise this kind of work and focus on 
political advocacy instead. This is a key problem that drives this study, and to unpick it 
requires systematic analysis of these two distinct trajectories, and how they have co-
existed in practice.  
 The relationship between NGO disaster relief and advocacy has not been 
systematically covered from a historical perspective. However, a number of authors do 
highlight a series of practical constraints on the effectiveness of campaigning and 
lobbying which may explain why NGOs have been unable to shift away from traditional 
humanitarian aid. Writing in 1993, Michael Edwards highlighted a lack of strategic 
direction, a lack of co-ordination between agencies, and the pressures of maintaining good 
relations with government as key barriers preventing the realisation of NGO advocacy 
goals.
42
 Edwards has also highlighted how NGOs have found certain issues more 
straightforward to present to the public and policymakers, such as landmines and sex 
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tourism. By contrast, more complex and structural forces such as international trade have 
proved more difficult to effectively mobilise around.
43
 Larry Minear similarly speaks of a 
preference for direct action (by both agencies and the public), the sheer complexity of 
global poverty, and a reluctance to divert too much funding to educational and lobbying, 
as working against advocacy ambitions. Crucially, Minear also identifies a deep-rooted 
concern among humanitarians that campaigning and lobbying would ‘draw NGOs into the 
forbidden political arena’, which he argues has been a ‘formidable constraint’ on their 
advocacy ambitions.
44
 
 This depiction of a problematic relationship between NGOs and politics raises 
fundamental questions. It suggests that moving into more radical educational and lobbying 
work has not been a smooth or organic process for aid agencies, but has instead been 
undertaken with difficulty and hesitation. This thesis explores at length the supposed 
politicisation of the British NGO sector that took place from the 1960s onwards, and how 
the leading NGOs approached and traversed this new path in practice. Becoming more 
overtly political was hazardous for aid agencies, as to do so was forbidden by British 
charity law. Legally, this was enforced by the Charity Commissioners, the non-ministerial 
body responsible for monitoring and regulating the voluntary sector. The Charity 
Commissioners tended to take a conservative view of charitable action and political 
lobbying, and their interventions often impacted directly upon the sector. However, 
charity law was not the only rationale for NGOs to hesitate about political engagement. 
Privately, the leading NGOs were also concerned that to become too closely associated 
with politics would also alienate their supporters, who it was believed supported them 
primarily because of charitable relief. As one of the more conservative agencies, Save the 
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Children fretted throughout the 1960s that to be associated with the political activities of 
other NGOs in the sector could cause ‘disillusionment amongst many of its supporters, to 
the serious detriment of their fund-raising’.45 The constraints of public opinion, and its 
impact on the sector during this period, is another crucial issue that requires further 
historical examination.  
 
 
Humanitarianism and the Media 
If public opinion was oriented primarily to apolitical disaster relief, it stands to reason that 
the media played a crucial role in shaping it. The history of non-governmental 
humanitarianism is padded with major emergency operations that were sparked by 
television coverage of distant suffering, which in turn galvanised popular compassion and 
massive donations to aid agencies. The huge public response to the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami indicates how this trend has both continued and extended in the contemporary 
period. There is a significant body of literature which explores the fundamental linkage 
between emergency interventions and the media; a recent publication begins from the 
position that ‘it is through media that most of us encounter disaster and bear witness to 
suffering around the world’.46 Indeed, the mass media is widely understood as a critical 
force in the contemporary aid industry, due to its central role in publicising distant 
suffering and mobilising responses.
47
  
 A historical analysis of the British humanitarian sector is therefore incomplete 
without an understanding of the role played by the mass media, especially television. 
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Indeed, it was during the period under examination here that television suddenly emerged 
as the dominant form of British broadcasting. The 1950s witnessed a rapid spread of 
television ownership, especially after the Queen's coronation in 1953 and the introduction 
of commercial television (ITV) in 1955. By 1960 over 70 percent of the population had 
access to both channels, as television firmly supplanted radio as the leading medium.
48
 
Mark Donnelly describes the phenomenal rise of television as ‘the most important cultural 
transformation of the sixties’, as television was transformed from a luxury item into a 
social necessity. By 1975, more than 90 percent of all Britons possessed a television set, 
an emphatic demonstration of how the technology had become the lens through which the 
British public viewed and understood the wider world.
49
 
 The institutional and technological development of television also helped fuel the 
growth of humanitarian NGOs. News footage of overseas emergencies publicised distant 
suffering to large audiences, which in turn encouraged donations to aid agencies. 
Technological advances in communications and filming reduced the delay between 
capturing and broadcasting footage, bringing a new level of immediacy to overseas 
events.
50
 Michel Ogrizek writes that the twentieth century information revolution ‘paved 
the way for contemporary humanitarian aid’, by ‘exposing to the whole world the 
misfortunes of people living in areas never seen and sharing their suffering in real time 
with an affluent protected public’.51 While the central importance of television to the rise 
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of NGOs is widely acknowledged, there has been little historical analysis of how the 
media and the humanitarian sector have interacted and shaped one another over time. This 
thesis does so through a focus upon the Disasters Emergency Committee, which offers 
unique insights into the intricate relationship between NGOs, disasters and the media.  
 Chapters one and two set out the creation and internal workings of the DEC at 
length. In short, the DEC was set up in 1963 as an umbrella body for the ‘big five’ aid 
agencies; the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children, and War on 
Want. In the early 1960s, a series of disaster appeals on television raised record sums for 
individual agencies, which also intensified inter-agency competition within the sector. The 
DEC was intended to facilitate closer co-ordination between its members, and dampen 
this competition by making joint emergency appeals to the public on television after major 
disasters. The Committee was granted special arrangements with the BBC to make these 
appeals, the proceeds of which would then be shared between the members.
52
 The appeals 
were also broadcast simultaneously on ITV, as the body responsible for regulating 
commercial television (the Independent Television Authority, or ITA
53
) used the same 
appeals machinery as the BBC.
54
 
 From the outset, the BBC played an integral role in setting up the DEC, providing 
the facilities to produce appeals, and drawing up its guidelines and procedures. This 
reflected a longer history of the BBC providing services and airtime to charitable 
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organisations; for instance, in 1927 the Corporation had introduced its popular Week's 
Good Cause programme, which broadcast weekly charitable appeals on wireless radio.
55
 
In the 1950s the BBC began broadcasting similar charitable appeals on television. To be 
eligible for such appeals, organisations had to satisfy a variety of criteria, and were 
restricted to an interval of two years between requests.
56
 This meant that in practice the 
presence of British NGOs on television was tightly restricted, as charities were not 
permitted to purchase advertising airtime on commercial television until 1989.
57
 The DEC 
arrangements therefore represented an exclusive level of access to television for voluntary 
organisations, as the Committee members could collectively request a broadcast appeal 
for any disaster they considered to be of sufficient magnitude.  
 However, while the television broadcasting authorities granted this access, they 
also regulated the content of DEC appeals. Eve Colpus has set out persuasively how, in 
the interwar period, the BBC policed the political boundaries of British philanthropy 
through its Week's Good Cause programme. The Corporation did so by rejecting requests 
for broadcast appeals from any charitable organisations deemed to be implicitly or 
explicitly ideological or political.
58
 This reflected the BBC's wider ethos of public service 
broadcasting, which emphasised impartiality and political neutrality.
59
 In the same 
tradition, the television broadcasters insisted that all DEC appeals were to be explicit ly 
non-political in character, which reinforced the Committee's stance of depoliticised 
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humanitarianism. As chapter four explores, in the early 1980s the broadcasters were also 
prepared to directly intervene to prevent any ‘political’ activities by the DEC members. 
Historical analysis of the DEC therefore sheds light on how television broadcasters 
stimulated the growth of humanitarian NGOs, while also shaping and containing them. 
 Television also shaped the humanitarian sector more generally, due to the 
particular way in which overseas disasters were constructed and presented in news and 
current affairs programmes. Scholars have consistently shown that the mass media is 
highly selective in its coverage of such emergencies, with only visible large-scale crises 
receiving significant attention and news time. These tendencies are attributed to the news 
values and judgements institutionalised within the globalised media industry, which foster 
a professional bias to not seriously cover overseas disasters until they have become large 
in scale, visually dramatic and negative, and can be presented in simplistic and 
unambiguous terms. Geopolitics also contributes to this process, as events become less 
visible the farther they occur away from home, leading to a distinct lack of coverage for 
African nations.
60
  
 Furthermore, it has been argued that the media frames all disasters within a 
consistent and simplistic framework. Jonathan Benthall refers to a ‘well established 
narrative convention’ for disasters, characterised by familiar tropes and symbols, such as 
heroic Western aid workers rushing to save starving African children. In the process, 
emergencies are heavily simplified, and their complex causes are reduced to unambiguous 
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explanations (often presenting complex man-made crises as sudden natural disasters).
61
 
Stanley Cohen similarly writes of a ‘required template for famine reporting’: 
 ‘People must already be starving to death; the causes and solutions must be simplified; 
 and the language of a morality play must be used. Mothers and children are ideal  victims; 
 men are associated with violent ‘factions’ or ‘war-lords’, and seldom appear to be 
 hungry (they are too busy being photographed brandishing guns). And so on.’
62
 
 
The media's perceived orientation toward simplification, distortion, and a narrow focus 
upon physical suffering would feasibly reinforce public support for apolitical disaster 
relief by NGOs, rather than complex and less dramatic advocacy. The leading NGOs have 
long understood this problem; for instance, the first ever DEC appeal in 1966 (for an 
earthquake in Turkey) coincided with Oxfam undertaking a major development 
programme in India, and the organisation observed the contrasting responses to the two 
initiatives. While the public had donated a record sum to the ‘brilliant’ DEC television 
appeal, they had also been ‘stolidly unmoved and apparently unconvinced by the Indian 
famine’.63 
 However, there is also a need to explore how NGOs have themselves been 
implicated in this process. A recent study argues that contemporary aid agencies have 
assimilated a prevailing ‘media logic’, effectively pitching and packaging stories of 
humanitarian crises in simplistic ways which conform with established news values.
64
 
More broadly, the publicity produced by humanitarian organisations is the subject of a 
long-standing critique, which challenges the use of simplistic narratives and provocative 
images of starving children in NGO appeals. The processes by which audiences receive 
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and respond to media messages are complex, and debates continue over the extent to 
which audiences have agency to interpret and shape messages or ‘codes’ promoted by 
television and the media.
65
 While the nature of audience reception for charitable 
advertising is also contested
66
, there is a general consensus among commentators that this 
style of representation negatively impacts upon public perceptions of the developing 
world. It is argued that these appeals reproduce colonial ideas and stereotypes, by 
presenting the global South as helpless, passive, and dependent upon foreign assistance 
and guidance. Negative images of vulnerable children have attracted especially strong 
criticism, for allegedly infantilising the developing world and attributing to it an ignorant 
and child-like state. While these images have a track record of provoking an emotional 
response from viewers, they have also been implicated in reinforcing patronising 
stereotypes of the Third World, while obscuring the more complex political causes of 
global poverty and suffering.
67
 
 There therefore appears to be an inherent contradiction between the use of these 
images by NGOs to raise funds, and the stated commitment of the same agencies to 
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promoting development and advocating for long-term change. This tension is particularly 
significant to the time period in question here, as it was during the 1960s that the 
stereotypical image of a starving African child was elevated into a ‘universal icon of 
human suffering’. This was due largely to the intensive dissemination of such images in 
television news and NGO fundraising appeals.
68
 Unpicking this contradiction feeds back 
into broader questions concerning the institutional impulses that have driven the growth of 
NGOs, and the extent of their own political engagement. This also reinforces the crucial 
importance of the mass media to understanding the British humanitarian industry, given 
the central place of mediation in shaping public responses to distant suffering (and indeed, 
the wider world in general), and the complex relationship between the NGO sector and 
television. 
 
 
Humanitarian NGOs and contemporary British history 
A historical investigation of the British humanitarian sector clearly raises important 
questions about the politics, dynamics and practices of aid agencies. It also contributes 
towards understanding broader debates and processes in contemporary British history as a 
whole. A growing body of scholarship now analyses non-state actors as a way to open up 
familiar terrains of British political and social history to new approaches and perspectives. 
A recent edited collection begins from the position that ‘contemporary Britain can only be 
properly understood with reference to the phenomenon of non-governmental 
organisations... their influence can be detected at the heart of every major socio-political 
initiative of the post-war period’.69 Matthew Hilton, James Mckay, Nicholas Crowson, 
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and Jean-François Mouhot argue that the impressive growth of the voluntary sector as a 
whole in the twentieth century reflects a broader professionalisation of British society, 
which has granted increased authority to expert elites. For Hilton et al., rising public 
support for NGOs therefore points to a transformation in the nature of socio-political 
engagement in modern Britain, as politics has been both professionalised and 
personalised.
70
 
 In a similar vein, the historical rise of the British humanitarian sector in the post-
war period can also be expected to shed light on wider issues in British society. Firstly, 
there is a need to unpick what the growth of public support for aid agencies since the 
1940s reveals about civic and political engagement in Britain. There is a long lineage of 
accounts which portray such participation as having fundamentally declined in the 
contemporary period. Robert Putnam famously argued that ‘social capital’ (the 
connections between individuals) had declined in the United States after 1950, which 
contributed to citizens disengaging from politics. For Putnam, this disengagement 
correlated directly with a decline in the membership of civic organisations, weakening the 
social bonds required for an effective democracy.
71
 While Putnam's methodology and 
interpretations have been questioned
72
, his findings also fit into a broader body of 
literature which connects social capital and civic engagement to a vibrant voluntary 
sector.
73
 In Britain, historian Frank Prochaska depicts this decline as having onset ever 
since the end of the Victorian era, which marked a high point of Christian-inspired 
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philanthropy. For Prochaska, the emergence of the modern welfare state displaced this 
dynamic voluntary action with the detached authority of secular experts.
74
 
 However, such declinist accounts do not correlate with the phenomenal rise of 
public support for NGOs in the post-1945 period, most obviously expressed in financial 
contributions. This is especially apparent for the leading humanitarian organisations, 
which have experienced a phenomenal rate of growth since the 1940s. Putnam notably 
dismissed the contribution of major campaigning NGOs such as Amnesty International 
and Greenpeace to social capital, referring to them as ‘tertiary’ organisations in which 
membership is restricted to the passive, individual act of donating money (‘chequebook 
activism’).75 Establishing to what extent this is an accurate depiction of the humanitarian 
NGO sector requires further research. In a case study of the relationship between British 
development NGOs and the public, Luke Desforges makes similar arguments to Putnam, 
concluding that these organisations are ‘inimical to global citizenship’. For Desforges, this 
is because they are by nature professional expert bodies which are geared towards the 
‘marketing driven recruitment of support which enables the continuation of their 
organisation’.76 This depiction of international aid organisations broadly correlates with 
the notion of a professionalised and self-interested aid industry put forward by 
contemporary critics.   
 The issue of public engagement is complicated for international aid NGOs by the 
problematic relationship between their emergency relief work, and their political 
advocacy activities on the causes of underdevelopment. While the former tends to be 
characterised by simplistic appeals to the public for donations to support immediate 
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assistance, the latter explicitly aims to educate and mobilise the public in support of long-
term change in the global South. The two would therefore appear to be promoting very 
different kinds of public engagement. What this suggests is a need for sustained historical 
research into the nature of popular support for humanitarian NGOs, examined in tandem 
with the types of publicity produced by aid agencies. It is well established that simplified 
narratives and negative imagery of starving children have been a mainstay of the 
international aid sector. This raises a question whether this imagery has directly increased 
the tendency of the public to support emergency relief at the expense of development. 
This in turn would imply that declinist narratives of contemporary civic participation may 
be accurate, in relation to how the British public engages with the developing world via 
NGOs. 
 There is also a need to interrogate the forms of activism facilitated by 
humanitarian NGOs, and how this fits into a broader history of social movements. There 
is a voluminous literature which argues that a wave of ‘new social movements’ emerged 
in the 1960s, which were fundamentally different in character from those that had come 
before. This scholarship argues that increased post-war affluence and education 
precipitated a shift in the individual values of citizens, from the material concerns of 
previous movements to post-material issues such as the environment and human rights.
77
 
New social movements literature tends to privilege the 1960s as a key historical juncture 
when post-material concerns first became evident in young, affluent and educated groups 
in North America and Western Europe.
78
 However, this approach appears problematic 
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when applied to the growth of the humanitarian sector. As discussed further in chapter 
two, the 1960s was indeed an important period for aid agencies. Prominent organisations 
such as Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want took up the cause of international 
development and gradually embarked on a more overtly political path. These agencies 
also attracted support from younger and more radical activists, who pushed for their 
organisations to take up a more confrontational stance on the political causes of global 
poverty.  
 However, approaching humanitarian NGOs from a social movement perspective 
also fails to capture their complexity. Despite this influx of younger and more radical 
elements, moderate and conservative voices have always been influential within the 
sector. Many of the principal NGOs were founded and shaped by religious inspiration and 
middle-class professionals. The social movements approach also fails to account for the 
close relationship that has always existed between the sector and government. As will be 
explored further in chapter three, humanitarian NGOs have long looked to the state for 
approval and legitimacy, and worked closely with government to implement disaster 
relief. These bonds were consolidated with the creation of the DEC, paving the way for a 
closer integration of the work of the leading NGOs and the Ministry of Overseas 
Development in the 1970s. This thesis therefore takes an approach distinct to the 
sociological literature on social movements, and instead looks toward a more complex and 
nuanced analysis of the politics of activism which can account for the diversity, 
professionalism and interconnections with governance which characterises the 
humanitarian sector.  
 Furthermore, the transnational character of humanitarian NGOs provides insights 
into the relationship between Britain and the wider world. This is important, as the period 
under examination in this study also overlapped with the end of empire, and the 
32 
 
emergence of the Third World as a distinct entity. While historians have long debated the 
extent of the impact of empire on British society
79
, an impressive body of scholarship has 
argued persuasively for the prevalence of colonial legacies in the post-imperial period.
80
 
The growth of public support for NGO humanitarianism should therefore shed light on 
how engagement with the former colonial territories after decolonisation helped shape 
notions of citizenship, culture and identity within Britain itself.  
 Scholars have often presented contemporary aid agencies as heirs to colonial 
discourses of benevolence and paternalism.
81
 James Vernon states that in the post-war 
period, British humanitarian NGOs ‘neatly repackaged the old imperial conceits of the 
civilizing mission, by leading the now global war against hunger’.82 Anna Bocking-Welch 
details how, through involvement in the 1960s UN Freedom from Hunger Campaign 
(which as discussed in chapter one, influenced many NGOs to became more development-
oriented), imperial ideas of British philanthropy and trusteeship were extended after 
decolonisation, co-existing with newer discourses of humanitarian aid and development.
83
 
The enduring relevance of these colonial outlooks in contemporary Britain may, therefore, 
suggest that humanitarian philanthropy has blossomed in the void created by the collapse 
of the imperial project. Decolonisation generated considerable public anxiety and debate 
concerning the relevance of Britain in a post-imperial world, neatly captured in Dean 
Acheson's oft-quoted 1962 remark that Britain had ‘lost an empire and... not yet found a 
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role’.84 Indeed, Acheson's famous remark serves as the starting point for Brian Harrison's 
recent, comprehensive history of postwar Britain.
85
 The growth of public support for 
humanitarian aid may reflect one potential vision of this role,  repackaging what Rob 
Skinner and Alan Lester termed the colonial ‘concern for distant strangers’ for a post-
imperial age.
86
 Such a line of analysis also feeds back into broader debates about the 
nature of citizenship, civic engagement and identity in contemporary Britain. 
 
 
NGO History 
There is a broad and diverse body of literature which addresses international aid and 
development NGOs, much of which originates in the social sciences and is ahistorical in 
character. Historians have traditionally paid less attention to these actors, although 
important and original scholarship is now emerging. A number of historians have 
explored the history of the Save the Children Fund, much of which focuses on their 
activities in the interwar years.
87
 Rebecca Gill looks at the early years of the British Red 
Cross, as part of a study into the historical origins of organised British emergency relief.
88
 
Matthew Hilton has recently problematised the history of British development NGOs and 
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human rights.
89 
Hilton has also examined the British humanitarian sector as a whole, as a 
case study in a broader historical account of NGOs in Britain in the twentieth century.
90
 
There have also been authorised histories published on Oxfam and War on Want, which 
despite their limitations are very useful. Maggie Black's historical account of Oxfam's first 
fifty years is particularly impressive in its scholarly detail.
91
 This investigation adds to this 
emerging body of work. Outside of studies of specific NGOs, there is a burgeoning field 
of international history which examines the contributions of non-state actors to 
transnational movements and global governance. This thesis takes its cue from this 
scholarship, and the approach taken to NGOs in subsequent chapters is broadly inspired 
by the themes its raises.  
 Much of this literature has been influenced by the work of Akira Iriye. Iriye 
explores the historical evolution of international organisations (intergovernmental and 
non-governmental) since the nineteenth century, and how they have contributed to the 
making of the contemporary world. Iriye argues that these organisations have been the 
principal promoters of a ‘global consciousness’, an alternate global community that has 
‘tended to develop with its own momentum, on a separate level of existence from the 
international system defined by sovereign states or from the business world’.92 For Iriye, 
studying international non-state actors therefore permits a fresh perspective on 
globalisation, and a potential reconceptualisation of contemporary international history in 
non-state centric terms. These ambitions have helped stimulate a literature on international 
history and global governance which ‘sees beyond the state’ to emphasise the importance 
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of NGOs and other non-state actors.
93
 This scholarship aims to account for how, in our 
global epoch, ‘power is shifting increasingly to amorphous forces, such as environmental, 
or to communications networks, or to new, less fixed sorts of institutions, such as 
multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations’.94 
 This approach is apparent in Matthew Connelly's recent history of the global 
population control movement, which he charts from its imperial origins, to its peak in the 
1970s and 1980s. The depiction of population control as a ‘global movement’ permits 
Connolly to move beyond monolithic geopolitics. Instead, Connelly examine how a wide 
range of actors interacted in complex ways, yet produced a discernible direction and 
momentum. As Connelly summarises: 
 ‘Scientists and activists organized across borders to press for common norms of 
 reproductive behaviour. International and nongovernmental organizations spearheaded 
 a worldwide campaign to reduce fertility. Together they created a new kind of global 
 governance, in which proponents tried to control the population of the world without 
 having to answer to anyone in particular.’
95
 
 
For Connelly, this represents a new phase in international history, as ‘a transnational 
network of population experts took up where empires left off’.96 Connelly's account 
therefore moves away from viewing the twentieth century through the ideological prism 
of the Cold War. Instead it brings to the fore questions about governance, the 
consequences of expertise, and the web of interactions between the modern technocratic 
state, its intergovernmental equivalents, and non-state actors. These questions could 
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conceivably be applied to a wide variety of case studies; Connelly himself concludes that 
his investigation into population control can be adapted to other transnational networks: 
 ‘The world is now full of transnational movements responding to a range of different 
 ‘crises’  including epidemic disease, refugee flows, and climate change. Many see global 
 governance as the hope of the future. It appears to be a welcome alternative to the 
 sovereign state at a time in which the most important problems cannot be contained 
 by national borders’.
97
 
 
Matthew Hilton's history of the global consumer movement adopts a similar approach, 
charting its expansion in the post-1945 period. Hilton argues that consumer activism was 
not confined to affluent capitalist society, but was instead a global phenomenon, as 
activists emerged across the global South in the 1960s and 1970s. Like Connelly, Hilton 
depicts a global alliance of NGOs and non-state actors, interacting to influence and shape 
governance at the international level. Indeed, Hilton argues that the consumer movement 
played a crucial role in pioneering these transnational networks, through famous and 
influential campaigns such as those targeting the sale of infant formula in the developing 
world.
98
 Through a focus on the advocacy activities of the movement, such as in its 
relations with the UN, Hilton also raises questions of expertise and governance in a 
similar vein to Connelly.  
 Peter Gatrell's recent study of the 1959-60 World Refugee Year (WRY) campaign 
is also framed in a similar manner, examining how WRY was the product of interactions 
between the UN, national governments and NGOs in conceptualising and addressing 
displaced populations around the world. Gatrell's focus is the ‘national and transnational 
networks that were created to meet the perceived needs of refugees, and how refugees in 
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turn engaged with external agencies’.99 For Gatrell, WRY was also associated with the 
consolidation and extension of the NGO sector, as ‘the number of NGOs has since 
multiplied enormously and their universe has changed out of all recognition’.100  
 What such work reflects is the emergence of a literature inspired by Foucauldian 
notions of governmentality, which presents a broader analytical approach to NGOs. The 
big themes raised in this literature, such as advocacy, expertise, governance, and techno-
politics, can be all be directly applied to a case study of the humanitarian NGO sector. 
What they would indicate is a need to capture not only the growth of aid agencies, but also 
their professionalisation, their complex interactions with the state, and their contribution 
to shaping and promoting new forms of humanitarian governance. As an approach, this is 
also quite distinctive from accounts which cast NGOs as bottom-up social movements. 
 The major distinction between this thesis, and the international literature discussed 
here, is that it focuses on a specific national NGO sector, rather than a transnational 
movement (although in practice humanitarian NGOs are self-evidently transnational 
actors). It therefore looks to apply these themes and questions within a national context. A 
similar approach can be seen in James Vernon's modern history of hunger. Vernon charts 
how conceptualisations of hunger in Britain evolved over time as a result of the 
interactions within a diffuse network of experts, humanitarians, philanthropists and 
scientists, who worked to construct and shape modern social democracy. Vernon thus 
avoids a clean narrative of the state directing food policy from above, and points to 
multiple sites of governance and power in modern Britain.
101
 As historians increasingly 
acknowledge the important contributions of non-state actors in making contemporary 
Britain, more studies like these can be expected to emerge. 
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The Historical Origins of Modern Humanitarian NGOs 
This thesis charts the history of the British humanitarian NGO sector, between 1942 and 
1985. While this represents an important period for non-state humanitarianism, NGOs 
have a much longer lineage than the 1940s. What follows therefore is a brief historical 
overview of the origins and emergence of humanitarian organisations, up to the period 
focused upon in this study. While the term ‘NGO’ is itself a product of the 1940s and the 
United Nations
102
, the antecedents of modern aid agencies can be traced back much 
further. 
 The emergence of the humanitarian concern for distant strangers is usually located 
in the late eighteenth century. This was a crucial period for the emergence of modern 
transnational organisations more generally, driven by the impact of Enlightenment 
thought, the societal transformations brought about by industrialisation, and the spread of 
empire overseas.
103
 These forces stimulated humanitarian notions of compassion, while 
also making people more aware of their presence in ‘a new global assemblage of 
empire’.104 In this context, the forerunners to modern aid agencies were the missionary 
societies that operated in the imperial territories, reflecting a migration of evangelicals 
from industrial cities to colonial outposts.  
 While these organisations aimed to evangelise native populations, they also 
engaged in practical work aimed at improving the living standards of the communities in 
which they operated, such as through the construction of schools. In Britain, some of the 
earliest of these groups were the London Missionary Society (founded in 1795) and the 
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Church Missionary Society (founded in 1799). British Quakers established the Friends 
Foreign Missionary Association in 1868, which worked at improving schools and 
hospitals across Africa and Asia.
105
 Missionaries and Quakers were also key actors in the 
development of the anti-slavery movement in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, which has been presented in some accounts as the beginning of modern British 
humanitarian thought and action.
106
 
 These organisations tended to be entangled with the practices and discourses of 
colonial governance.
107
 As Michael Barnett argues, while early humanitarianism 
contained discourses of equality, it also promoted discourses of ‘Christianity, colonialism 
and commerce’. These were paternalistic in nature, as indigenous populations were 
considered to be primitive and backwards in relation to the civilised colonisers. 
Humanitarianism was therefore coloured from the outset by colonial notions of the 
‘civilising mission’, and early humanitarian organisations operated within the parameters 
of the imperial state.
108
 For instance, Harald Fischer-Tiné documents how the Salvation 
Army's early development activities in India worked to reinforce British colonial rule, as it 
increasingly took on subcontracting work for the imperial authorities.
109
 
 As the nineteenth century progressed, emergency humanitarianism became more 
prominent, as new organisations appeared following the founding of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1859. Famously created by Henry Dunant in 
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response to suffering he witnessed at the Battle of Solferino, the ICRC aimed to save lives 
and provide neutral care for wounded soldiers. The Red Cross's founding principles of 
impartiality, independence and neutrality would later gain widespread acceptance as the 
core principles of international humanitarianism as a whole. The creation of the ICRC also 
led to various national Red Cross societies being set up, expanding the emerging Red 
Cross movement.
110
 The British Red Cross originated as the British National Society for 
Aid to the Sick and Wounded, founded in 1870 in response to the Franco-Prussian War 
and under the patronage of Queen Victoria. British surgeons and nurses from the Society 
served in both the French and German armies during the conflict.
111
 It later adopted the 
Red Cross emblem and became the British Red Cross in 1905, receiving a royal charter in 
1908.
112
 British Quakers also established the Friends War Victims Relief Committee in 
1870, to provide relief for those affected by conflict in Europe.
113
 
 In the early twentieth century, the First World War and subsequent creation of the 
League of Nations acted as significant drivers for the further growth of humanitarian 
organisations. Bruno Cabanes argues that the outbreak of the First World War led to 
significant changes in international humanitarian action, as relief work became more 
secular and organised around transnational networks of experts, such as physicians, 
engineers, and social workers. Humanitarian action on the ground was professionalised as 
a result.
114
 The war gave rise to a renewed sense of internationalism, and a new generation 
of international NGOs larger in scale and more geared for practical action than their 
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predecessors. For instance, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies was founded in 1919 as the League of Red Cross Societies. The Federation was 
intended to bring together the existing national Red Cross entities, and promote the 
creation of new branches across the globe.
115
 The Federation also prompted an expansion 
of the activities of the Red Cross movement, beyond strictly wartime assistance to include 
public health and disaster relief.
116
  
 In Britain, the Save the Children Fund (SCF) was founded in 1919 by sisters 
Eglantyne Jebb and Dorothy Buxton, to provide aid to civilians suffering as a result of the 
Allied blockade of Germany. SCF quickly established itself as a leading humanitarian 
agency in Britain, a position it still maintains almost a century later. Save the Children's 
success was largely the result of its innovative and professionalised fundraising style, 
which utilised graphic images of suffering children to capture the attention of the public, 
and maximise the impact of its humanitarian rhetoric. However, the Fund's publicity also 
worked to obscure the radical internationalism of SCF's founders, who had intended the 
provision of humanitarian aid to children to be an act of civil diplomacy which would 
rebuild the bonds between European nations broken by war.
117
 Instead, SCF's publicity 
fostered a one-sided relationship between the Fund and its supporters, presenting children 
as universal figures who lacked any distinct national or political context. The success of 
SCF embedded this publicity style within the British humanitarian sector, and many 
modern NGOs would later adopt similar fundraising techniques.
118
 
 The emergence of Save the Children reflected both changes and continuities in the 
character of early twentieth century humanitarianism. SCF promoted itself as non-political 
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and impartial, which would become increasingly important characteristics of modern 
NGOs. In doing so, Save the Children was able to make potentially controversial appeals 
for former enemies and communist nations in a politically neutral way. Helen McCarthy 
has also argued that the designation of being ‘non-party’ or ‘non-political’ was a broader 
characteristic of pressure groups in the interwar period. For McCarthy, this reflected a 
wider response to the destabilising effects of class conflict and ideological struggle.
119
  
 SCF was also an explicitly secular organisation, appealing to universalist 
discourses of ‘humanity’ rather than religious inspiration. In this regard, SCF represented 
a departure from the humanitarian missionaries of the nineteenth century. However, SCF 
also actively promoted imperial discourses of British superiority and trusteeship, as the 
Fund's appeals deliberately linked humanitarian assistance with colonial traditions.
120
 
Emily Baughan argues that SCF was engaged in a broader project of reimagining the 
empire during the interwar period, which emphasised imperial morality and benevolence 
as a way to cast Britain as an ‘inherently international power’.121 The early years of SCF 
thus also demonstrate how internationalism and imperialism have not been mutually 
incompatible discourses in modern British humanitarianism.
122
 
 During the 1920s, the development of international NGOs was further stimulated 
by the League of Nations. The League apparatus offered substantial opportunities for the 
participation of NGOs in a diverse range of fields, including humanitarian assistance. For 
instance, the Red Cross movement worked closely with the League of Nations High 
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Commissioner for Refugees to respond to famine in Russia in the early 1920s, in which 
the Save the Children Fund was also involved.
123
 Collaboration between the League of 
Nations and NGOs during this period also reflected an increasing legitimacy of non-
governmental experts in international forums and global governance in the twentieth 
century.
124
 
 While the geopolitical tensions of the 1930s constrained the development of 
transnational civil society, the Second World War acted as a further catalyst for the 
growth of humanitarian NGOs. Many principal contemporary aid agencies were founded 
during this period in response to the conflict, including Christian Aid and Oxfam in 
Britain.
125
 The 1940s relief efforts have been widely depicted as representing a 
fundamental transformation in humanitarian action. This shift is generally attributed to the 
sheer scale of the operations, and the assumption of authority for co-ordinating 
humanitarian aid by Allied armies and governments.
126
 This new involvement of official 
actors reflected a broader enthusiasm for state planning which characterised the period, as 
well as a shared viewpoint by Allied planners that the humanitarian consequences of the 
conflict would have to be addressed before the post-war era could be inaugurated.
127
 
Gerard Daniel Cohen argues that the massive intergovernmental relief and rehabilitation 
programme undertaken in the 1940s resulted in the end of ‘the charitable phase of modern 
humanitarianism’, as a more integrated and official system of humanitarian governance 
took shape.
128
 In Britain, state intervention also resulted in a new level of co-ordination 
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within the NGO sector, as the government intentionally sought to mesh the leading 
international aid agencies with their own plans for post-war relief from 1942 onwards.
129
 
It is this moment which this thesis takes as its starting point, as the humanitarian sector 
was reshaped and set to be enrolled into a new era of professionalised, co-ordinated 
emergency relief. 
 
 
Sources and Methodology 
This thesis examines the British humanitarian NGO sector and emergency relief, over the 
period 1942-85. It focuses upon the largest and most influential humanitarian NGOs of the 
period, all of whom were members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC). The 
DEC was created in 1963 by the ‘big five’ organisations who had come to form the 
nucleus of the sector; these were the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the 
Children, and War on Want. The only change to DEC membership that took place during 
this period was the admission of the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 
(CAFOD) in 1973, and the exit of War on Want in 1979, ostensibly to focus solely on 
long-term development. The DEC members represent the central focus of this study, both 
individually, and as a collective. Particular attention is paid to the quartet of Christian Aid, 
Oxfam, Save the Children, and War on Want. This is in part a pragmatic choice, reflecting 
the availability of archival sources. Focusing upon these organisations also illuminates the 
complex relationship between humanitarian aid and political advocacy. All four NGOs 
engaged with the politics of long-term development from the early 1960s onwards, but 
with varying levels of enthusiasm - from the overtly radical War on Want, to the more 
conservative SCF. Given the large number of organisations active in the British 
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humanitarian industry today, it may appear restrictive to focus on this particular grouping 
of agencies. However, it will be shown that in practice the DEC members dominated the 
sector throughout the period in question, and used their access to television to sustain 
what amounted to a humanitarian oligarchy in Britain.  
 The DEC mechanism itself is also a key focus of this study. As the Committee was 
designed to co-ordinate the major disaster appeals of its members, it enjoyed unique 
arrangements with the television broadcasting authorities (especially the BBC). The DEC 
therefore provides a way in to assess the relationship between the NGOs and the media, as 
well as the NGOs and the public (through exploring the characteristics of DEC publicity). 
The inter-agency discussions that took place within the DEC also provide insights into the 
internal politics of the sector and the nature of NGO co-ordination. 
 This study draws upon substantial primary research, the majority of which was 
conducted in the archives of specific NGOs (Christian Aid, Save the Children, and War on 
Want).
130
 Many of these sources have only been made publicly available recently, and are 
largely untapped by historians. There are methodological issues associated with such 
archives, as they tend to be smaller in scale and less comprehensive than the state 
resources which historians has traditionally drawn upon. The thoroughness of NGO 
archives can vary greatly, correlating with the nature and size of specific organisations. 
For instance, the archives of War on Want are relatively disorganised in comparison to 
other agencies, which is perhaps a reflection of the organisation's volatile history. 
Furthermore, there has been no research undertaken for this study in the archives of 
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Oxfam, which have been closed off to researchers for a number of years.
131
 However, the 
organisation's published material has been drawn upon when relevant. Save the Children 
has a substantial archive, although it does not currently permit researchers to view post-
1972 material. For both Oxfam and Save the Children, these limitations are somewhat 
mitigated by the long-standing dissemination of correspondence, information and 
publications between NGOs, which leads to significant material from each organisation 
being found in the archives of others. All of these organisations were also involved in any 
discussions or exchanges which took place within the DEC, captured in Committee 
minutes and records compiled from a number of archives. 
 These archives are supplemented with state and media sources. Substantial 
research has been undertaken in The National Archives (TNA). These largely relate to the 
government's response to specific humanitarian crises, the evolution of official relief and 
development policy, and the relations between the state and NGOs. Indeed, aid agencies 
feature prominently in these official sources, in direct correspondence with officials, as 
well as in copies of NGO reports and minutes retained in government files. These sources 
are an essential aspect of this investigation, providing a more comprehensive picture of 
British humanitarianism and the role played by the state. Finally, extensive use is also 
made of written and visual sources from the archives of the television broadcasting 
authorities (the BBC and the ITA/IBA). These sources largely relate to the DEC and 
broadcast emergency appeals policy, and are essential to understanding the relationship 
between the NGOs and the media. A number of sources also relate to specific 
programmes and news reports of disasters which sparked major humanitarian responses. 
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These media sources are further supplemented by a diverse range of press articles and 
images from throughout the period. 
 
 
Thesis Outline 
This study charts the growth of the humanitarian NGO sector and emergence of a disaster 
relief industry in Britain in the decades after the Second World War. Chapter one begins 
by focusing upon the period between the start of NGO co-ordination during the Second 
World War in 1942, and the creation of the Disasters Emergency Committee in 1963. It 
shows that the DEC was the culmination of two decades of co-operation between NGOs 
in the field of emergency relief, which was apolitical and military-driven in character. 
However, the DEC was created at a time when the majority of its members were 
beginning to look beyond this approach, to a more expansive vision of addressing the root 
causes of global hunger and suffering. The stimulus for this was the involvement of NGOs 
in UN-led initiatives in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This enrolled aid agencies into a 
new era of development, while also fuelling their growth and inaugurating a new phase of 
more competitive and professionalised fundraising. The creation of the DEC therefore 
pointed to a problematic relationship between charitable relief and long-term 
development, and should be viewed as a reaction to the growing power of television, and 
competition between insecure NGOs for publicity and resources. 
 Setting up the DEC provided its members with an exclusive level of access to 
television for voluntary organisations. As chapter two explores, they were therefore well 
positioned for the events of the following decade, as a series of high-profile Third World 
disasters captured the public imagination and fuelled a rapid expansion of the sector. 
However, this expansion also overlapped with the increasing commitment of a number of 
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agencies to long-term development, in particular the trio of Christian Aid, Oxfam, and 
War on Want. Taking up the cause of development motivated these organisations to 
engage in domestic campaigning and awareness-raising activities, which became more 
overtly political as the decade progressed. This chapter argues that, despite this increasing 
political focus, NGOs were consistently brought back to simplistic charitable relief as a 
result of the media, public opinion, and the decisions taken by the sector as a whole. The 
DEC played a crucial part in this, as it reinforced a popular depiction of its members as 
apolitical relief actors, while internally the nature and make-up of the Committee acted as 
a significant restraint on the sector's broader politicisation. This depoliticising role of the 
DEC is examined at length through three in-depth case studies of major emergencies in 
the period between 1968 and 1973; namely the Nigerian Civil War, the East Pakistan 
Crisis, and famine in Ethiopia and the Sahel. 
 These first two chapters present a bottom-up perspective of the growth of NGOs. 
Chapter three complements these with a top-down study of the relationship between the 
British state and the humanitarian sector during the same chronological period (1942-74). 
It is shown that the government attached relatively little importance to emergency relief 
until the 1960s, when public support for humanitarian aid grew quickly as a result of 
media coverage, decolonisation, and the public activities of NGOs. These same trends 
drove the rise of the humanitarian sector, and as the leading NGOs grew they also 
increased their legitimacy in the eyes of the state. A series of major disasters in Nigeria, 
East Pakistan and the Sahel in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to soaring official relief 
expenditure, while also bringing about closer partnership between the government and the 
DEC members. By 1973, the government accepted increased responsibilities for providing 
humanitarian aid, and initiated an overhaul of its relief machinery. This resulted in the 
creation of a specialist Disaster Unit within the Ministry of Overseas Development, to 
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spearhead a more comprehensive and effective humanitarian response. Crucially, the 
Disaster Unit also implemented closer integration with the NGO sector, using the DEC as 
the vehicle. The success of the DEC therefore contributed to the state forging a closer 
relationship with the NGO sector as a whole. 
 Chapter four examines the continuation and further development of these trends, in 
the decade following the creation of the Disaster Unit. This period witnessed a further 
politicisation of development NGOs, who articulated an increasingly distinct and radical 
advocacy agenda. This also corresponded with the emergence of a critique of 
humanitarian aid from within the development community. However, it is shown that the 
leading NGOs still continued to be drawn away from advocacy and back to more 
simplistic emergency assistance. NGOs extended their capacities for disaster relief, aided 
by advances in media technologies and increasing public support. Crucially, the British 
government also worked to co-opt the sector, using the Disaster Unit to build up a wider 
infrastructure for relief around the DEC. This effectively enmeshed the Committee 
members as instruments for the delivery of humanitarian aid within an integrative and 
technocratic disaster relief industry. The state also politically contained the sector through 
the interventions of the Charity Commissioners. The political activities of the DEC 
members were also undermined by the active interventions of the television broadcasters, 
who policed the boundaries of the sector and strongly resisted any attempts by the DEC to 
broaden out its mandate. While these powerful forces all worked to contain the sector, it is 
also argued that the leading NGOs themselves exacerbated these trends through their own 
deliberate decision-making. In an increasingly competitive humanitarian industry, aid 
agencies repeatedly returned to simplistic disaster fundraising as a way to maintain public 
support and drive institutional growth. 
50 
 
 Chapter five sets out how all of these trends culminated in the humanitarian 
response to a severe famine in Ethiopia in 1984-85. Ethiopia has been widely depicted as 
an epochal event in the history of non-state humanitarianism. The massive public reaction 
to media images of African famine in late 1984 is often seen as giving rise to the 
contemporary professionalised aid industry. This chapter locates Ethiopia within a longer 
history of NGOs and emergency relief, arguing instead that the response to the famine, 
including the iconic Band Aid phenomenon, was as much a continuation of prior trends as 
it was a break. Furthermore, the simplistic apolitical humanitarianism promoted by Band 
Aid generated massive popular support, but it also worked to further undermine the 
politicising trends within the NGO sector. Band Aid therefore represented a step 
backwards for the development community. However, the DEC members once again 
exacerbated these issues through their deliberate decisions, as the sector became more and 
more dominated by inter-agency rivalries, material incentives, and competition for 
publicity. 
 By tracing the trajectory of humanitarian NGOs over this period, these chapters 
highlight and problematise a paradox that increasingly took root within the sector, 
between high-profile charitable relief and long-term development advocacy. A final 
concluding chapter summarises these findings, and what they demonstrate about the 
nature of non-state humanitarianism. This chapter also sets out how this history 
contributes to understanding changing patterns of activism, engagement and participation 
in contemporary Britain. 
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Chapter One 
The Emergence of a Disaster Lobby, 1942-1963 
 
In December 1963, the five largest humanitarian organisations in Britain came together to 
form the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC). Comprised of the British Red Cross, 
Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and War on Want, the DEC was intended to 
provide a ‘co-ordinating machinery’ for how these NGOs responded to major disasters 
overseas.
1
 Acting as an independent Standing Committee, the DEC met after large-scale 
emergencies to pool information and discuss planned responses. Crucially, the DEC could 
also initiate joint appeals to the public through television, for donations to support relief 
efforts. The formation of the Committee was presented by those involved as a pragmatic 
and rational step, to pool resources, share knowledge, and streamline the appeal-making 
process. The DEC continues to present itself in a similar fashion today.
2
 
 In practice the creation of the DEC was more complex and problematic, and 
reflected a number of longer-term trends and competing trajectories within the 
humanitarian sector. This chapter unpacks and explores these developments, setting out a 
longer history of British NGOs and disaster relief in the period between the Second World 
War, and the creation of the Committee in 1963. It is argued that the DEC represented the 
culmination of two decades of co-ordination between NGOs in providing apolitical 
emergency assistance, which the Committee consolidated and institutionalised.  However, 
it did so at a time when this approach was beginning to be challenged by a more 
                                                             
1 In January 1964 Lord Astor, Chairman of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to 
Refugees, referred to these organisations as ‘the big five which constituted the backbone of the refugee 
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CHAR 11/193: ‘Note on meeting with Lord Astor on 29th January 1964’, 3 February 1964. 
2 For more on the contemporary DEC, see: http://www.dec.org.uk/ [accessed 31 March 2014]. For a useful, 
if somewhat limited overview of the Committee, see: Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp.42-49. 
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expansive vision of international aid. Involvement in long-term development in the early 
1960s influenced a number of principal NGOs to look beyond charitable relief, to also 
tackling the structural forces which created and perpetuated global hunger and poverty. 
The DEC therefore highlighted a nascent tension within the sector, between traditional 
humanitarian assistance and long-term development. It is therefore suggested that the 
Committee's creation should be interpreted more as a response to competition between aid 
agencies for resources and publicity, and the growing power of television to influence the 
public. 
 To articulate this argument, this chapter is structured into four distinct sections. 
Firstly, it is shown that the experience of the Second World War also brought about 
fundamental changes within the humanitarian sector. The linking together of the largest 
British relief bodies in 1942, largely at the behest of the British government, established a 
new precedent for planned, co-ordinated humanitarian responses. The War also enrolled 
aid agencies into a new era of expert-driven and professionalised relief, in which 
governments and intergovernmental agencies assumed responsibilities for the regulation 
of humanitarian aid. The 1940s also gave rise to a new generation of NGOs, which 
included the organisations that would become Christian Aid and Oxfam. While 
humanitarian NGOs differed slightly in their characteristics and approach, at this time 
they were all geared towards the provision of short-term emergency assistance, mainly to 
refugees displaced by conflict.  
 It is then shown how the sector continued to co-operate and develop after the move 
into peace-time. British NGOs gradually moved into new theatres of war and disaster both 
within and outside of Europe during the 1950s, often following a lead being set by 
governments and intergovernmental bodies. Making popular appeals for funding to 
support this work fuelled a period of sustained growth, as the public responded generously 
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to media reports of distant suffering. As aid agencies generated larger incomes, they also 
gradually professionalised their organisational structures and practices. By the late 1950s, 
a collective approach to organised, overtly apolitical emergency relief was well 
established within the NGO sector.  
 However, as the 1950s drew to a close this form of assistance began to be 
overshadowed by newer types of organisation. Major transnational humanitarian 
campaigns brought British NGOs closer together with other non-state actors, government, 
and intergovernmental bodies. In particular, the launch of the UN World Refugee Year in 
1959, closely followed by the UN Freedom from Hunger Campaign in 1960, spurred the 
growth of NGOs while also enrolling them into a new era of international development 
spearheaded by the UN. The third section examines this crucial period, and how it acted 
as a catalyst for a number of principal aid agencies to shift their focus from immediate 
charitable relief to long-term development. In taking up the cause of international 
development, these NGOs also tentatively began to enter the political arena. Having 
traditionally only ameliorated the visible effects of global poverty, development agencies 
now explored ways to address its more complex root causes.  
 While this suggested a substantial change in direction for the NGO sector, it did 
not spell the end of aid agencies responding to overseas disasters. Indeed, the formation of 
the DEC indicates how this branch of their work continued to grow in the early 1960s. 
The fourth section addresses this further expansion of the disaster relief business in the 
early 1960s, leading up to the formation of the DEC in late 1963. Involvement in World 
Refugee Year and the Freedom from Hunger Campaign brought the leading NGOs 
together, but it also accentuated competition between them for income and publicity. The 
early 1960s therefore witnessed a new era of more intensive and professionalised 
humanitarian fundraising. In this context, high-profile disasters consistently brought 
54 
 
NGOs back to short-term crisis management, as public donations for relief work fuelled 
rapid institutional growth. The rise of television as a medium reinforced this trend, 
enabling new levels of fundraising while exacerbating rivalry within the sector. It was in 
this context that the DEC was created, as a means to dampen competition and harness the 
new power of television to influence the public. 
 The form of inter-agency co-ordination implemented by the DEC reflected a 
longer lineage of depoliticised relief established during the 1940s. It also appeared out of 
step with the broader direction of a number of aid agencies towards long-term 
development in the global South. The DEC paved the way for a rapid expansion of the 
British humanitarian industry, and many of the themes discussed throughout this thesis (in 
particular the problematisation of the relationship between NGOs, disasters and the 
media) can be detected and unpicked very early on in the history of the modern 
humanitarian sector. The DEC also reinforced a growing contradiction within British 
humanitarianism, between short-term relief and new forms of political action on the 
causes of global underdevelopment and suffering. 
 
 
The Second World War 
The Second World War has been widely understood as a period of fundamental change in 
international humanitarianism. Michael Barnett argues that the conflict inaugurated a new 
age of ‘neo-humanitarianism’, characterised by Cold War, nationalism, development and 
sovereignty. For Barnett, this age is demarcated from the prior phase of imperial 
humanitarianism, characterised by colonialism, commerce, and the ‘civilising mission’.3 
This shift is commonly attributed to governments assuming responsibility for regulating 
                                                             
3 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2011). 
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humanitarian aid, as part of a broader drive towards increased state planning in the post-
war order. Enthusiasm for intervention motivated Washington and London to begin post-
conflict planning as early as 1941, with relief work acquiring a distinct urgency.
4
 This was 
in contrast to humanitarian efforts in Europe during the First World War, which were 
generally implemented by individual voluntary organisations with the assistance of local 
institutions. While this relief work received a certain degree of financial support from 
governments, it was largely unorganised and suffered from a lack of effective 
international co-ordination.
5
 
 In Britain, state intervention also prompted a new level of co-ordination within the 
NGO sector. This began in mid-1942, as officials from the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
sought to mesh the leading, internationally-affiliated voluntary agencies with their own 
plans for post-war relief. This led to the Council of Voluntary Societies for the Relief of 
Suffering and for Aiding Social Recovery being established in June 1942, later renamed 
the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSRA). COBSRA was a 
consultative committee designed to facilitate closer co-ordination between aid agencies 
and the state, and a total of 40 British humanitarian organisations joined the Committee. 
11 of these eventually despatched their own teams of relief workers to continental Europe, 
and collectively these bodies were the principal organisations in the humanitarian sector at 
this time (table 1.1).
6
 An official from the Ministry of Food was appointed Chairman (Sir 
William Goode), reflecting a degree of governmental control over the Council.
7
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6 Mary Kinnear, Woman of the World: Mary McGeachy and International Cooperation (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 2004), pp.111-112; Steinert, ‘British Humanitarian Assistance’, pp.423-425. 
7 SCFA: Box A1214: ‘The 192nd Meeting of The Council’, 21 January 1943: Report of post-war committee 
(C.2803.). 
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The British Red Cross Society and Order of 
St John of Jerusalem 
The Friends Relief Service 
The Friends Ambulance Unit The Young Women’s Christian Association 
The Save the Children Fund The Salvation Army 
The Catholic Committee for Relief Abroad The Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad 
The International Voluntary Service for 
Peace 
The Boy Scouts Association 
The Guide International Service  
Table 1.1: Operational members of COBSRA.
8
 
 
Following formation, the Council was informed that all ‘all immediate relief work would 
be administered by the Army... there would be no possibility of civilian relief work being 
done within the near future’.9 Furthermore, all large appeals to the public were to be 
banned, on the grounds that such appeals could provide information to belligerent nations. 
The Council members accepted government oversight and agreed to undertake no 
overseas relief work without official permission
10
, with the Army to act as ‘final 
authority’ in the pre-armistice period.11 COBSRA subsequently established a panel of 
experts to survey overseas relief requirements and make recommendations to the War 
Office. This working party was comprised of an even mix of government officials and 
senior staff from the COBSRA agencies, and served to join up the voluntary societies and 
                                                             
8 Steinert, ‘British Humanitarian Assistance’, pp.423-424. 
9 SCFA: Box A1214: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 192nd Meeting of The Council’, 21 January 1943: 
Report of post-war committee (C.2803.). 
10 SCFA: Box A419: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 65th Meeting of the Executive Committee’, 6 January 
1943: Post-war committee (E.924.). 
11 SCFA: Box A419: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 66th Meeting of the Executive Committee’, 3 February 
1943: Abyssinia (E.932.). 
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relevant government departments.
12
 This involvement in COBSRA set a new precedent 
for co-ordination between the NGOs involved. Indeed, this period witnessed a 
transformation of voluntary action within the humanitarian sector, as working under 
government and military authority encouraged a degree of professionalisation, while also 
drawing aid agencies into an emerging, more intricate system of humanitarian 
governance. 
 COBSRA's close links with government also ensured its members would receive a 
prominent role in working alongside the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), the international relief agency mandated to coordinate aid 
efforts in liberated Europe. Established in 1943, the UNRRA was to have overall control 
of relief in liberated countries after the military administrations were withdrawn, and the 
government communicated to COBSRA that ‘British organisations... represented on the 
Council would have the best claim to official approval’.13 For its part, COBSRA 
emphasised its recognition of ‘the necessity of unified operational control’ for relief, and 
throughout 1944 agencies such as Save the Children began deploying teams into the field 
to work under UNRRA control.
14
 The relationship between UNRRA and national NGOs 
was not without tension, as aid agencies expressed concerns that they would be ‘absorbed 
in the UNRRA machine’.15 COBSRA members were also anxious to enter the field and 
became frustrated by the long delays in moving aid workers from the UNRRA training 
camps in the Middle East to the liberated countries.
16
 These tensions largely subsided after 
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April 1945, and UNRRA increasingly enlisted the co-operation of voluntary bodies, with 
Save the Children one of those content to confine its work to UNRRA commissioned 
areas.
17
 
 Gerard Daniel Cohen has argued that the scale and character of the UNRRA 
operation constituted a new phase in humanitarian action. Subordination to UNRRA 
authority deterred voluntary agencies from favouring a particular national or religious 
group, encouraging an ‘increased secularisation of relief work’.18 While UNRRA itself 
was short-lived, falling victim to Cold War concerns in 1947, the organisation's approach 
to humanitarianism strongly influenced the emergence of NGOs. UNRRA emphasised the 
importance of planning and professional expertise, and the organisation's field workers 
tended to be staunch internationalists dedicated to modern welfare techniques.
19
 Voluntary 
organisations worked closely with UNRRA, emulating their methods and taking up a 
more professionalised approach to relief work. The UNRRA therefore arguably signalled 
‘the end of the charitable phase of modern humanitarianism’.20 In the process, NGOs were 
also incorporated into a nascent international aid regime. The COBSRA members were 
willing partners in this new era of technocratic, depoliticised relief, and worked 
prominently alongside the UNRRA throughout its existence. 
 The organisations that would become Oxfam and Christian Aid were also founded 
during this period, in response to the conflict. Oxfam began life as the Oxford Committee 
for Famine Relief, as part of a larger national Famine Relief Committee created in 1942, 
which lobbied the British government to provide famine relief to Nazi-occupied Greece. 
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The Oxford Committee was one of many local bodies which sprung up as part of this 
network, being founded in October 1942 by a group of Quaker-inspired individuals. Early 
activities of the Oxford Committee focused upon what Maggie Black terms ‘modest 
lobbying’ of the government to provide assistance to Greece, which achieved little 
tangible results. The Committee was galvanised in 1943 by the membership of Cecil 
Jackson-Cole, a local philanthropist who pioneered a business-like approach to 
fundraising. It was at Jackson-Cole's initiative that the Committee formally registered as a 
charity in 1943, and began making repeated appeals for funds to the public. The Oxford 
Committee proved to be one of the most successful local Famine Committees, raising 
£12,700 in its first campaign.
21
 
 From the outset the Oxford Committee was influenced by a Quaker internationalist 
tradition, which emphasised principles of humanitarian neutrality and impartial aid.
22
 It 
was not a member of COBSRA, which reflected its small, amateur, non-operational status. 
Indeed, there was a clear contrast between COBSRA agencies and the national Famine 
Relief network. COBSRA deferred to official authority and refused to pressurise 
policymakers over aid to Greece, simply stating that ‘the question of sending food had to 
be considered by the Allied Governments’. Save the Children justified its decision not to 
‘agitate politically’ on the grounds that ‘the present position in regard to relief was 
different from that when the Fund came into being, which was after the cessation of 
hostilities’.23 COBSRA similarly declined to participate in left-wing publisher Victor 
Gollancz's ‘Save Europe Now’ campaign, launched in 1945 to pressurise the British 
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government into addressing the refugee crisis in Germany.
24
 Instead, the COSBRA 
members deemed the campaign to be too ‘political’.25 However, in practice the Oxford 
Committee also shared characteristics with the COBSRA approach, as it moved away 
from lobbying to focus more on fundraising for emergency aid. This funding was 
channelled through the Friends Relief Service (FRS), the official relief arm of the British 
Quakers and an operational member of COBSRA. The FRS provided a machinery for 
deploying Quaker aid and relief workers into the field to work alongside the UNRRA and 
other voluntary organisations.
26
 The approach of the Oxford Committee was affirmed by 
its continued operation after the national Famine Relief Committee had wound itself down 
in 1945, enlarging its charitable objectives to the ‘relief of suffering in consequence of the 
war’.27 
 Christian Aid was also formed in response to war, beginning life as Christian 
Reconstruction in Europe (CRE) in 1944, a department of the British Council of Churches 
(BCC).
28
 From the outset, CRE worked under the direction of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) in Geneva, an international inter-church organisation founded in 1948 
which arose out of the ecumenical movement. Christian Reconstruction in Europe defined 
its objective as ‘the provision of help to European Churches and Christian institutions 
which have suffered through the war’. For CRE, relief work was deeply connected with 
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ecumenical mission.
29
 Working through the WCC also established a pattern for 
humanitarian assistance which has largely persisted within the organisation ever since. 
Like Oxfam, CRE lacked the size, prestige or resources to participate directly in 
COBSRA. CRE instead functioned by making appeals to the British Churches, and 
channelling the funds these raised into the WCC's European relief programme. However, 
the organisation also pursued a similar apolitical, emergency-oriented approach. Working 
through the World Council of Churches also served to associate the organisation with the 
UNRRA relief efforts. Despite its orientation towards aiding Church institutions, the 
WCC recognised the authority of the UNRRA, stating in 1944 that ‘it will be impossible 
to carry on any reconstruction work in the needy countries without the consent of the 
responsible authorities’.30 What this all pointed to was the dominance of a particular 
approach to humanitarianism within the emerging modern NGO sector, geared towards 
war and the provision of apolitical relief. Emphasising planned co-ordination and 
logistical efficiency, this approach endured after the post-war relief efforts in Europe had 
peaked, and the NGO sector stood ready to co-ordinate again in times of emergency. 
 
 
The Globalisation of Relief 
1948 marked a watershed in post-war relief, as Europe's recovery moved from emergency 
aid to reconstruction. The winding down of the UNRRA after 1947 led to relief being 
brought firmly under American control, and the subsequent launch of the Marshall Plan 
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financed governments to rebuild infrastructure and industry across the continent.
31
 The 
move into peacetime also effected the NGO sector. Although relief needs in Europe 
persisted well into the 1950s, especially in relation to displaced persons in Germany and 
across the continent, aid agencies began seeking to expand further into the global South. 
As established bodies and the leaders in their field, this transition came naturally to the 
British Red Cross and Save the Children, who remained committed to a form of 
emergency humanitarianism coloured by wartime. Indeed, Save the Children came to be 
shaped by a military ethos in the early post-war period, extensively recruiting former 
military and colonial personnel and consolidating itself as part of the establishment. This 
included securing the Queen as the organisation's patron in 1952.
32
 
 Many of the British bodies which had sprung up during the war elected to wind 
themselves down (including COBSRA in 1950), although both the Oxford Committee and 
Christian Reconstruction in Europe elected to continue as permanent relief agencies. In 
1949 Oxfam further altered its charitable objectives to ‘the relief of suffering arising as a 
result of wars or of other causes in any part of the world’. The organisation also initiated a 
process of internal professionalisation under the dynamic leadership of Leslie Kirkley, an 
iconic figure in the organisation's history.
33
 In the same year, CRE was restructured into a 
more permanent arm of the British Council of Churches, changing its name to the Inter-
Church Aid and Refugee Service Department (ICARS).  
 ICARS was deliberately modelled after the Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid 
Department of the World Council of Churches, which had itself been created as ‘a body 
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which in an emergency could organise relief for areas outside Europe’.34 ICARS publicity 
described the new agency as ‘a permanent factor in the life and work of the British 
Churches’, and throughout the 1950s it functioned primarily as a national fundraising 
agency for a broader WCC programme of international emergency aid.
35
 In 1952 Inter-
Church Aid appointed Janet Lacey as Director, a position she would hold until 1968. 
Lacey became one of the central figures in the organisation's history, overseeing a period 
of growth and consolidation. Lacey was also intimately connected to the World Council of 
Churches, working in administrative roles for the inter-church aid division, and leading a 
number of fact-finding missions. Under Lacey, ICARS closely followed WCC 
orthodoxy.
36
 
 What united all of these organisations in the 1950s was an emphasis on emergency 
relief, especially working with refugees. As organisations they had collectively been 
shaped by responding to conflict, and considered the application of emergency 
humanitarianism outside of Europe to be a natural progression. SCF openly defined itself 
as a ‘war charity’ in 1951, stating that ‘many of the Fund's present activities were 
connected with the difficulties of war’.37 Indeed, the War had provided such a strong 
impetus for humanitarian action that aid agencies initially found it challenging to sustain 
their momentum. In this regard the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided an 
important stimulant, as NGOs gravitated towards a new theatre of conflict under the 
banner of the UN. 
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 Despite a conviction among humanitarian agencies to operate in Korea, it was not 
until early 1953 that charitable organisations were permitted by the UN to undertake relief 
work, under the umbrella of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA). Korea proved to be a crucial intervention for the NGO sector. Church agencies 
were significantly involved in the region, with ICARS channelling significant funds to 
Korea Church World Service, the instrument of the Korean National Council for all relief 
operations.
38
 Between 1954 and 1956, Oxfam made more financial grants for Korea than 
any other nation.
39
 Save the Children was especially eager to work in Korea and managed 
to get a team into the field in 1952, bypassing the British state and obtaining permission 
through the Australian SCF branch.
40
 The precedent for co-ordination on emergency relief 
established during the Second World War was clearly evident in Korea, with SCF officials 
observing a ‘very happy spirit of co-operation between all the relief organisations’, with 
‘much room for expansion’.41  
 Save the Children channelled substantial resources to the region from 1953 
onwards. In late 1954 the SCF council commented that ‘of all the fields in which the Fund 
was working, Korea was the most rewarding... the Founder's dream of relief work in the 
Far East had now been realised’.42 SCF designated Korea as a central theatre of 
operations, and worked heavily to publicise their own involvement. In 1954 the Fund 
commented that ‘everything possible would have to be done to get publicity... the plight 
of the Koreans did not appear sensational enough’.43 The Fund subsequently emphasised 
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to its workers in Korea the ‘necessity of employing a professional photographer’, as it was 
‘essential when trying to raise funds to have a steady flow of information backed with 
good photographs’.44 
 This led to dramatic images of the suffering of Korean children being utilised 
prominently in SCF fundraising and publicity material for a number of years. For SCF, the 
purpose of this ‘propaganda’ was ‘to stimulate the flow of contributions to the relief 
work’.45 A 1958 leaflet (image 1.1) typified this approach, centred on an image of four 
malnourished Korean children under the headline ‘Korean Plight Shames Humanity’: 
 
 
Image 1.1: Save the Children Fund, ‘Korean Plight Shames Humanity’, May 1958.
46
 
 
Save the Children had a long history of utilising such marketing techniques. Graphic 
child-centric publicity had a populist appeal, and was effective in generating donations 
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from the general public. Indeed, the agency had effectively invented the genre of modern 
emergency fundraising in the 1920s.
47
 Such images also fitted into a longer lineage of 
child-centric charitable appeals dating back to missionaries and philanthropists in the 
colonial period.
48
 Images like these also restricted SCF to a narrow, apolitical mission of 
child relief, by calling on donors to sympathise with an archetypal child rather than a 
larger community or nation as a whole.
49
 Such was SCF's persistence in using Korean 
children in its appeals that the Bishop of Korea personally requested that the Fund 
discontinue the practice in 1958. The SCF Council were largely dismissive of the Bishop's 
request, observing that ‘there was no question that these pictures brought in the most 
money’. The Council therefore decided that ‘the Fund's press appeals should not be 
altered... the present method should be continued until the Fund's workers advised it to 
stop’.50  
 SCF's attitude towards Korean imagery pointed to a conception of disaster that had 
developed in conflict situations, and was geared towards short-term crisis management 
rather than long-term development. Images of vulnerable children reinforced this 
emergency humanitarianism, while also generating public donations which translated into 
institutional growth. SCF's insistence that such images ‘brought in the most money’ 
typified the sector in the 1950s, as NGOs developed and grew using dramatic visuals of 
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disasters and displacement to mobilise public support. Ben Whitaker charts Oxfam's 
growth in the 1950s through the increasing amounts raised by the organisation's BBC 
Week's Good Cause radio appeals, beginning with £9,700 in 1950, rising dramatically to 
£31,000 in 1956, and reaching £46,700 by 1958.
51
 Post-Korea, the large and high-profile 
refugee displacement which followed the failed Hungarian uprising of 1956 provided a 
further stimulus for non-governmental action. Media coverage of the Hungarian crisis 
raised awareness of the role NGOs could play in responding to humanitarian emergencies, 
as aid agencies worked closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
in channelling assistance to Hungarian refugees.
52
 Save the Children experienced a 29 
percent increase in income in 1957 due to its Hungarian appeal. Contributions to ICARS 
trebled between 1956 and 1957, its staff observing that ‘the consequent plight of 180,000 
refugees captured the sympathy of a public which at that moment in history needed an 
outlet for emotion and compassion’.53 Indeed, a public appeal by the Lord Mayor of 
London alone raised more than £2.5 million for the refugees.
54
 
 The Hungarian crisis also encouraged ICARS to direct more of their publicity 
towards the general public, rather than solely targeting their religious constituency. This 
resulted in the first ever Christian Aid Week in May 1957, a carefully designed publicity 
initiative to maximise exposure of the organisation to the national public, and leverage 
this into funding and support. The name ‘Christian Aid’ was selected on the basis that the 
term ‘Inter-Church Aid’ suggested ‘a more or less private mutual aid society operating 
between churches’. Instead, it was hoped that Christian Aid was a phrase which would, 
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through repetition, achieve ‘the status, sympathy and currency of Save the Children or 
Red Cross’.55 It was this public relations logic, coupled with the success of Christian Aid 
Week as an annual event, that contributed to ICARS permanently changing its name to 
Christian Aid in 1964. 
 As the 1950s drew to a close, a collective approach to organised, overtly apolitical 
emergency relief was well embedded within the NGO sector. One notable exception to the 
rule was War on Want, which was founded in the early 1950s as an overtly political 
advocacy body connected to the political Left. War on Want grew out of the Association 
for World Peace (AWP), created in 1950 by left-wing publisher Victor Gollancz in 
support of overseas development. The AWP in turn created a committee to investigate 
world poverty, chaired by Labour MP and future Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The 
committee subsequently published a report entitled War on Want - A Plan for World 
Development, which advocated intensive global development as a means to contain 
communism and prevent further world wars. The report sold 20,000 copies, giving rise to 
War on Want as a genuine grassroots movement.
56
 War on Want's official biographers 
depict this genesis as a ‘synthesis of the campaigns against war and colonialism and a 
growing recognition of the need for a new post-colonial campaign against world hunger 
and poverty in the age of the atom bomb’.57 However, War on Want proved unable to 
maintain its initial momentum, and a lack of resources and the death of key figures 
resulted in a loss of direction. Throughout most of the 1950s War on Want existed only as 
an informal committee with a meagre income, functioning as little more than a ‘talking 
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shop’.58 It was only when Frank Harcourt-Munning (a Christian socialist of private 
means) took over as administrator and, from 1958 onwards, began investing significant 
amounts of his own resources that War on Want emerged as a mainline NGO. This 
development was reflected in the organisation finally being registered as a charity in 
1959.
59
 
 This revival also led to War on Want developing a capacity for emergency relief in 
line with the rest of the sector, although it always retained a connection to its radical 
advocacy origins. War on Want's support for Algerian refugees affected by the war of 
independence with France played a significant role in the organisation's reversal of 
fortunes, and the agency produced a range of provocative publicity documenting the 
plight of Algerian refugee children.
60
 Reflecting established methods of co-ordinating on 
emergencies, War on Want formed the British Committee for Algerian Refugees 
alongside Christian Aid and Oxfam, to lobby for the inclusion of Algerian refugees in the 
UN World Refugee Year initiative of 1959. This Committee utilised a robust media 
strategy to draw attention to Algerian refugees, which included attempts to have articles 
and appeals covered in the national press, and lobbying for a broadcast appeal on the 
BBC.
61
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
58 War on Want had an income of ‘no more than £75’ in 1955. see: Frank Harcourt-Munning, The Lonely 
Maverick (London: Harcourt-Munning, 1985), p.97. 
59 Luetchford and Burns, Waging the War on Want, pp.28-33. 
60 See, for instance: CAA: Box CA/A/1, file CA/A/1/4: War on Want, Yas Mina (London: War on Want, 
1959). 
61 CAA: Box CA/A/1, file CA/A/1/4: ‘Report from the Working Party of the British Committee for Algerian 
Refugees’, November 1959. 
70 
 
National co-ordination and the rise of Development 
While the 1950s was marked by a common emphasis on emergency relief in conflict or 
post-conflict situations, this approach to humanitarian action began to be overshadowed 
by newer types of organisation as the decade came to a close. The key catalyst for this was 
the involvement of NGOs in initiatives launched by the UN, which facilitated closer co-
ordination between intergovernmental bodies, donor states and aid agencies. This also 
worked to tie NGOs into a new era of international development about to be launched, as 
indicated by the UN designating the 1960s as a ‘Development Decade’.62 Taking up the 
cause of development inspired a shift within the sector, as a number of prominent NGOs 
gradually recast themselves as ‘development agencies’, promoting expert-led solutions to 
the root causes of poverty across the developing world. This in turn encouraged new 
forms of co-operation and activity which were very different in character to the 
established practices of apolitical emergency relief. 
 The concept of overseas development was not alien to NGOs. The imperial 
missionary societies that preceded modern aid agencies had provided education, health 
and social services to rural populations in Africa and Asia as early as the eighteenth 
century. Harald Fischer-Tiné documents how the Salvation Army worked on reducing 
poverty in colonial India by establishing educational and medical institutions.
63
 Such 
activities also helped to create important grassroots institutions for modern NGOs to work 
through in the post-imperial period. In a similar vein, Save the Children undertook work 
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in Africa in the 1930s that not only aimed to alleviate immediate hunger, but to also 
address broader welfare needs through constructing and running schools in rural 
villages.
64
 
 Involvement in the UNRRA aid programme in 1940s Europe also encouraged 
humanitarian NGOs to twin emergency assistance with ‘rehabilitation’ programmes. 
Rehabilitation was a loose term which was adapted to different contexts, but in practice 
involved going beyond meeting the basic material needs of displaced persons to also 
providing a comprehensive welfare package.
65
 Aid agencies were heavily involved in the 
provision of these services, coming into contact with professional American welfare 
methods in the process, and they continued to undertake rehabilitation projects outside of 
Europe in the 1950s as a supplement to relief. For instance, Christian Aid channelled 
significant funding to a Mau Mau rehabilitation programme in Kenya in the mid-1950s, 
which was ran by the Christian Council of Kenya. The rehabilitation element included 
visitations to detainee camps, children's homes, women's work and social work in the 
villages, blended with more traditional emergency assistance.
66
 
 These initiatives indicated a growing interest by humanitarian organisations in 
providing additional welfare services that went beyond immediate relief. However, they 
were also all self-contained and small in scale, with no apparent connection to broader 
processes of national or international development. Rehabilitation was on the periphery of 
NGO assistance, which was dominated by the immediate demands of emergency relief. 
The notable exception to this in Britain was War on Want, which was an advocate for 
international development from its creation. However, War on Want struggled to put these 
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ideas into practice in the 1950s, and when it channelled money to overseas development 
projects it had to rely on local groups and institutions already in place. It therefore ended 
up supporting the same types of limited welfare activity as other secular and faith-based 
organisations.
67
  
 The international development agenda was instead being led at this time by 
Western governments and intergovernmental organisations. Britain and France had began 
implementing development projects in their colonial territories during the 1920s, as an 
increasing awareness of colonial poverty and underdevelopment prompted interventions 
to finance infrastructure and welfare services. In Britain, the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts of 1929 and 1940 raised the importance of economic development, while 
tying it more closely to official colonial policy.
68
 However, the modern era of 
international development is generally acknowledged as beginning with US President 
Harry Truman's inauguration address of January 1949. Against the backdrop of an 
emerging global Cold War, Truman committed the US to a ‘bold new program for making 
the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’.69  
 As Gilbert Rist argues, Truman's use of the term ‘underdeveloped’ offered a new 
worldview of North-South relations, replacing the traditional colonial worldview with a 
‘developed/underdeveloped dichotomy’ more in keeping with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the ongoing globalisation of the world system of states.
70
 Truman's 
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speech also consolidated an emphasis on economic growth as the key development 
doctrine of the period. It was widely assumed that rapid state-led economic growth and 
modernisation, facilitated by the transfer of Western capital and technology, would 
quickly propel developing countries towards becoming industrialised nation states. 
Development was also closely linked to security objectives in the aid programmes of the 
US and many Western nations, as a means to prevent the spread of communism.
71
 
 Following Truman's declaration, the UN created the institutions to oversee and 
implement development policy, and other industrialised nations followed the American 
lead in setting up their own foreign aid programmes.
72
 The crucial stimulus for NGOs 
beginning to work more closely with the UN and become partners in this new era of 
development came in 1959, with the launch of the UN World Refugee Year (WRY). 
WRY was an ambitious attempt by UN agencies, governments and non-state actors to 
increase public awareness of enduring refugee situations around the world. WRY was 
supported in Britain by a number of NGOs, including Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the 
Children and War on Want. The WRY National Committee was a prestigious body, with 
the Queen as its Patron. Many NGOs hoped their involvement in World Refugee Year 
would grant them exposure and prestige; Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley was head of 
WRY public relations and publicity, and he viewed the initiative as an opportunity to 
elevate Oxfam on the national stage.
73
 Christian Aid head Janet Lacey also obtained an 
important position, as vice-chair of the British WRY Executive Committee.
74
 World 
Refugee Year was officially launched in June 1959, and its blend of innovative 
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campaigning, organisation and theatricality proved to be highly effective in raising funds, 
financing an enhanced role for NGOs. Of the aid agencies involved, Christian Aid was the 
most successful, playing a prominent role and raising over £1,250,000. Oxfam also raised 
a substantial sum of £755,900.
75
 
 Peter Gatrell has depicted World Refugee Year as ‘a turning point in the “life” of 
many NGOs’.76 The initiative brought a new level of international attention to 
humanitarian issues, especially those concerning refugees outside of Europe. In the 
process, WRY created new opportunities for NGOs to participate in an international 
campaign conducted under the aegis of the UN. World Refugee Year also helped to 
internationalise the humanitarian NGO sector, as national aid agencies from almost 100 
countries participated and collaborated in carrying out the campaign.
77
 Kevin O'Sullivan 
argues that WRY therefore helped reinforce an ‘international language of 
humanitarianism taking shape alongside the realm of inter-state relations’.78  
 In Britain, the success of World Refugee Year enabled participating organisations 
- especially Christian Aid and Oxfam - to acquire exposure and legitimacy in the national 
arena.  WRY also forced a pooling of resources between agencies, and a closer coming 
together of senior figures within the NGO community.
79
 In the process, WRY reshaped 
the sector by elevating Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want into leading agencies, on a 
par with the British Red Cross and Save the Children. Crucially, WRY also acted as a 
powerful stimulus to national co-operation for these NGOs, in tandem with governmental 
and intergovernmental bodies. The conclusion of WRY in 1960 therefore marked the 
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emergence of a new phase in humanitarian action, as NGOs were beginning to be 
integrated more closely into the international aid system.  
 These trends were accelerated and extended by the launch of the UN Freedom 
from Hunger Campaign (FFHC) in 1960, organised and overseen by the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The FFHC was heavily influenced by World Refugee 
Year, and adopted many characteristics of its approach. The FFHC also intended to go 
further than WRY's focus upon the provision of immediate relief to refugees. Instead, the 
FAO envisioned the FFHC as a global education and information campaign, to promote 
long-term agricultural development in the global South. A key driving force behind the 
FFHC was FAO Director-General Binay Sen, who was committed to addressing world 
hunger and had pushed (unsuccessfully) for a more integrated global food bank 
throughout the 1950s.
80
 The launch of the FFHC also pointed to a growing international 
awareness of the problems of malnutrition and underdevelopment in the newly 
decolonising states, and the disparity between this and agricultural surpluses in the West.
81
 
The FAO enlisted a variety of partners for its mission, in particular other UN agencies, 
national governments, and NGOs. The latter were seen as playing a vital part in 
stimulating and co-ordinating FAO efforts, and NGOs quickly became supportive of the 
FFHC's aims.
82
  
 In Britain, the response to the FFHC was one of great enthusiasm. The government 
set up and financed a National Freedom from Hunger Committee to run the domestic 
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campaign, which brought together more than 30 organisations in early 1961. As with 
WRY, the National FFHC Committee was a prestigious body, which included the heads 
of all three political parties, church leaders, and the Duke of Edinburgh as patron. By the 
time the Campaign was officially launched in Britain in June 1962, there were 63 NGOs 
associated with the FFHC Committee. The success of the FFHC affirmed a rural 
development focus, stressing the importance of national planning and international co-
ordination through the UN, and led to a greater realisation of global hunger. In 1961 the 
UN General Assembly designated the 1960s to be a ‘Development Decade’ - the era of 
development had truly arrived.
83
 
 The effect of the FFHC on NGOs was substantial. Globally, a shift in focus from 
refugee concerns to the theory and practice of development could be seen as taking place 
during the 1960s. The FAO commented in 1968 that the campaign had ‘influenced the 
policy of non-governmental organisations towards development problems’, and helped to 
‘turn their attention from emergency and relief action and a charitable approach towards 
economic development priorities’.84 Shifting NGOs away from a ‘charitable approach’ 
also implied a further professionalisation of non-state actors, and their closer integration 
into the UN system. The international action spearheaded by WRY and the FFHC 
increased the profile of international aid and development issues in global forums, and 
helped shape the emergence of a ‘global humanitarian culture’.85 In Britain, the FFHC 
influenced the philosophy and approach of Oxfam and other NGOs towards longer-term 
development objectives. Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want gradually recast 
themselves as ‘development agencies’, placing new emphasis on development 
programming and campaigning over traditional emergency assistance. Oxfam in particular 
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used the FFHC as a springboard to become a practitioner of development aid,  and became 
the main vehicle of the campaign during its key period in the 1960s, where according to 
Oxfam's official biographer a ‘new crusade on behalf of the poor overseas took rote in 
British hearts and minds’.86 
 The FFHC also consolidated the move towards closer national co-operation 
between NGOs begun by World Refugee Year, and altered the sector by motivating these 
actors to co-ordinate on long-term development. Becoming development agencies also 
implied a new level of political engagement by NGOs, as attempting to tackle the root 
causes of poverty (rather than simply ameliorating its effects) drew aid agencies into the 
politics of overseas development. Entering into the development field stimulated debates 
over an apparent need to raise public awareness of global hunger and poverty within 
Britain, and whose responsibility this was. The UK Freedom from Hunger Committee 
accordingly positioned itself as a co-ordinating body for what would later be termed 
‘development education’, co-ordinating the various different initiatives of its member 
NGOs to inform the public about long-term development.
87
 This appeared to represent a 
dramatic shift in direction for the sector, compared to traditional notions of short-term 
relief. Indeed, this fast pace of change was most clearly evident in the attitude of Save the 
Children, which (while publicly supporting the FFHC) was deeply reluctant to expand its 
work from emergency relief into long-term development. The Fund struggled to formulate 
projects to its liking, and yet was also aware that if such projects were not funded then 
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‘much valuable support might be lost to other organisations’.88 When the initial phase of 
the FFHC came to an end in 1964, the SCF, unlike other NGOs, was against its renewal.
89
 
 
 
The Disaster Business 
The Freedom from Hunger Campaign was instrumental in stimulating voluntary 
organisations to re-orientate themselves towards development. It also set in motion a 
gradual move of the sector into the political arena, which would become more apparent 
later in the decade. The early 1960s has thus often been presented by commentators as 
marking a dramatic shift in humanitarian action, away from emergency aid to the politics 
of long-term development.
90
 However, this linear narrative is too simplistic. The early 
1960s also witnessed a parallel expansion of the sector's involvement in the field of 
disaster relief, as reflected in the creation of the DEC in late 1963. Indeed, the creation of 
the DEC highlighted an emerging tension within the sector. Despite taking up the cause of 
international development, high-profile emergencies consistently brought NGOs back to 
relief, and provided a means for rapid growth through intensive fundraising campaigns. 
The spread of television ownership was a crucial factor in this regard, enabling new levels 
of fundraising while also intensifying competition within the sector.  
 In bringing the leading NGOs closer together on the national stage, World Refugee 
Year and the Freedom From Hunger Campaign also accentuated competition between 
them, especially in the field of publicity. Christian Aid experienced a record level of press 
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attention in 1960, in both religious and national newspapers, which was directly attributed 
to ‘the wide public interest which has developed in World Refugee Year’. The WRY 
National Committee similarly stated that it had generated ‘vastly increased publicity for 
the constituent agencies’.91 A number of aid agencies began scaling up their advertising 
budgets in the 1960s, and the decade saw many more appeals for funds in the aid field 
than in previous years. Oxfam, buoyed by its association with WRY and under the 
ambitious leadership of Leslie Kirkley, adopted a more professionalised and well-
resourced PR strategy, aiming to become the largest aid and development organisation in 
the country. Oxfam continued Cecil Jackson-Cole's practice of applying business methods 
to charitable action, pioneering innovative fundraising schemes and more sophisticated 
marketing techniques. Indeed, it was during the 1960s that NGOs from a diverse range of 
sectors came to view the use of such publicity tactics as a ‘necessary tool of the modern 
charity and campaigning organization’92. Oxfam accordingly increased its up-front 
investment in publicity, which became dominated by powerful and hard-hitting images of 
starving children.
93
 
 This publicity strategy was evident in Oxfam's response to famine in the Republic 
of Congo in late 1960, which marked a key moment in the organisation's history. The 
Congo had slid into crisis almost immediately after independence from Belgium in June 
1960, and by the end of the year a UN emergency food programme was being directed to 
300,000 refugees displaced by tribal conflict in the south of the country.
94
 The launch of a 
UN Congo Famine Relief Fund also alerted British newspapers to the crisis, and vivid 
famine stories began appearing in the press soon after (the Daily Mail referred to ‘the 
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Belsen of the Congo’95). This press coverage culminated in a ‘shock issue’ of the Daily 
Mirror in January 1961, which included many graphic images of African famine (image 
1.2). Crucially, the Mirror also urged its readers to donate to one or more of Oxfam, War 
on Want and the British Red Cross.
96
 
 
 
Image 1.2: Daily Mirror ‘shock issue’ on the Congo, January 1961.
97
 
 
Oxfam seized upon the press coverage, ordering 50,000 prints of the Daily Mirror news 
spread and mailing them to all its supporter groups and donors, calling for further funds 
for famine relief. Oxfam's strategy was highly effective, generating an instant response 
from the British public. The Oxfam office was inundated with donations, and further press 
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coverage followed.
98
 The organisation's strategy was so effective that ITV news 
independently encouraged viewers to donate to Oxfam, which technically constituted a 
breach of broadcast regulations.
99
 War on Want and Save the Children also benefitted (to 
a lesser extent) from being associated in the media coverage with Congo relief.  
By February 1961 Oxfam's Congo appeal had raised £100,000 for famine relief, to be 
channelled through the UN. Maggie Black has argued that this outpouring of public 
generosity was ‘something completely new’, and ‘burnt the image of the starving African 
child onto the collective British conscience’.100 In practice the image of the starving child 
had a much longer history, and was already well established as a standard trope of the 
humanitarian narrative. The real impact of the press coverage was in raising the profile of 
Oxfam. Despite internally beginning to shift towards a developmental outlook, the 
organisation became more concretely associated with apolitical humanitarian relief in the 
eyes of the general public. Such was the success of this publicity tactic that by 1964, press 
reports of neglected British children could refer to them as looking ‘just like an advert for 
Oxfam relief’.101 
 Christian Aid had also been involved in the Congo, raising almost £40,000 to be 
channelled through the World Council of Churches.
102
 The organisation (then still known 
as the Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service) however went unmentioned in the media, 
its staff commenting with some resentment that ‘considerable limelight has been turned on 
Oxfam, War on Want and the Red Cross’.103 Hugh Samson, the agency's head of 
communications, concluded that in the Congo ‘Inter-Church action did not appear to be 
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relevant’.104 The reluctance of the press to mention Inter-Church Aid contributed to the 
organisation changing its name to the more memorable Christian Aid in early 1964. The 
bitter reaction to Oxfam's monopolisation of press coverage also reflected an ongoing 
rivalry between the two agencies in the 1960s over publicity. In particular, Christian Aid 
took exception to Oxfam appealing directly to the Churches, which broke a prior 
agreement between the organisations. This ‘shameless’ tactic was itself attributed to the 
impact of War on Want's ‘doubtful’ publicity - referring to the organisation's tendency for 
marketing shock tactics post-Algeria.
105
 These disputes all pointed to how the growth of 
NGOs had created a more congested and competitive humanitarian environment by the 
early 1960s. 
 This competition was intensified by the emergence of television as a popular 
medium. Television ownership expanded rapidly after the Queen's coronation in 1953, 
especially after the introduction of commercial television in 1955 and an expansion of 
reception to cover the entire country at the end of the decade. By 1960 over 70 percent of 
the population had access to both BBC and ITV, as television became the main lens 
through which the British public viewed and understood the wider world.
106
 Publicity-
oriented NGOs naturally gravitated towards television from the late 1950s onwards, 
convinced (like many of their contemporaries) that the medium had an unrivalled power 
to create and shape public opinion. The introduction of commercial television reinforced 
this conception, as observers looked on in awe at the perceived persuasive powers of 
television to subconsciously manipulate the public to purchase consumer products.
107
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 However, opportunities for NGOs to make direct appeals to the public on 
television were initially very limited, as they were not permitted to purchase advertising 
time on ITV (a restriction which remained in place until 1989). The BBC had introduced 
charitable appeals to television in 1956 on a quarterly basis, and from 1959 these were 
extended to every month. These were the television equivalent of the BBC's long-running 
Week's Good Cause radio programme, which had provided airtime for pre-approved 
charitable organisations to make philanthropic appeals to the public since 1927.
108
 Access 
to these television appeals was regulated by the Central Appeals Advisory Committee 
(CAAC), an independent body also set up in 1927, and mandated to advise the BBC on 
appeals policy and procedures. To be eligible, organisations had to satisfy a variety of 
criteria, and were restricted to an interval of two years between appeals.
109
 In late 1962 
ITV also began broadcasting such appeals, using the same machinery as the BBC. 
Notably, despite rivalries between the broadcasters, the commercial television authorities 
accepted the oversight of the CAAC and looked to it for guidance.
110
 
 However, given the regulation of the CAAC, and the lengthy application and 
production processes involved, this machinery was unsuitable for sudden and dramatic 
disaster appeals. BBC policy was initially to only grant emergency appeals when the 
appeal was being made for a national fund, such as the Lord Mayor's Fund, which 
effectively excluded voluntary organisations.
111
 This attitude began to change in the early 
1960s. An emergency appeal for victims of an earthquake in Northern Iran in September 
1962 raised over £400,000 for the British Red Cross to spend on emergency relief - a huge 
sum which overtly demonstrated the power of television to reach mass audiences. The 
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Iran appeal was also internally problematic. BBC staff criticised the ‘confusion and 
inefficiency’ of the British Red Cross in producing the appeal and handling the donations, 
as the huge funds overwhelmed the organisation administratively and led to the appeal 
being over-subscribed, as not all the money could be spent in the disaster area. This raised 
troubling questions over the status of these funds in charity law.
112
 
 Anxieties over inter-agency competition, and the new levels of fundraising made 
possible by television, prompted the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid 
to Refugees (which included all the main relief NGOs) to form a ‘Sub-Committee on 
Emergencies’ in early 1963. The sub-committee was a precursor to the DEC, and was 
presented as a pragmatic attempt to rationalise and co-ordinate emergency relief. It was 
also intended to dampen competition, and within the sub-committee the idea of making 
joint appeals for disasters (and sharing the donations raised equally) began to gain 
currency among Oxfam and other agencies.
113
 
 Calls for closer co-ordination and joint appeals were reinforced in July 1963, after 
War on Want was granted an emergency appeal on BBC television to raise funds for 
disaster relief in Skopje, Macedonia (struck by a powerful earthquake). The response to 
the appeal was huge, surpassing £250,000 within a week. By October 1963 the total had 
risen to over £380,000, well above the original target of £100,000. The level of donations 
overwhelmed War on Want administratively, to the point that the BBC became critical of 
their ‘elusive and unhelpful’ stance.114 It also provoked jealousy and criticism among 
other NGOs on the sub-committee. Christian Aid Director Janet Lacey expressed concerns 
over ‘how the special appeals for emergencies are carried out... I would hate us to get a 
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sum of that size for one project’. Lacey went on to call for ‘a fund for immediate 
emergencies so that no special BBC appeal is made on behalf of any one organisation and 
also there would always be some funds in hand to send immediate help’.115 
 The other agencies were thinking along similar lines, and in December 1963 the 
sub-committee was officially reconstituted as the Disasters Emergency Committee. The 
DEC was comprised of the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children, 
and War on Want - the five leading NGOs which had come to form the nucleus of the 
sector. The DEC was designed to function as a ‘co-ordinating machinery’, acting as an 
independent Standing Committee which met after major disasters to pool information, 
discuss planned responses, and initiate joint action when deemed appropriate. All five 
members had equal authority, with decisions taken by majority vote. The British Red 
Cross provided the necessary administrative staff and machinery, and the DEC stressed a 
need for close co-operation with government departments (primarily the Foreign Office, 
which was responsible for disaster relief).
116
 Committee meetings tended to be relatively 
exclusive affairs, attended by the DEC secretariat and the Chief Executives of the 
individual member agencies, although representatives from the Foreign Office, UN 
agencies, foreign embassies, and the broadcasting authorities were also invited to observe 
and contribute.  
 The DEC shared a similar organisational ethos to COSBRA, in its emphasis on 
logistical co-ordination, deference to authority and depoliticised emergency relief. The 
DEC also institutionalised this approach to humanitarianism just as three of its members 
(Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want) were beginning to look beyond it, to a more 
expansive vision of the politics of overseas aid. This suited the staunchly apolitical British 
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Red Cross and Save the Children, who did not share their enthusiasm for development. 
Indeed, Save the Children had deliberately pushed for the Red Cross to spearhead the 
DEC and delimit the Committee's activities strictly to relief for this very reason.
117
 With 
the DEC poised to make regular, joint disaster appeals to the public on television in the 
years to come, a foundation was in place for further dramatic growth of the British 
disaster relief lobby. However, this trajectory was clearly unaligned with the broader 
direction of many principal agencies towards long-term development. The gap between 
the two was apparent in War on Want's suggestion that the DEC could provide a separate, 
insulated revenue stream for emergencies, which would also work to free up agency 
funding for development programmes.
118
 While this was a rational viewpoint, it also 
raised the counter-possibility that continuous, high-profile disaster appeals would instead 
reinforce public support for relief at the expense of development as a whole. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The two decades between the Second World War and the creation of the Disasters 
Emergency Committee in 1963 marked an important period in the history of British 
humanitarianism. The modern NGO sector materialised and took shape, triggered by the 
devastation of total war, and growing rapidly on the basis of successive emergencies in 
the emerging Third World. Co-ordination between aid agencies during the war (as 
implemented by COBSRA) provided the model for responding to these disasters, based 
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upon short-term apolitical relief funded by simplistic, emotive appeals to the British 
public for funding.  
 By the early 1960s, the continued growth of NGOs, a professionalisation of their 
publicity strategies, and the rapid spread of television ownership all contributed to the 
sector becoming a much more competitive environment. This was reinforced by 
intergovernmental fundraising initiatives such as World Refugee Year and the Freedom 
from Hunger Campaign, which brought the principal NGOs closer together and enrolled 
them into a new era of more intensive, media-driven fundraising. Competition between 
humanitarian organisations for resources is often depicted as a major contemporary 
challenge currently facing the sector. However, it is apparent that as early as the 1960s the 
NGO sector was acting in a more business-like fashion, as budgets were scaled up and 
public support for international aid grew. This directly contributed to the creation of the 
DEC in 1963. Despite being presented as a pragmatic coming together of like-minded 
actors, in practice the Committee owed more to a longer history of emergency relief, 
anxieties about competition between insecure NGOs, and the new power of television to 
evoke an emotional response from mass audiences. The creation of the DEC 
institutionalised the relationship between NGO expansion and media coverage of 
disasters, paving the way for a continuous growth of the British humanitarian industry 
over the following decades. 
 The overlapping of these trends with the start of a shift into the development field 
also indicated how the sector was beginning to effectively pursue two competing 
trajectories simultaneously. In the early 1960s, NGO involvement in the politics of 
development was still very tentative, and aid agencies were reluctant to fully enter the 
political arena. Instead, development NGOs concentrated on less controversial educational 
initiatives. But the contrast between the depoliticised relief co-ordination embodied by the 
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DEC, and the new possibilities of development co-operation envisioned by the FFHC, 
implied an emerging paradox in how the sector functioned. The provision of short-term 
charitable relief, financed by the populist appeal of exploitative images of starving 
children, appeared to contradict new objectives to educate the public about the root causes 
of distant suffering. The tension between these two trajectories would become more 
evident towards the end of the 1960s, yet it was clearly already present at the point of the 
DEC's creation in 1963. 
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Chapter Two 
Charity or Advocacy?  
The First Decade of the Disasters Emergency Committee, 1964-74 
 
The creation of the DEC in late 1963 represented a deliberate attempt by the leading 
humanitarian organisations to harness the power of television, and increase their 
fundraising potential through broadcast joint emergency appeals. The five DEC agencies 
were therefore well positioned for the events of the following decade, as a series of major 
disasters in the Third World attracted the media spotlight and resulted in massive public 
responses. In particular, a succession of high-profile crises in Nigeria, East Pakistan and 
Ethiopia in the late 1960s and early 1970s fuelled an intensive growth in the scale and 
prominence of NGOs. The DEC fundraising mechanism made a direct contribution to this 
growth, as illustrated by a comparison of DEC and Save the Children income during this 
period (graph 2.1). Institutional expansion made it possible for humanitarian NGOs to 
broaden out their operations, and play a more prominent role in responding to overseas 
emergencies. In the process, the DEC mechanism enabled its members to construct what 
amounted to a humanitarian oligarchy in Britain, as exclusive access to television ensured 
a steady stream of publicity and revenue, while raising their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
state. 
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Graph 2.1: Cumulated income (£m) of the Disasters Emergency Committee and the Save the 
Children Fund, 1964-74 (adjusted for inflation, 2012).
1 
 
This building up of the sector's capacity for disaster relief also ran parallel to the 
increasing engagement of a number of leading organisations in international development, 
which opened up new arenas for NGO action. Aid agencies recognised the need for 
educational campaigns, to raise the British public's awareness of the complex issues 
connected to global poverty and underdevelopment. As the 1960s progressed these 
activities gradually became more overtly political, as NGOs twinned development 
education with direct lobbying of government to commit more to overseas development. 
A more pronounced advocacy role also implied a shift in focus away from emergency 
relief, as NGOs looked beyond short-term crisis management towards facilitating long-
term change. The sector thus became increasingly Janus-faced over the course of this 
period, in that it looked towards two contrasting directions (relief and development) 
simultaneously. 
                                                             
1 Income data for Save the Children sourced from SCF annual reports. DEC fundraising data sourced from 
http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/appeals-archive [accessed 31 March 2014]. Adjusted for inflation using 
Bank of England Inflation Calculator, 2012 rate: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/calculator/flash/default.aspx [accessed 31 March 
2014]. 
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 This apparent tension between charitable relief and political advocacy is integral to 
unpicking non-governmental humanitarianism. In this context, the fundraising appeals and 
publicity produced by aid agencies have attracted significant attention, as it through such 
forms of representation that NGOs have constructed a relationship with the public and 
shaped popular understandings of the wider world. It is widely acknowledged that 
humanitarian organisations have a long history of representing the global South in a 
particular way. This publicity style is based upon hard-hitting visual images of individual 
suffering, predominantly vulnerable children or women (or indeed, women with children). 
Such images have been consistently effective at capturing the attention of the viewer, and 
provoking an emotional response which translates into donations. These images are 
usually accompanied by a caption or narrative, which reinforces the effect by describing 
in vivid terms the suffering captured in the image. Commonly, NGO appeals and publicity 
also offer the viewer an immediate form of action to help alleviate the hardship on 
display, by donating directly to the organisation concerned.
2
 A typical example of this 
style of charitable fundraising from the period in question is shown below (image 2.1). 
                                                             
2 Seymour H. Fine, ‘The Starving Baby Appeal’, in Seymour H. Fine (ed.), Marketing the Public Sector: 
Promoting the Causes of Public and Nonprofit Agencies (Brunswick: New Jersey, 1992, pp.154-159); 
Henrietta Josephine Lidchi, ‘“All in the choosing eye”: Charity, Representation and the Developing World’ 
(Unpublished PhD thesis: Open University, 1993). 
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Image 2.1: Oxfam, Christmas press appeal, December 1970.
3
 
 
The processes by which audiences receive and respond to such media messages are 
complex, and debates continue over the extent to which audiences have agency to 
interpret and shape messages or ‘codes’.4 While the nature of audience reception for 
charitable advertising is also contested
5
, there is a general consensus among commentators 
                                                             
3 Oxfam, ‘The ghost of Christmas present appeal’, The Times, 9 December 1970, p.7. 
4 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies Occasional Paper (Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1973); Ronald Lemboa 
and Kenneth H. Tucker, ‘Culture, television, and opposition: Rethinking cultural studies’, Critical Studies in 
Mass Communication, 7:2 (1990, pp.97-116); Lawrence Black, ‘Whose finger on the button? British 
television and the politics of cultural control’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 25:4 
(October 2005, pp.547-575); David E. Morrison, ‘Cultural and Moral Authority: The Presumption of 
Television’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 625:1 (September 2009, 
pp.116-127). 
5 Magdalini Tsoutsoumpi, ‘Audience Reception of Charity Advertising: Making Sense, Interpreting and 
Decoding Advertisements That Focus on Human Suffering’ (MSc thesis: London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2012). 
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that this form of humanitarian advertising negatively impacts upon public perceptions of 
the developing world. It is argued that these appeals reproduce colonial ideas and 
stereotypes, by presenting the global South as helpless, passive, and dependent upon the 
civilised North for assistance and guidance.
6
 The ubiquitous imagery of starving children 
has come in for especially strong criticism, for infantilising the developing world by 
attributing to it an ignorant and child-like state.
7
 Such images also fit into a longer lineage 
of child-centric charitable appeals dating back to missionaries and philanthropists in the 
colonial period, who used suffering children as symbolic objects of ‘innate pathos 
universally worthy of humanitarian concern’.8 These images have therefore been 
implicated in obscuring the more complex structural causes of inequality and suffering in 
the global South, and the interconnections between First World affluence and Third World 
poverty. 
 As will be shown in this chapter, the growth of the humanitarian sector over the 
1960s and early 1970s can be heavily attributed to the populist appeal of this form of 
representation. The emergency appeals produced by the DEC were typical of this genre of 
humanitarian fundraising, and the individual Committee members also promoted this view 
of the Third World in their own publicity. Indeed, Stanley Cohen argues that it was during 
this period that the stereotypical image of the starving African child became a ‘universal 
                                                             
6 Kate Manzo, ‘An extension of colonialism? Development education, images and the media’, The 
Development Education Journal, 12:2 (2006, pp.9-12); Kate Manzo, ‘Imaging Humanitarianism: NGO 
Identity and the Iconography of Childhood’, Antipode, 40:4 (2008, pp.632-657); Lisa Rideout, 
‘Representations of the “Third World” in NGO advertising: practicalities, colonial discourse and western 
understandings of development’, Journal of African Media Studies, 3:1 (March 2011, pp.25-41). 
7 Nandita Dogra, Representations of Global Poverty: Aid, Development and International NGOs (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp.33-45. 
8 Emily Baughan, ‘“Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!” Empire, internationalism and 
the Save the Children Fund in inter-war Britain’, Historical Research, 86:231 (February 2013, pp.116-137), 
quote at p.124. See also: Jan Nederveen Pieterse, White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western 
Popular Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Seth Koven, Slumming: Sexual and Social 
Politics in Victorian London (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.130; Marianne Gullestad, 
Picturing Pity: Pitfalls and Pleasures in Cross-cultural Communication - Image and Word in a North 
Cameroon Mission (NY: Berghahn, 2007), p.25; Manzo, ‘Imaging Humanitarianism’. 
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icon of human suffering’.9 This was the result of a widespread dissemination of such 
images on television in relation to major emergencies (such as the Nigerian Civil War in 
the late 1960s), as well as their repeated usage in NGO advertisements and fundraising 
material. However, the perpetuation of such images by aid agencies over this period was 
also fundamentally problematic. Presenting the developing world as ignorant and passive 
may have maximised fundraising income, but it was counter-productive to the new 
objectives of development NGOs to raise public awareness and understanding of the 
structural causes of global poverty. 
 This tension within development agencies, often depicted as a clash between 
fundraising and education, has  been well documented.
10
 It also points to more deep-
rooted issues concerning the extent to which NGO practices (and, therefore, NGOs 
themselves) are political. The simplistic images and narratives of NGO emergency 
appeals often suggest an abstraction from politics, with the starving child used to represent 
an abstract universal humanity, removed from any national or political context. This 
practice has a long history in non-governmental humanitarianism, dating back to the 
fundraising success of Save the Children in the early 1920s.
11
 Arguably, portraying 
emergencies and crises in this fashion also works to depoliticise global poverty and 
suffering, through their presentation as naturally occurring, apolitical conditions outside of 
human agency. This style of representation therefore appears incompatible with political 
                                                             
9 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 
p.178. 
10 Jørgen Lissner, ‘Merchants of Misery’, New Internationalist, 100 (June 1981); Cohen, States of Denial, 
pp.178-195. 
11 Ellen Boucher, ‘Cultivating Internationalism: Save the Children Fund, Public Opinion and the meaning of 
Child Relief, 1919-1924’, in Laura Beers and Geraint Thomas (eds.), Brave New World: Imperial and 
Democratic Nation-Building in Britain between the Wars (London: IHR, 2012, pp.169-188); Baughan, 
‘Empire, internationalism and the Save the Children Fund in inter-war Britain’. 
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campaigning on the causes of underdevelopment, which aims to convey a sense of 
injustice and interconnectedness.
12
   
 This chapter explores how this tension between disasters and development played 
out between 1964 and 1974 - the first ten years of the DEC. It is shown how, despite an 
increasing political focus on the causes of global underdevelopment, in practice the 
humanitarian sector was consistently brought back to apolitical relief. A key instrument in 
this was the rise of television, which publicised and brought a new immediacy to distant 
suffering, thereby stimulating public demands for humanitarian aid. By contrast, public 
support for the less dramatic processes of long-term development was not as forthcoming. 
While these factors worked to politically contain the sector, humanitarian NGOs also 
exacerbated this process through their own decision-making. Divides within the sector and 
widely shared anxieties over the consequences of becoming overtly political all drove aid 
agencies back to a familiar and less controversial position of short-term charity. NGOs 
also undermined their own advocacy ambitions through a reliance on patronising images 
of starving children, which generated funding while also depoliticising global poverty and 
suffering. The DEC mechanism was crucial to all of this, as it promoted simplistic 
narratives of disaster on television and consolidated a public depiction of its members as 
apolitical relief actors. The discrete and moderate nature of the Committee itself also 
worked to reinforce a depoliticised humanitarianism within the sector, as it provided a 
means for conservative elements to restrain more radical voices. 
 To set out this argument, this chapter is structured into five distinct analytical 
sections. Firstly, the move towards a political advocacy role by the majority of the sector 
is charted. Following on from the UN Freedom from Hunger Campaign, aid agencies 
continued to co-ordinate on development activity in the 1960s, gradually becoming more 
                                                             
12 Manzo, ‘Imaging Humanitarianism’; Dogra, Representations of Global Poverty. 
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political as the decade progressed. NGOs realised that their own efforts were miniscule 
when compared to official actors, which in turn fostered a more committed lobbying 
agenda, despite the oversights of charity law. Development NGOs were also influenced by 
the broader societal climate of unrest which characterised the late 1960s, as they recruited 
younger activists who impatiently pushed for more radical change. This new focus upon 
advocacy was reflected in such initiatives as the formation of the World Development 
Movement in 1970, which aimed to rally grassroots support for pro-development policy 
change. 
 However, in practice the effectiveness of these activities was always limited by a 
lack of widespread popular interest in development issues, especially in relation to 
emergency relief. High-profile disasters consistently brought the focus of NGOs back to 
traditional charity, while reinforcing a popular conception of aid agencies as relief actors 
acting outside of politics. As a mechanism for making emergency appeals to the public 
through television, the DEC was a key agent in this process. The second section therefore 
undertakes a brief overview of the DEC mechanism, clarifying how it functioned in 
practice, its relationship with the television broadcasters, and the discourses of 
humanitarianism it promoted in its early appeals. It is shown that from the outset the DEC 
deliberately simplified disasters and disaster relief in its publicity, depicting a generic 
state of emergency and relying on negative images and narratives of suffering to raise 
funding. The DEC was therefore fundamentally apolitical in character, despite the 
advocacy ambitions of the sector. The fundraising success of the DEC also reflected 
broader trends, such as the rapid development of television, and the ongoing 
professionalisation of NGO advertising practices. 
 The importance of the DEC in shaping the direction of the sector is then set out 
through case studies of three major emergencies in the period between 1968 and 1973. 
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The first of these examines the humanitarian response to the Nigerian Civil War in the late 
1960s. The Nigerian Civil War has been well documented by scholars, who widely 
present it as a critical moment in the history of modern humanitarianism and NGOs. This 
case study builds on the existing literature, by documenting the contribution of the DEC. 
While at first the Committee members responded to the conflict discretely and carefully, 
television images of starvation in the secessionist state of Biafra in June 1968 transformed 
the crisis into a major political issue. The combination of a sudden surge of popular 
support for Biafra, and an increasingly radical climate within the NGO sector, led to 
Oxfam breaking with the DEC and launching a major publicity campaign. This unilateral 
action enabled the agency to monopolise public donations for Biafra (fuelling their own 
expansion), but it also resulted in Oxfam becoming publicly associated with an explicitly 
political, pro-Biafran position on the conflict itself. This overt political involvement 
created serious problems for the organisation, including sharp criticisms from the other 
DEC members within the Committee. In this context the DEC acted as a restraining 
influence and depoliticising force, as the other agencies pressurised Oxfam to disassociate 
itself from the pro-Biafra lobby and re-emphasise its apolitical humanitarian credentials. 
In the process, Oxfam's experience also pointed to the broader problems NGOs faced in 
becoming more political.  
 A second case study looks at the involvement of the DEC agencies in East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the early 1970s. A fatal cyclone in late 1970 brought 
international NGOs to the region at a time of political volatility between Pakistan's West 
and East wings. The DEC's television appeal for the cyclone raised a record sum, which 
highlighted how effective the fundraising mechanism could be. However, while funding 
was extracted from the public on the basis of simplistic disaster publicity, the growing 
ideological focus on development within the sector impacted upon how these donations 
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were actually spent. The trio of Christian Aid, Oxfam, and War on Want formed a 
Consortium to discretely spend their DEC income on agricultural development 
programmes in the cyclone region, effectively blurring the populist appeal of emergency 
relief with rural development. This blurring represented a tacit acknowledgement by the 
agencies that development had failed to mobilise the public, and they instead utilised the 
spectacle of disaster for their own purposes. This tension between relief and development 
was further exacerbated by the political involvement of the Consortium's aid workers, as 
well as War on Want more generally, after the outbreak of civil war between East and 
West Pakistan in 1971. Many of these individuals became staunchly pro-Bangladesh, and 
(as with Oxfam and Biafra) the other DEC members deliberately intervened to restrain 
radical voices and re-assert an apolitical stance. 
 A third and final case study examines the exposure of a severe famine in Ethiopia 
in late 1973 by British television. Having previously attracted minimal media attention, a 
single ITV documentary (The Unknown Famine) elevated Ethiopia into a major 
international crisis. Shortly afterwards, a wide array of donor governments, 
intergovernmental agencies and international NGOs were mobilised to implement a major 
aid programme across the entire Sahel region of Africa. The Unknown Famine also 
deliberately simplified the famine by presenting it as a sudden natural disaster without 
human agency, obscuring the political failings of the Ethiopian government. This decision 
was taken deliberately by the film crew (including presenter Jonathan Dimbleby) to 
maximise the response of the public to the film. The DEC members were well aware of 
this, and yet they were also complicit in this simplification by endorsing the film, and 
using its footage in their own broadcast appeal. The record fundraising total generated by 
this appeal further highlighted how effective this form of representation was. The public 
reaction to the ITV film also reinforced how ineffective the sector's educational and 
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advocacy work had been in generating mass support, in relation to disasters featured on 
television. It is ultimately concluded that these case studies, and the decade as a whole, 
raise challenging questions about the nature of overseas development, the relationship 
between NGOs and the public, and the linkages between the humanitarian sector and 
government. 
 
 
NGOs and the Politics of Development 
As chapter one discussed, the early 1960s marked the beginning of a shift within the NGO 
sector. A number of leading organisations invested in campaigns to tackle the root causes 
of global hunger and poverty, rather than solely ameliorating its visible effects. This shift  
in approach also necessitated new forms of voluntary action, as these newly-christened 
development agencies explored ways to build up public awareness of the complex issues 
and politics linked to global development.  
 These trends continued to gather pace after 1963, as the British state also moved 
more concretely into the development field. The election of Harold Wilson's Labour 
government in 1964 led to the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), 
charged with executing all aspects of development policy. The ODM was formed amid 
great optimism; the first three Ministers of Overseas Development were Cabinet members, 
and the new Ministry commanded substantial resources.
13
 As part of its remit to 
administer all aspects of the British overseas aid programme, the ODM also sought to 
draw upon the growing expertise of development NGOs, and supported increased co-
                                                             
13 Owen Barder, ‘Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience’, Center for Global 
Development - Working Paper Number 70 (October 2005), p.6, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=984062 [accessed 31 March 2014]; Barrie Ireton, Britain's International 
Development Policies: A History of DFID and Overseas Aid (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
pp.31-32; see also: TNA: Overseas Development Papers: OD 15/15: Ministry of Overseas Development, 
‘Aid Policy’, 16 November 1964. 
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ordination within the sector. Indeed, the ODM went as far as to help aid agencies set up 
their own lobby in 1965, as the Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development 
(VCOAD). VCOAD grew out of the FFHC and was intended to provide a joint platform 
for development programming and public awareness raising initiatives. The Committee 
had an initial membership of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), 
Christian Aid, the FFHC, Oxfam, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Save the 
Children, the United Nations Association, and War on Want. The British FFHC 
committee wound down shortly after, with VCOAD taking on all of its functions. In 
particular, co-ordination of NGO public education and awareness raising activities 
became a key VCOAD function, picking up where the FFHC had left off.
14
  
 In practice, the effectiveness of such activities was limited from the outset by a 
lack of clarity over what was permissible under charity law. Throughout this period the 
sector was aware that its public awareness campaigns could be classified as overly 
political. Development NGOs therefore risked censure from the Charity Commissioners, 
the non-ministerial body responsible for monitoring and regulating the voluntary sector. 
During the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Oxfam and other agencies had regularly 
made public statements that called upon policymakers to do more to address world 
poverty.
15
 By contrast, as early as 1962 the Commissioners had stated that ‘propaganda 
and advocacy for legislation’ was ‘political, and not charitable’. This foreshadowed an 
official examination of the work of Oxfam and other development NGOs in 1963. 
Initially, the Commissioners argued that development aid as a whole was political, and not 
suited to the work of charitable organisations. While the Commissioners later softened 
their stance, largely on the grounds that the government had itself encouraged NGOs to 
                                                             
14 Donald Geoffrey Harrison, ‘Oxfam and the rise of development education in England from 1959 to 1979’ 
(PhD thesis: University of London, 2008), pp.93-95. 
15 See, for instance: ‘Oxfam's call to government: More aid for hungry’, The Guardian, 4 August 1962, p.10. 
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take up a developmental role, they also requested that Oxfam make it clearer to the public 
how they spent their donations. In 1965 the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
accordingly changed its name to Oxfam, although in practice it had been widely known as 
this for some time.
16
 While this particular clash with the institutions of the state was 
resolved amicably, it also demonstrated how the Charity Commissioners could intervene 
at any moment to investigate a particular organisation or sector. 
 Nonetheless, development NGOs slowly became more political in their stance on 
development aid as the 1960s progressed, demonstrating more will to exert pressure on 
policymakers. A key stimulus for this was a downgrading in the importance of overseas 
aid by the government. While the ODM had been launched amidst genuine enthusiasm, 
economic difficulties led to the aid budget being abruptly cut by £20 million in 1966. 
Oxfam activists observed that this was a larger sum than their organisation had ever spent 
in their twenty year history. The Minister for Overseas Development was also removed 
from the Cabinet, as optimism for development gave way to a reducing official 
commitment.
17
 The size of the aid budget cuts also confirmed a perception within the 
NGO sector that only donor governments and multilateral institutions possessed the 
necessary resources and scale to address the huge issue of global poverty. An influential 
report by a senior Oxfam official in 1967 stated that: 
 ‘Relief and development of peoples in all parts of the world cannot be accomplished by 
 voluntary agencies alone. Massive effort by governments is essential, and to encourage 
 such effort, Oxfam must sometimes play the role of Socrates and be a gadfly to sting 
 the State to action’.
18
  
 
                                                             
16 Maggie Black, A Cause for our Times: Oxfam, the First Fifty Years (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/Oxfam, 1992), pp.85-91. 
17 Black, A Cause for our Times, p.155; Peter J. Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World 
(Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991),  p.35. 
18 Black, A Cause for our Times, p.155. 
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Such thinking reinforced an ongoing trend for NGOs to become more political, even if 
this risked further confrontation with the Charity Commissioners. Oxfam was not the only 
organisation traversing this path. War on Want also became more geared to political 
lobbying over the course of the 1960s, and its radical origins enabled it to do so with less 
internal disquiet than other agencies. However, the organisation's overall effectiveness 
was restricted by financial difficulties throughout the 1960s.
19
 Christian Aid's take up of 
advocacy was facilitated by the British Council of Churches adopting a resolution in 1966 
that ‘the more equitable distribution of the world's growing wealth is a primary demand of 
justice’. The same document also stated that such action ‘must be undertaken through 
governmental action, for voluntary aid cannot of itself establish economic justice’.20 In 
this regard Christian Aid was also following broader shifts taking place in the World 
Council of Churches. In 1968 the British Council issued a further ‘Policy Statement on 
Christian Aid and World Development’, which specifically called upon Christian Aid to 
promote the cause of ‘economic justice’. This was to be advanced by lobbying ‘all 
political parties’ to commit to making one percent of GNP available for overseas aid, to 
restructure the terms of trade to provide ‘freer access for developing nations to the 
markets of the world’, and urging the ODM to extend family planning and population 
control measures.
21
 
 This general momentum towards more overt political activism in turn encouraged 
greater co-ordination between NGOs within VCOAD (with the notable exception of the 
more conservative Save the Children). The membership of the development-oriented 
organisations also began to swell with younger student radicals, who impatiently pushed 
                                                             
19 Matthew Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp.71-72. 
20 CAA: Box CA/J/1: British Council of Churches, World Poverty and British Responsibility (London: SCM 
Press, 1966), p.5. 
21 CAA: Box CA/J/5: British Council of Churches, ‘A Policy Statement on Christian Aid and World 
Development’, October 1968. 
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for a faster pace of politicisation, reflecting a broader confrontational climate of the late 
1960s. VCOAD's General Secretary remarked privately that ‘militants in all the members 
of VCOAD’ were ‘upsetting their elders and pushing them all the time for a more positive 
stance on the part of the voluntary societies in favour of more government aid’.22 Within 
Oxfam, these flames were stoked further by the appointment of Rev. Nicolas Stacey as 
Deputy Director in early 1968. An outspoken and controversial figure with a flair for 
publicity, Maggie Black describes Stacey as ‘the new look for the 1960s generation... a 
young people's leader for the aid lobby’.23 Stacey identified with the radical elements 
within the organisation, and pushed for Oxfam to assume a more muscular campaigning 
agenda.
24
 
 These militant voices came together to form the Haslemere Group in 1968, a non-
charitable body that was technically outside of the formal charity network. In practice, 
Haslemere was heavily comprised of young activists connected to Christian Aid, Oxfam 
and War on Want. The group published the Haslemere Declaration in March 1968, an 
overtly political manifesto on the causes of global poverty and underdevelopment. The 
Declaration stated that the developed world was directly responsible for the condition of 
the developing nations, through exploitation, trade imbalances, and the inequality of the 
international monetary system. Influenced by critiques of Western-led development 
emanating from the global South, Haslemere called for a revolution in world politics to 
create parity between nations, an overtly radical position that was in stark contrast to 
traditional humanitarian assistance. Indeed, Haslemere advanced a critique of the entire 
practice of emergency relief, equating it with ‘tossing sixpence in a beggar's cap: money 
given by those who have no intention of changing the system that produces beggars, and 
                                                             
22 TNA: OD 15/72: R. Miles, ‘Haslemere Declaration’, 5 June 1968. 
23 Black, A Cause for our Times, p.121. 
24 Ibid., pp.156-157. 
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no understanding that they are part of it’. Haslemere's authors intended for the Declaration 
to be a call to arms, a focal point around which a mass movement could crystallise in 
support of development, to exert pressure upon the state.
25
 The ODM interpreted it as 
‘another manifestation of student power which is impatient for the right outlets for their 
energies... their militancy is as strong in Christian Aid as in Oxfam’.26  
 Adopting this more overt advocacy role was not an organic process for NGOs, and 
it gave rise to heated debate and divisions within the sector. Save the Children was 
especially alarmed at what it perceived as a reckless entry into the political arena by its 
fellow VCOAD members, and deliberately worked to slow down or halt this momentum 
when possible. Indeed, SCF expressed little enthusiasm for long-term development and 
had internally opposed the creation of VCOAD in 1965, although it felt obliged to join 
due to concerns that it would appear publicly out of step with the other agencies.
27
 Hence, 
when in late 1968 Christian Aid produced a paper which it hoped to publish jointly 
through VCOAD, calling for political pressure on pressure on government to increase aid 
levels, SCF staff expressed their ‘dismay and concern’. Save the Children Director Colin 
Thornley argued that it would be a ‘grave error’ for the organisation to be ‘in any way 
associated’ with political protest, as it risked ‘causing disillusionment amongst many of its 
supporters, to the serious detriment of their fund-raising’. SCF threatened to withdraw 
from VCOAD if the publication went ahead, which led to Christian Aid abandoning the 
idea altogether.
28
 
 The following year, the more radical agencies within VCOAD tabled a proposal to 
publish a document entitled A Manifesto on Aid and Development through the Committee, 
                                                             
25 The Haslemere Group, The Haslemere Declaration (London: Haslemere, 1968). 
26 TNA: OD 15/72: R. Miles, ‘Haslemere Declaration’, 5 June 1968. 
27 SCFA: Box A422: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 251st Meeting of the Executive Committee’, 15 June 
1965: Freedom from Hunger Campaign (E.3869.). 
28 SCFA: Box A421: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 271st Meeting of the Executive Committee’, 19 
November 1968: Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development (E.4248). 
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which called for increased official aid, and more intensive political advocacy work in 
support of this objective. Much of the Manifesto was synthesised from papers originally 
prepared by Oxfam, which Nicolas Stacey had played a role in drafting.
29
 Save the 
Children strongly opposed the proposal, as they had done a year earlier with Christian 
Aid's paper. The Manifesto also attracted the scrutiny of the Charity Commissioners, who 
interpreted it as an illegal use of charitable funds for political activity. To circumvent 
these obstacles, the trio of Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want created the World 
Development Movement (WDM) in 1970 as a separate, non-charitable body distinct from 
VCOAD, to which all political activity could be hived off. This also left VCOAD as 
concerned solely with co-ordinating educational and informational activities.
30
 As a non-
charitable organisation, WDM was free to pursue advocacy work outside the constraints 
of charity law, while retaining an association and connection with the leading 
development agencies.  
 A similar rationale led to the creation of the pro-development magazine New 
Internationalist in 1973 by Christian Aid and Oxfam, which despite being funded by the 
two agencies maintained a position of editorial independence.
31
 However, despite these 
legal innovations, the launch of WDM was largely an anti-climax. A Manifesto on Aid and 
Development failed to capture public attention on the scale envisioned by the NGOs, in 
stark contrast to a series of high-profile disasters in Africa and Asia which occurred over 
the same period. Maggie Black attributes this failure to the sheer complexity of the issues 
connected to global poverty and underdevelopment, which were inevitably less geared to 
dramatic representation than emotive images of suffering disaster victims. WDM's growth 
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was slow, and failed to significantly engage young activists, who instead tended to 
mobilise around such issues as the anti-Vietnam War movement.
32
 
 Development NGOs thus found themselves in a difficult position by the early 
1970s. They had come to recognise and articulate the need for a more overt advocacy role, 
to mobilise the public and exert political pressure upon government. Taking up this role 
also implied a shift in focus away from emergency relief concerns, as made explicit in the 
Haslemere Declaration. However, the sector was also divided over what constituted an 
acceptable limit to their own radicalisation. This was partially due to the constraints of 
charity law, as enforced by the conservative-minded Charity Commissioners. It also 
reflected a deep-rooted anxiety that the general public was not motivated by international 
development, as demonstrated by the lukewarm response to Haslemere and WDM's 
Manifesto. Many agency staff worried that to be publicly associated with politics risked 
losing the trust of their established supporters. Save the Children in particular felt that 
political protest could negatively impact upon their fundraising ability. This also proved to 
be a formidable barrier for the more advocacy-oriented agencies as well. Calls by Nicolas 
Stacey in 1970 for Oxfam to reduce its overseas aid commitments and invest more in 
domestic campaigning were resisted by the organisation's Council of Management. 
Instead, the Council publicly reaffirmed that Oxfam's primary purpose was to raise money 
to finance overseas aid projects. Despite being considered by many as a future leadership 
candidate, Stacey's position became untenable, and he resigned later that year.
33
 Upon his 
exit, Stacey commented in the Times on the complex dilemmas being raised by the 
sector's politicisation: 
 ‘...I accept that the whole tradition of charities in Britain makes it extraordinarily difficult 
 to combine fund raising on a large scale with education, propaganda and political 
 pressure... The sincere and well-meaning but elderly and cautious people with a high 
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 threshold of boredom who dominate the web of committees that control most charities 
 shrink from the cut and  thrust of the political arena. While the typical donor, thought to 
 be elderly, female and middle class, probably considers politics dirty, pressure groups 
 irrelevant and controversy ungentlemanly.’34 
 
The reaffirmation of the primacy of Oxfam's aid programme by the organisation's Council 
also indicated how the sector's involvement in overseas disaster relief operations had been 
expanding, fuelled by growing public support for NGO emergency interventions. As 
much as this period represented an advancement of the sector's commitment to 
developmental advocacy, in practice high-profile disasters also redirected the focus of 
NGOs back to traditional, apolitical assistance. In the process, a popular conception of aid 
agencies as charitable relief actors was also reinforced, restricting public awareness of 
long-term development. As a recently-founded mechanism for making emergency appeals 
to the public via television, the DEC clearly played a crucial role in this process. 
 
 
The DEC and Emergency Humanitarianism 
Once the DEC had been established in late 1963, the Committee's initial years were 
largely spent working out the technicalities for launching joint emergency appeals on 
television. The DEC agencies had taken care to cultivate close links between themselves 
and the BBC, which was highly supportive of the new ‘co-ordinating machinery’ for 
disasters. However, the making of joint broadcast appeals was complicated by the lack of 
any specific BBC emergency appeals policy.
35
 After protracted discussion the BBC 
Appeals Secretary eventually confirmed in September 1965 that he would consider ‘all 
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appeals sponsored by the DEC’. Under the new arrangements, the DEC members could 
collectively request a broadcast appeal for any disaster they considered to be of sufficient 
magnitude. If the broadcasters agreed, a primetime appeal would be granted to the 
Committee for transmission on BBC television and radio, presented by a prominent BBC 
personality. This reflected a longer lineage of the BBC using celebrities and public figures 
in charitable appeals, as a way to establish a personal connection between the viewer and 
a specific cause. This also built on an older tradition of voluntary organisations using a 
‘figurehead’ to frame their activities and fundraising.36 
 The appeals themselves were produced by in-house BBC specialists, working from 
original scripts and material provided by the Committee.
37
 The DEC was also provided 
with facilities for processing and disbursing the public donations they could expect their 
appeals to generate. The DEC was intended to function primarily as a fundraising 
mechanism, and was only responsible for allocating the funds among its members; the 
individual agencies maintained responsibility for how they spent their shares. In practice 
these tended to be allocated equally, subject to the extent of each individual NGO's 
involvement in affected regions.
38
 It was also agreed that emergency appeals would be 
broadcast simultaneously on commercial television, as ITV used the same appeals 
machinery as the BBC.
39
 The emergency appeals process was eventually formalised in an 
aide-memoire in March 1971, the product of discussions between senior British Red Cross 
and BBC staff. The aide-memoire included an acknowledgement by the BBC that the 
DEC members were ‘the leading British charities concerned with the provision of aid and 
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relief overseas’. The document also recognised the exceptional status of the DEC 
mechanism, stating that emergency appeals were ‘unique in the sense that for them 
alone... the BBC was prepared to break its normal schedules to appeal to the giving 
public’. It was also agreed at this time that ‘to preserve the credibility of emergency 
appeals', requests for broadcasts would be ‘confined to major disasters’. The broadcasters 
also made clear that they had to be in unanimous agreement before any appeal would be 
granted.
40
  
 These arrangements granted the DEC agencies an unprecedented level of access to 
national television for British charitable organisations. Indeed, while the DEC worked to 
dampen competition between its members for emergency fundraising, it also prevented 
external organisations from challenging their exclusive status. The DEC agencies were 
aware of this, and actively excluded other NGOs from sharing in the privileges of the 
Committee. For instance, an application from Help the Aged to join the DEC in 1968 was 
rejected on the basis that ‘the Committee would no longer serve the purpose it was set up 
for if its membership was expanded’.41 This rejection was agreed by all of the DEC 
agencies, despite Oxfam's acknowledgement that Help the Aged had become ‘a 
considerable force to be reckoned with’, whose expenditure on press advertising was 
‘second only to our own’.42 The DEC fundraising mechanism thus also worked to 
consolidate the de facto oligarchy of its members within the humanitarian sector. 
 The DEC's first joint appeal was aired in August 1966, for people affected by a 
earthquake in Eastern Turkey. The appeal was fronted by BBC presenter Cliff 
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Michelmore (who had long-standing links with Christian Aid
43
), and established a 
particular publicity style and fundraising model which the DEC would consistently adhere 
to in the following years. The appeal emphasised the extensive human suffering caused by 
the disaster, and was framed as a moral imploration to the audience, stating that ‘we need 
your help and we need it urgently’.44 However, little information of substance was 
provided to the public concerning the actual delivery of aid, or the disaster's broader 
political context. The appeal raised a record sum of over £550,000 for emergency relief, 
the majority of which was channelled into a War on Want housing project.
45
 Internally, 
the DEC Chairman viewed the appeal's success as a validation of ‘the decision of the five 
member Charities to combine their resources in such emergencies’.46 The critical role of 
television in sparking this response was not lost on the individual agencies. Oxfam, which 
was undertaking a development programme in India throughout this period (becoming 
operational in the field for the first time
47
), observed that although the public had donated 
a record amount for Turkey, they had been ‘stolidly unmoved and apparently unconvinced 
by the Indian famine’. This contrast was attributed directly to a ‘brilliant Cliff Michelmore 
T.V. Appeal’.48 
 Buoyed by the success of the Turkey appeal, the DEC launched further appeals in 
1967 and 1968 in response to wars in the Middle East and Vietnam, which raised 
£164,000 and £350,600 respectively. The appeals were framed in a similar manner to the 
Turkey earthquake, despite both being for conflicts with complex man-made causes. 
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Indeed, the DEC deliberately championed itself as a non-political actor in its publicity for 
such emergencies. The 1967 Middle East appeal urged the viewer to ‘forget politics’, and 
instead ‘help the tired, hungry, homeless, torn victims of the six-day war’.49 The 1968 
appeal for Vietnam similarly characterised the DEC approach as ‘No politics. No 
boundaries. Send us money now. We'll rush your aid to the people of Vietnam’.50 This 
deliberately apolitical presentation of the DEC was reinforced by the Vietnam appeal 
being made for both sides of the conflict, which required contributions to be made to 
organisations working in North Vietnam.
51
 The generous public responses to these early 
appeals demonstrated the effectiveness of this form of representation at generating 
donations without controversy.  
 The DEC mechanism worked smoothly in these initial years, and the Committee 
enjoyed a relaxed relationship with the broadcasting authorities. In depicting a simplified 
state of generic ‘emergency’, these appeals also worked to foster a paternalistic and one-
sided relationship between the DEC members and the public, grounded in passive 
philanthropy rather than political engagement. As has been demonstrated, this was 
increasingly in contradiction with the development education programmes being pursued 
by many of the same organisations. Indeed, the manner in which the DEC operated was 
reminiscent of the emergency humanitarianism which characterised the sector in the 
1940s and 1950s. As a form of co-ordination, the DEC ultimately had more in common 
with COBSRA in the 1940s, then it did with the new types of organisation emerging 
within the sector such as the Freedom from Hunger Campaign or VCOAD. 
 The fundraising success of early DEC appeals also indicated the growing power of 
television footage to influence the public. Television ownership rose throughout the 
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1960s, consolidating the medium as the lens through which the British public viewed and 
understood the wider world. Mark Donnelly describes this trend as ‘the most important 
cultural transformation of the sixties’.52 The spread of television, and concurrent advances 
in communications technology, brought a new immediacy and emotional impact to images 
of distant suffering. News reports of overseas disasters helped stimulate humanitarian 
empathy among the viewing public, evoking an impulse to act immediately to address 
emergencies in the newly post-colonial states.
53
 This humanitarian imperative to ‘save’ 
shared many characteristics with older colonial discourses of Western benevolence and 
paternalism, and captured how notions of imperial philanthropy continued to endure in 
post-imperial humanitarian aid.
54
 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann notably refers to a ‘politically 
double-edged form of empathy’ emerging during this period, which ‘bore similarities to 
the imperial humanitarianism of the early nineteenth century’.55 
 The sophisticated procedures and technical processes involved in producing, 
broadcasting, and collecting the proceeds from DEC appeals also reflected an ongoing 
professionalisation of NGO advertising taking place throughout the 1960s. Within the 
humanitarian sector Oxfam led the way, extensively commercialising its operations and 
applying sophisticated corporate techniques to fundraising and public relations. A report 
in the Guardian in 1964 referred to Oxfam as ‘our most businesslike charity... girding the 
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country with gift shops as determinedly as any trading street company’.56 Other NGOs 
followed suit, marking a broader shift to professional advertising within the voluntary 
sector as a whole. Professionalised fundraising spurred the expansion of NGOs, but it also 
worked to contain the more radical voices within the sector by encouraging simplification 
and homogenisation, drawing organisations to the centre ground ideologically.
57
  
 This was especially apparent for humanitarian agencies, who repeatedly returned 
to the stereotypical image of the starving child due to its emotional impact. A British 
advertising consultant memorably commented in 1969 that the most effective charitable 
fundraising method was to ‘show babies, all the time show babies and more babies’.58 
This professionalising process was so pervasive that by 1970, the Times commented that 
disaster relief had ‘undergone a complete metamorphosis in the past decade’. This was 
attributed to the evolution of amateur groups into ‘professional organisations fired by the 
entrepreneurial spirit’. The same article acknowledged that while this had potentially 
‘robbed “charity” of much of its charm’, disaster relief had become ‘big business’ and 
professional business methods were therefore now required, not only to raise money but to 
also account for how it was spent.
59
 
 These trends all significantly accelerated in the period between 1968 and 1973, 
which witnessed a quick succession of major, internationalised emergencies in Nigeria, 
East Pakistan, and the Sahel belt of Africa. Widely covered in the Western media, these 
disasters captured the attention of the public and stimulated a further expansion of 
international aid agencies. Indeed, the late 1960s is often presented as the beginning of a 
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new phase in humanitarian action, as NGOs and emergency aid were rapidly globalised.
60
 
In Britain, the DEC was prominently involved in the humanitarian response to all three of 
these disasters, most overtly in raising public donations through televised appeals, but also 
as a forum for NGO collaboration and discussion. In the process, the DEC also worked to 
actively reinforce a depoliticised humanitarianism within the NGO sector as a whole. The 
contribution and role of the DEC in these emergencies is examined below in three detailed 
case studies, beginning with the Nigerian Civil War in 1968. 
 
 
Biafra, 1968 
In 1968, humanitarian NGOs from across the Western world launched a major relief 
operation in response to the Nigerian Civil War, being fought between the Nigerian 
Federal Military Government (FMG) and the Secessionist state of Biafra in the East. The 
Biafran crisis has been widely presented as a critical moment in the history of modern 
humanitarianism and NGOs. Michael Barnett describes the civil war as opening a ‘new 
chapter in humanitarian action... while the suffering was hardly unprecedented, the 
international response was’.61 Television images of Biafran starvation gave rise to huge 
public demands for intervention all over the world (Tony Vaux refers to the ‘first 
humanitarian disaster to be seen by millions of people’62), propelling NGOs to a new level 
of prominence. Biafra also gave rise to important new agencies such as Concern and 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). NGOs were able to step into the ‘humanitarian vacuum’ 
created by an absence of donor governments and UN agencies, taking on a leading role 
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and further fuelling their own expansion. Biafra is also infamous as the moment when 
NGOs lost their ‘innocence’, as the Biafran leadership exploited their humanitarian efforts 
to sustain themselves and prolong the conflict. Alex de Waal thus depicts Biafra as both a 
‘totem and taboo’ for NGOs; it drove their emergence and professionalisation, yet did so 
while also exposing naive agencies to the harmful, unintended consequences that can arise 
from providing relief in times of conflict.
63
 Rony Brauman, former president of MSF, 
states that ‘the Biafran War of 1967-70 was the founding event of the modern 
humanitarian aid movement’.64 
 The humanitarian response to the Biafran crisis has thus been well documented in 
existing scholarship. The following case study adds to this literature, by examining the 
role played by the DEC. The Committee members initially responded to the war in a 
similar manner to previous appeals, by making a deliberate effort to appear apolitical and 
neutral and providing aid to both sides with discretion. To work in Biafra where the need 
was greater, NGOs could channel funds through the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, which was tasked with leading the humanitarian response in the absence of official 
intervention. Alternatively, they could work through established religious structures in the 
region, such as the Irish Holy Ghost Fathers. The latter group was itself a problematic 
body to direct aid through, as many missionaries in the field identified with the Biafran 
cause and actively blurred humanitarian aid with political action. This extended to 
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accusations that individual missionaries were engaged in arms trafficking for the Biafran 
military.
65
  
 Catholic missionaries would later begin their own airlift into Biafra in 1968, in 
conjunction with Caritas and other European Church agencies, which became known as 
the Joint Church Aid (JCA) airlift. JCA was less concerned with neutrality, and permitted 
their assistance to be carried on flights also transporting arms and ammunition for the 
Biafran military.
66
 The DEC agencies provided grants and funding to both the ICRC and 
Irish missionaries, while also taking care to provide aid in Federal territory, using the 
Committee as an arena to exchange dialogue and pool knowledge. The DEC members 
however declined to launch a televised joint appeal following a meeting in May 1968, due 
to the logistical and political challenges of getting aid into Biafra. Instead the agencies 
agreed to hold off all publicity until the ICRC channel was fully secured, at which point 
all funds raised could be channelled directly into the expanding ICRC aid programme.
67
 
 At this point, the civil war had largely failed to capture media or public interest in 
the West, despite the efforts of the Biafran leadership and individual aid workers or 
journalists. This situation was dramatically altered in June 1968, as a sudden upsurge of 
media images of starvation and suffering transformed Biafra into a major international 
news story. In Britain, ITV aired a lengthy news report from the Biafran refugee camps on 
12 June, narrated by broadcaster Alan Hart. Hart's report featured powerful footage of 
starving Biafran children being attended to by white aid workers, and explicitly called for 
relief to be made available (image 2.2). Television reports were further reinforced by 
features and photographic spreads of starving Biafran children in several national 
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newspapers, such as the Sun and the Sunday Times, which called on the international 
community to act. The effect of this media coverage was instant, mobilising public 
compassion in support of humanitarian relief efforts in Biafran territory. Biafran 
propaganda (which had been struggling in vain to internationalise the war) quickly seized 
upon these new developments, disseminating a mass of sensational imagery and 
exaggerated claims about the death rate and Federal atrocities in Biafra.
68
 
 
    
Image 2.2: Images from ITN news report on Biafra, 12 June 1968.
69
 
 
The sudden transformation of Biafran suffering into a major domestic issue dovetailed 
with the broader social climate of protest and tumult which characterised the late 1960s. 
As a staunch supporter of the Nigerian Federal Government (which included supplying 
arms), the British Labour government came under immense pressure for its pro-Nigeria 
policy. Harold Wilson acknowledged to his cabinet in late 1968 that the war had ‘aroused 
profound feeling in the country... it could give rise to a political and Parliamentary crisis 
of the utmost gravity’.70 Evocative television images of emaciated African children 
created public demands for action, which in turn placed pressure on aid agencies to visibly 
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intervene. Within the NGO sector, these demands were further exacerbated by broader 
calls for more overt political action on Third World suffering. In this heated environment, 
Oxfam broke with the previous DEC agreement to avoid publicity, and took unilateral 
action. The organisation deployed its professionalised publicity machinery in support of 
Biafran relief, launching a major fundraising campaign within days of the ITV news 
reports. The campaign utilised the now ubiquitous images of starving Biafran children to 
capture the attention of the viewing public, and drive fundraising (image 2.3). Indeed, 
Oxfam's rapid response enabled the organisation to quickly generate substantial public 
donations at the expense of other aid agencies. Oxfam's income soared over the course of 
1968, fuelling further organisational expansion.
71
 
 
   
Image 2.3: Oxfam, Biafra press appeals, June/July 1968.
72
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The deliberate use of the trope of the starving African child reflected its effectiveness in 
Oxfam's fundraising since the Congo crisis. Furthermore, despite claims that Oxfam was 
‘not concerned with the rights and wrongs of this conflict’, these appeals associated the 
organisation with the Biafran cause, effectively adopting a political stance on the war. The 
very naming of Oxfam's ‘Biafran emergency appeal’ drew criticism from the Nigerian 
High Commissioner in London, who complained that the advertisement would ‘add 
credence to the fiction that a State of “Biafra” exists’.73 In practice many Oxfam staff had 
already adopted a pro-Biafran position. This included senior executives such as Nicolas 
Stacey, who made regular appearances on television which cast Oxfam as Biafra's saviour. 
Leslie Kirkley himself flew to Biafra in a blaze of publicity to negotiate directly with the 
Biafran leadership on the relief issue.
74
 The radical climate within Oxfam, and the sector 
as a whole, motivated the agency towards taking a more overtly political stance which 
went well beyond the apparently neutral humanitarianism of the DEC.  
 While Oxfam's publicity blitz thrust the organisation into the limelight, the 
consequences of their pro-Biafran campaigning also demonstrated the problems that could 
arise from becoming more political. The agency was repeatedly and publicly attacked by 
the Nigerian Federal Government for becoming ‘politically involved’ in the conflict. At a 
meeting between the Nigerian leadership and NGO representatives in July, all aid 
agencies were warned that ‘political interference would not be tolerated from any relief 
organisation’.75 Within the British government there was a consensus that Oxfam had 
become too partisan, and the organisation was excluded from an official mission to 
Nigeria in July 1968 led by future DEC Chairman Lord Hunt. Instead, the mission 
included representatives from the more moderate British Red Cross and Save the 
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Children.
76
 Indeed, SCF's response to the conflict was in stark contrast to Oxfam. The 
Fund was very careful to avoid antagonising the Nigerian state, and eventually withdrew 
its aid workers from Biafra altogether in October 1968. Instead SCF operated solely in 
Federal territory, where it received significant financial assistance from the British 
government.
77
 
 Crucially, Oxfam also came under heavy criticism within the privacy of the DEC, 
for taking unilateral action and breaking the prior agreement to hold off publicity. The 
British Red Cross stated that Oxfam had undermined its partners by jeopardising the 
possibility of future DEC broadcast appeals for Nigeria. Oxfam replied that they had tried 
to ‘pave the way for the DEC by stirring up public opinion’, and had ‘no intention of 
prejudicing a DEC television appeal’. Oxfam also agreed that they would place their own 
publicity on hold if a DEC appeal was launched.
78
 Rebuked by its fellow agencies, and 
facing sharp official criticism, Oxfam began to rein in its more radical elements. The 
agency dialled back on its controversial statements, and moved to publicly disassociate 
itself from the emerging Biafra lobby in Britain. This included sending a representative to 
a July rally in London to announce that Oxfam was a ‘completely non-political body’.79 
The organisation's representative in Lagos also formally apologised to the Nigerian 
government, assuring that Oxfam would ‘henceforth avoid doing anything that might 
cause suspicion of the humanitarian motives of his organisation’.80  
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 Oxfam's response to Biafra highlighted many of the tensions and contradictions 
within the sector. The promotion of simplistic, negative images of starving Biafran 
children generated significant financial benefits, while also further reinforcing 
problematic stereotypes of African suffering and helplessness. Simultaneously, the 
organisation also attempted to move beyond charitable relief and become more politically 
involved in the conflict, which exposed the divides within the sector concerning the 
acceptable limits of political engagement. In this context, the DEC functioned as an 
instrument for moderation, providing a forum for its other members to restrain Oxfam and 
push the organisation back to a less controversial stance of charitable relief. 
 Within the broader international humanitarian community, Oxfam's experience 
was not unique. The same pressures that had influenced the agency to break ranks with the 
DEC could be detected all across Europe. Attending a meeting between the ICRC and 
European NGO representatives in August 1968, Lord Hunt observed the ‘tremendous 
pressures of public opinion for quick decisions and action on relief operations... 
independent initiatives will prove irresistible unless [the ICRC] can move fast’. He added 
that there was a clear ‘Biafran bias’ evident among the assembled NGOs.81 British Red 
Cross Director A.B. Hodgson, also attending, observed the ‘extreme frustration and sense 
of concern of all the 20/30 nations represented at the apparent inability of the ICRC to 
organise relief’. Hodgson added that the British public appeared comparatively ‘balanced 
and objective’ about Nigeria compared to France and the Scandinavian nations, where 
‘the Biafran problem is all that concerns their public’.82 In France, dissatisfaction with the 
ICRC famously led to the founding of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in 1971, which 
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took up a more aggressive media role. The experience of Biafra remains an important 
‘founding myth’ for MSF.83 
 The DEC eventually agreed to launch a joint broadcast appeal in November 1968, 
in response to an ICRC appeal for resources. By this point the initial wave of intense 
media coverage and public pressure over the Biafran issue had waned. Consequently, the 
appeal itself was a relatively low-key affair, which the agencies all wished to conclude 
quickly without interrupting their Christmas fundraising plans. The appeal for ‘Nigerian 
War Victims’ was cast in the established DEC mould, made for both sides of the conflict 
and avoiding any direct reference to ‘Biafra’. The appeal provided little concrete 
information on the complex politics of relief at play in the region, instead focusing on the 
abstract icon of the starving African child.
84
 Behind the scenes, the appeal was more 
problematic. The broadcast was presented on the BBC by Nicolas Stacey, an Oxfam 
representative who had become publicly associated with the Biafran cause. This decision, 
taken at the last-minute by the British Red Cross when the BBC declined to provide its 
own staff, provoked genuine anger within the Committee. Christian Aid commented that it 
was ‘very unfortunate indeed for DEC inner relationships’.85 Save the Children objected 
‘in the strongest terms to the selection of a representative of one of the member 
organisations’.86 Tellingly, when the appeal was broadcast on ITV it was presented by 
newsreader Andrew Gardner instead. The DEC would later make a thinly veiled criticism 
of Stacey that ‘the appeal did not really get under way until after the ITV broadcast... the 
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appeal on ITV had the greater impact’.87 These internal debates further highlighted the 
competitive rivalries between NGOs, as well as demonstrating how the DEC was acting as 
a handbrake on the sector's own politicisation. 
 The DEC raised a total of £242,000 for Nigeria, falling short of a number of 
previous appeals. Save the Children had anticipated this ‘limited response’, which was 
attributed to a lack of follow-up advertising and the appeal cut-off date coming earlier 
than usual, to minimise interference with Christmas fundraising.
88
 The poor response to 
the appeal also reflected how the DEC mechanism had been sidelined by Oxfam's 
unilateral action, which prevented the Committee from being able to position itself as a 
leading channel for donations when public compassion was at its peak. Instead, in relation 
to Biafra the DEC's significance was more that it provided a means for the other agencies 
in the sector (particularly the conservative British Red Cross and Save the Children) to 
restrain overtly political activity. In the process, a simplistic humanitarianism embedded 
in the origins of the Committee was re-asserted. The deliberate cutting-short of the 
eventual DEC Nigeria appeal also revealed the limits to which the Committee could 
dampen competition within the sector. As important as Nigerian relief was, the DEC 
members still prioritised their own Christmas fundraising programmes, which were a vital 
source of income and publicity. 
 By this point the war was entering into its final phases. The accidental shooting 
down of an ICRC aircraft by Federal forces in June 1969 effectively ended the ICRC 
airlift into Biafra, and after this date the only method of getting aid supplies into the 
region was via the expanding Joint Church Aid airlift, which most NGOs transferred their 
support to. Notably, in a reflection of Oxfam's earlier predicaments, they did so without 
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publicity or fanfare.
89
 By this point Biafra's defeat was inevitable, and a final Nigerian 
offensive in late 1969 forced the surrender of the Biafran military in January 1970. 
Following Biafra, the DEC made a number of appeals in rapid succession in late 1969 and 
early 1970, for floods in Algeria, an earthquake in Yugoslavia, an earthquake in Turkey, 
and floods in Romania. While none of these disasters were on a scale approaching 
Nigeria, they all raised respectable sums for the Committee without controversy.  
 This flux of appeals indicated how integral disaster fundraising was to the sector, 
despite these coinciding with the launch of the World Development Movement. Indeed, 
the Committee members pressed ahead with these joint television appeals despite an 
awareness that the regular appearance of the DEC on television would discourage the 
BBC from covering the wider work of the individual agencies. Christian Aid's head of 
communications observed that ‘within the BBC the attitude towards these big five 
charities individually is hardening, but the attitude towards them collectively as 
represented by the DEC has softened to the point where they don't really like to say no 
when approached for a joint appeal’.90 What this suggests is the DEC agencies actively 
consolidated a public conception of themselves as concerned with humanitarian relief, 
rather than political justice. Christian Aid notably attributed the glut of appeals to the 
British Red Cross, which needed funds after having ‘emptied its coffers into Nigeria’.91 
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Bangladesh, 1970-72 
While the Biafran crisis highlighted the problematic relationship between NGOs and 
politics, it did not slow down the increasing advocacy ambitions of the sector. Indeed, 
Biafra arguably encouraged the sector to engage more systematically with development 
theory and programming, as a means to try and avoid the problems of relief encountered 
during the conflict. The Biafran episode also reinforced how effective provocative images 
of disaster and human suffering were at galvanising the public, especially when compared 
to the lukewarm reaction to the launch of the World Development Movement in the same 
period. As Maggie Black observes, for ‘all the achievements of the emerging development 
lobby, no-one could pretend that “1 per cent of GNP” and “fair trade” evoked in the 
public mind the passionate concern that a Biafran child could conjure’.92 Within a year of 
the war in Nigeria concluding, the NGO relief network was once again mobilised to 
respond to a major disaster, this time in the Indian subcontinent.  
 In late 1970, a destructive cyclone struck the coastal regions of East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh), causing huge damage and an estimated 500,000 fatalities. Media coverage of 
the devastation quickly galvanised a large international relief effort. This also brought 
British NGOs to the region at a time of intense political conflict between Pakistan's East 
and West wings. This erupted into an all-out civil war in 1971, which also gave rise to a 
massive refugee displacement from East Pakistan to India. The sheer magnitude of 
refugees crossing the border transformed the conflict into an international humanitarian 
crisis, with repercussions felt across the globe. The crisis eventually culminated in a brief 
war between Pakistan and India, and the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. 
The scale and complexity of the emergency also contributed to a reconfiguration of 
international humanitarian action over the course of the 1970s (as discussed further in 
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chapters three and four). Against this volatile political backdrop, humanitarian NGOs 
struggled to implement aid programmes in both the cyclone affected region and the 
refugee camps without becoming entangled in the chaotic politics of relief. 
 Despite the importance of this emergency in humanitarian history, there has been 
substantially less published on the Bangladesh crisis than other major international 
disasters, such as Biafra. This reflects a broader lack of historical literature on the creation 
of Bangladesh in general. Srinath Raghavan attributes this to the professional tendencies 
of South Asian history, in particular a bias towards cultural and social history, and a 
reluctance to examine the period beyond 1947.
93
 Excellent historical scholarship is now 
emerging. Antara Datta uses the 1971 refugee crisis to explore how attitudes to refugees 
and borders shifted during the period, and how this relates more broadly to the history of 
citizenship and participation in South Asia. Datta's work includes a thorough account of 
how the UN assumed authority for co-ordinating the humanitarian response to the refugee 
crisis in 1971. This paved the way for increased involvement of the UN system in the 
provision of emergency aid.
94
 Srinath Raghavan's global history of the creation of 
Bangladesh locates the events of 1971 in the context of broader international processes. 
This includes humanitarian responses in the West, such as NGO fundraising and George 
Harrison's famous Concert for Bangladesh.
95
 There is still a pressing need, however, for a 
more systematic investigation of the contribution of NGOs to how the Bangladesh crisis 
unfolded. 
 The devastation caused by the 1970 cyclone was widely covered in the 
international media, provoking a huge public response across the world. British 
government officials observed that ‘sudden human tragedy on such a scale has rarely 
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occurred since the advent of mass media... this calamity touched off a response of 
exceptional sympathy and generosity in many parts of the world’.96 The DEC launched a 
broadcast appeal almost immediately, presented by the famous actor Richard 
Attenborough, which called for immediate aid for ‘one of the worst catastrophes the world 
has ever known’ (image 2.4).97 The appeal resonated with the British public, who donated 
a record sum of £1.49 million to be divided up equally among the five member agencies.
98
 
The record amount demonstrated how effective the DEC could be as a fundraising 
mechanism, as exclusive access to television enabled the Committee to position itself as a 
channel for the public compassion fostered by emotive news footage. The DEC's 
deliberately simplistic approach to publicity also coloured its fundraising with a broad 
populist appeal.  
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Image 2.4: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘East Pakistan Floods’ press appeal, November 
1970.
99
 
 
Reflecting the problems encountered in Biafra, the DEC members made a conscious effort 
to present themselves as apolitical in their work in the cyclone region. From the outset, it 
was agreed that ‘none of the members should proceed with projects without the full 
agreement of the Pakistan Government’.100 As in Nigeria, aid agencies also assumed a 
more prominent role due to the lack of an official presence. The British government had 
deployed an effective and large-scale relief effort spearheaded by the Royal Navy in the 
immediate post-cyclone period. However, this was quickly withdrawn only weeks later 
due to the political difficulties created by stationing British soldiers on Pakistan soil. From 
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this point on the DEC agencies assumed responsibility for all British relief and 
rehabilitation efforts, with tacit governmental support.
101
  
 The response of the NGOs to the cyclone appeared publicly to be no different than 
previous emergency operations. In practice, the manner in which the DEC members spent 
their funding was problematic, and indicated a growing and contradictory tension between 
short-term relief and long-term development. Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want all 
agreed to spend the majority of their shares from the DEC appeal on rural development 
programmes. This led to the formation of a DEC sub-committee, to jointly implement 
such projects in the cyclone region. This sub-committee was legally constituted as the 
‘Consortium of British Charities’ in April 1971. The Consortium was mandated to 
promote agricultural development through land cultivation, community development, and 
mechanisation programmes.
102
 The consortium was structured so that Christian Aid would 
handle publicity, Oxfam would handle supplies, and War on Want would handle 
accounting. Iain Macdonald, War on Want's International Director, was appointed to the 
post of co-ordinator. Macdonald oversaw a team of aid workers carrying out the 
Consortium's work in East Pakistan, but answerable to the agency executives back in 
Britain.
103
  
 The Consortium was characterised by a staunchly pro-development outlook, 
captured in such statements as ‘the post cyclone situation might create a climate 
favourable to the acceptance of basic agricultural development’.104 However, the public 
had donated on the basis of a simplistic DEC emergency appeal, which had implied all 
contributions would be put towards immediate relief. Instead, the Consortium agencies 
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deliberately blurred the appeal of this form of humanitarianism with their own 
commitment to long-term development. This reality was never communicated to the 
public, especially not through the DEC, which promoted and endorsed a narrative of 
charitable altruism.  
 This tension was complicated by the gradual involvement of Consortium aid 
workers in the politics of the region. The outbreak of civil war in March 1971 was 
accompanied by a violent crackdown on Bengali separatists by the West Pakistan Army, 
which resulted in the widespread killing of unarmed civilians. These events also placed 
the Consortium plans on hold, as the Pakistan government no longer permitted foreigners 
to enter East Pakistan. In this volatile context, the Consortium team became increasingly 
pro-Bangladesh. Co-ordinator Iain Macdonald prepared a report which accused the British 
government of conspiring to aid West Pakistan. The same report urged the Consortium 
agencies to take action to prevent ‘the continuation throughout next winter of appalling 
misery among the people of all parts of East Pakistan’.105 Extracts from Macdonald's 
report later appeared in the Times, which risked attracting the censure of the West 
Pakistan military. Christian Aid and Oxfam subsequently discussed removing Macdonald 
from his position, on the grounds that he could no longer be trusted to ‘conduct the 
delicate negotiations which were required if the Consortium was to obtain permission to 
start up its programmes in East Pakistan’.106 
 However, Macdonald's views were not out of place within War on Want, which 
was beginning to accelerate the pace of its own radicalisation. Council members referred 
to a ‘genocide’ taking place in East Pakistan, and in June 1971 Chairman Donald 
Chesworth visited the region. Observers commented that Chesworth became ‘totally 
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committed towards Bangladesh... He can envisage no other future for East Pakistan than 
the emergence of an independent government of Bangladesh’. Chesworth also described 
the West Pakistan military as ‘savage and senseless’.107 Following Chesworth's visit, War 
on Want began making significant finance available for the ‘Bangladesh Voluntary 
Service Corps’, an overtly political pro-Bangladesh organisation composed of young male 
refugees, the board of which included a War on Want Field Director. These developments 
provoked deep concern among the other DEC agencies, who feared public association 
with War on Want could result in their expulsion by the West Pakistan government. As 
had happened with Oxfam and Biafra, the other Consortium agencies used the DEC forum 
to restrain War on Want's overtly political activities. This included refusing to go along 
with War on Want plans to make public statements on the causes of the suffering in East 
Pakistan. Christian Aid Director Alan Booth commented at this time that NGOs should 
‘not attempt to use the power of money to give the appearance of political interference in 
the Third World... I felt this rather strongly in the case of Nigeria and Biafra’.108 
 The Consortium was finally able to resume its aid programme in July 1971, by 
coming under the umbrella of the UN. Christian Aid and Oxfam pressurised Macdonald's 
staff to remain separate from ‘the general situation in East Pakistan... the Consortium 
should restrict its terms of reference to post-cyclone rehabilitation programmes’.109 By 
this point the Pakistan Army was treating the Consortium aid workers with growing 
hostility, who acknowledged they were ‘increasingly unwelcome to military 
authorities’.110 In practice Macdonald continued to agitate, criticising the Pakistan 
government and issuing predictions that a severe famine would soon develop in the 
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cyclone region. Oxfam commented privately that Macdonald worked more for War on 
Want than for the Consortium, and pressed for his removal.
111
 
 The violence in East Pakistan also sparked a mass displacement of refugees into 
the Eastern provinces of India, and by May an estimated 30,000 refugees were crossing 
the border every day due to Pakistan hostility.
112
 In the same month the Pakistan 
government, faced with a humanitarian crisis that was spiralling out of control, officially 
requested that the UN assume overall command of co-ordinating relief. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was subsequently designated as a ‘focal point’, 
administering assistance to refugees and co-ordinating the myriad of UN agencies and 
NGOs also involved.
113
 This marked a new phase of UN engagement in emergency relief, 
as discussed further in chapter three.
114
  
 Despite the unfolding refugee crisis, the DEC agencies initially worried that ‘by 
being involved with the refugee problem they may be prevented from carrying out the 
rehabilitation programme’.115 However, with public interest in the refugees growing, the 
DEC launched a new ‘India/Pakistan Relief Fund’ appeal in June 1971. This had no links 
with the previous cyclone appeal, and was deliberately constructed to make no reference 
to the political chaos unfolding in the region - instead stressing that it was ‘people as 
human beings with which the charities are concerned’.116 The DEC deliberately focused 
on the suffering of individual bodies, using the abstract image of the suffering child as a 
way to raise money and prevent political discussion. A DEC press advertisement from 
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July 1971 was explicitly framed in this fashion, focusing on the death of a young Bengali 
boy (image 2.5).  
 
 
Image 2.5: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘India/Pakistan relief’ press appeal, June 
1971.
117
 
 
The powerful image of a deceased child in the appeal was intended to immediately 
capture the attention of the reader, and provoke an emotional response. The narrative that 
accompanies the photograph makes clear that ‘like thousands of other Pakistani refugees, 
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this 10-years old boy made his way to India, only to find death. His father had to bury him 
in the mud because there was no wood for cremation’. The appeal then goes on to offer 
the reader the opportunity to alleviate such suffering, by stating that ‘we must have more 
money - NOW! Your donation may actually save a life’. The appeal was very successful, 
raising over £1.4 million to be distributed among the DEC members.
118
 It also deliberately 
depoliticised the complexities of the civil war and refugee displacement, allowing the 
DEC agencies to raise funds for a politically volatile emergency in a relatively neutral 
way. Save the Children privately acknowledged how the refugee displacement had been 
distorted, stating that ‘in view of the Fund's policy of treading a delicate political 
tightrope... it was felt necessary to restrict the outflow of information to the news 
media’.119 The injection of new funds enabled the DEC members to undertake relief and 
rehabilitation programmes in the refugee camps on the Indian border. However, in August 
the Indian government expelled all foreign NGOs, due to a view that the Indian state was 
better equipped to run the camps.
120
 The DEC agencies had no choice but to comply, 
although their exodus was largely downplayed to the British public which had just 
donated to them so generously. 
 As 1971 drew to a close, the difficulties of operating in the region prompted the 
Consortium NGOs to consider abandoning the cyclone aid programme altogether.
121
 
Political events overtook the agencies, as war erupted between India and Pakistan in 
December. India's rapid victory after only 13 days of fighting forced West Pakistan troops 
out of East Pakistan, which gained its independence as Bangladesh. Britain and the 
international community officially recognised the new state in the early months of 
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1972.
122
 The cessation of hostilities defused some of the political volatility surrounding 
the Consortium, which resumed its development work in 1972. Indeed, the Consortium 
team stated that the widespread destruction and chaos that had unfolded in the region also 
offered ‘an opportunity for imaginative basic integrated development’.123  
 The Consortium team was subsequently brought under the supervision of the 
Bangladesh authorities, to contribute to mechanisation and agricultural development 
programmes.
124
 Despite the grand visions of the team, in practice the Consortium quickly 
fizzled out, hindered by a lack of communication with the UK and increasingly subsumed 
by the developmental agencies of the Bangladesh state. Macdonald resigned in May 1972, 
commenting that the Consortium staff had become an ‘embarrassment’, and had even 
been declared ‘persona non grata’ in certain areas.125 Macdonald also referred to a ‘lack of 
funds’ for the programme, as the cessation of hostilities also signified the end of large-
scale emergency fundraising. The Consortium team lingered on inside Bangladesh to little 
impact, to the extent that by the end of the decade the entire project was viewed within 
War on Want as ‘ossified’, and an example of ineffective engagement with development 
theory.
126
 
 The fizzling out of the Consortium project after 1971 also indicated the importance 
of disaster to fuelling the work of NGOs in the Third World. Indeed, as Bangladesh 
declared its independence the DEC was already looking to its next emergency, intervening 
in Nicaragua in late 1972 in response to a destructive earthquake. A remarkably similar 
approach to East Pakistan was adopted, as a Consortium of agencies led by Christian Aid, 
Oxfam and War on Want was set up to implement long-term development programmes in 
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the earthquake region. The deliberate attempt to blur relief and development in these 
disaster zones, with little tangible results, prompted significant internal debate within the 
sector. A post-mortem report of the Nicaragua Consortium suggested that aid agencies 
lacked a ‘clearly defined understanding of what either “relief” or “development” should 
be taken to mean’. The same report advised that the realisation of tangible development 
results would therefore require ‘a much more vigorous campaign of socio-politico-
economic education among those power groups in the more developed world which 
control the means of production’.127  
 What this suggests is that complex and problematic relief operations, as 
encountered in Nigeria and East Pakistan, also reinforced the trajectory of development 
NGOs towards more radical domestic campaigning. Paradoxically, these same disasters 
also raised the capacity of  NGOs for emergency relief, and consolidated a public 
conception of them as apolitical humanitarians. The prevalence of simplified disaster 
imagery compounded this, by depoliticising global poverty and perpetuating problematic 
stereotypes. Indeed, agricultural development in contexts such as Bangladesh had 
arguably only been made possible by the declaration of an emergency, which provided 
fundraising income, domestic support, media coverage, and an infrastructure to work 
through.  
 
 
Ethiopia and the Sahel, 1973-74 
In the humanitarian responses to Biafra and Bangladesh, television obviously played an 
integral role. Dramatic images of human suffering acted as a lightning rod for popular 
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compassion, which in turn led to increasing donations to aid agencies. These huge public 
responses also further associated the NGOs involved with short-term relief, rather than 
long-term development. These trends culminated in October 1973, when a single ITV 
documentary about a famine in Ethiopia sparked a massive public outcry. The 
documentary helped galvanise a international aid effort across the entire Sahel belt of 
Africa, comprised of donor governments, intergovernmental agencies, and NGOs.  
 The famine itself was primarily the result of drought and harvest decline, 
compounded by the inaction of Emperor Haile Selassie's imperial government.
128
 Indeed, 
the Sahelian region as a whole had been experiencing an intense drought since the late 
1960s, resulting in desertification and crop failure. Livestock was decimated, and millions 
were exposed to hunger, thirst, and disease.
129
 The countries mainly affected were Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), all in North West 
Africa. Ethiopia was also affected, especially in its Northern provinces.
130
 Historical 
scholarship on the international community's response to the crisis has tended to focus 
upon the role played by UN agencies. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and 
the World Food Programme (WFP) both took a leading role in co-ordinating the 
international response to the Sahel crisis after 1972. This also marked these organisations 
becoming further engaged in the provision of emergency relief, having traditionally been 
development-oriented.
131
 As with Bangladesh, less attention has been paid to the role 
played by NGOs.  
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 The DEC agencies had been aware of worsening conditions in the Sahel region of 
Africa throughout 1973. However, at a meeting in July, the DEC members had agreed not 
to launch a joint broadcast appeal, due to divisions within the Committee over what kinds 
of activity should be funded. Christian Aid and War on Want both pushed for an appeal to 
be explicitly made for long-term development projects in the Sahel, a position opposed by 
the British Red Cross and Save the Children on the basis that the situation ‘demanded 
long-term attention by international agencies and governments rather than DEC member 
charities’. Oxfam supported development in principle, but argued that in this particular 
case short-term relief was preferable.
132
 This dispute also captured deeper divides within 
the sector as a whole, as the Red Cross and SCF bitterly opposed any attempt to move the 
DEC away from its original mandate for emergency relief. By contrast, War on Want's 
ongoing radicalisation was pushing the organisation further away from traditional charity. 
Indeed, at the very same DEC meeting, the agencies also discussed a War on Want 
proposal for the DEC to undertake a ‘long-term once for all solution to the world drought 
problem’, which was dismissed as unrealistic.133 Christian Aid and Oxfam blurred these 
two positions together; committed to long-term development, but unwilling to give up 
responsibilities for disaster relief, and the benefits that emergency appeals provided. 
 At this point in time, NGOs had limited knowledge of Ethiopia, where they had 
little presence or contacts. Oxfam was one notable exception, having learnt of famine 
conditions in May 1973 through Father Kevin Doheny. Doheny was a prominent Holy 
Ghost Father and veteran missionary, who had played a significant role in Biafra in 1968. 
Doheny had established the Christian Relief Association in May 1973, later the Christian 
Relief and Development Association (CRDA), as an umbrella body for Ethiopian 
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Churches and missionary bodies. CRDA was designed to share knowledge of the famine 
and appeal for funds from European Churches. CRDA was also heavily influenced by the 
Joint Church Aid initiative in Nigeria; Doheny later referred to it as ‘an outgrowth of the 
Biafran war... I would not have got the idea were it not for Biafra’.134 Oxfam was one of 
the first Western agencies to support CRDA, and began making small grants after May 
1973. However, there was still little awareness of the true extent of the famine within the 
country. It was only after a UNICEF survey in August 1973 that a true picture emerged, 
and Oxfam despatched their Communications Officer Tony Hall to the famine zones to 
provide advice from the field. Hall would later say of this period that ‘the people I talked 
to hadn't spoken to a reporter... Officials and missionaries were steering by the seat of 
their pants through raging human calamity, with no past experience to guide them, under 
government suppression’. Hall added that with ‘with no outside help to call on many were 
near breakdown themselves’.135 Hall repeatedly sent articles and photographs to the 
British press, attempting to generate coverage of Ethiopia, with little success. Hall later 
commented on the difficulties he experienced with the media: 
 ‘We rushed our material back to UK and waited in a feverish mood for the shocked 
 reaction, convinced that this was quite shattering international news. But the news 
 gatekeepers on this occasion could not give the prominence or make enough room for our 
 coverage to do it justice. The only appropriate place that week was already taken by a 
 calamity in the Far East. The crisis quota had been filed. The material was rushed over to 
 another national weekly, where much of it was published as the lead item on page two. 
 There were no big follow-ups, no signs of urgency in morning news conferences. We had 
 failed to catch the wave’.
136
 
 
                                                             
134 Kevin Doheny, No Hands But Yours: Memoirs of a Missionary (Dublin: Veritas, 1997), p.100. 
135 Tony Hall, ‘Do we see famine as it is? An eyewitness in northeast Ethiopia 1973/4’, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa Conference presentation (Addis Ababa, 1994), available at:  
http://xuitlacoche.blogspot.co.uk/2010/03/famine-in-ethiopia-1973-to-1974.html [accessed 31 March 2014]. 
136 Tony Hall, ‘Africa Emergency Report’, October 1985, quoted in Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, News 
out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid (London: Hilary Shipman, 1986), pp.48-49. 
140 
 
Hall's depiction of an apathetic media correlates with the findings of scholars who have 
examined how the news constructs overseas disasters.
137
 Despite Hall's failure to ‘catch 
the wave’ however, a brief publication of his in the Sunday Times was read by Jonathan 
Dimbleby, presenter of ITV's current affairs programme This Week. Dimbleby set out to 
Ethiopia with a film crew to document the famine, working closely with Tony Hall and 
Kevin Doheny. The footage they took was subsequently edited and broadcast on ITV as 
The Unknown Famine on 18 October 1973. A half-hour primetime documentary, The 
Unknown Famine consisted entirely of graphic footage of famine victims in the relief 
camps in Northern Ethiopia. The film documented huge numbers of peasants gathered in 
the camps, visibly afflicted by starvation and disease. Appearing throughout the film were 
powerful scenes of young children either dying or already dead (image 2.6). Dimbleby's 
commentary through the film was sparse and emotive, emphasising the need for 
immediate assistance. Towards the end of the film, a pile of young dead bodies is shown, 
as Dimbleby's narrative makes clear that they all died the previous night from 
starvation.
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Image 2.6: Images from The Unknown Famine, October 1973.
139 
 
Dimbleby's film was also a crass simplification, in that it provided no explanation or 
context for the famine beyond a vague reference to drought. Instead the famine was 
presented as a sudden, natural disaster beyond human agency, rather than as a political 
failure of the Ethiopian government. Dimbleby later acknowledged that he had 
deliberately distorted the famine to maximise the film's effect on the public. Dimbleby 
justified this on the basis that to ascribe blame would have resulted in ‘the impact of the 
horror [being] diminished’, as the public would be less inclined to support relief efforts. 
For Dimbleby, this was linked with a lack of public understanding of Third World issues, 
stating that ‘the degree of ignorance that one was having to confront in one's audience 
meant that we soft-pedalled that enormously’.140  
 Dimbleby's tactic was effective. The Unknown Famine was viewed by an 
estimated twelve million people, and the ITV switchboards were jammed as soon as the 
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programme ended with callers wishing to help.
141
 Both the BBC and the press picked up 
the Ethiopia story, providing it with endorsement and further momentum. The film was 
shown at the House of Commons, which the Shadow Minister for Overseas Development 
(Judith Hart) used to call for greater official aid. Dimbleby observed that ‘the result of the 
film has been a speeding up of creaky machinery between London and Addis Ababa’.142 
The film was circulated across Europe and the Commonwealth, mobilising a multitude of 
NGOs in the process. Oxfam commented that the film aroused public concern ‘first in 
Britain, and later in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Italy’.143 Quebec donated $1 million within a month, 
prompting the Assistant Director of Oxfam-Quebec to state that ‘after two and a half years 
of our efforts to publicise the causes of underdevelopment, 15 minutes of publicising the 
effects through the film seemed to do it’.144 
 The massive international reaction appeared to justify Dimbleby's depiction of 
famine. It also reaffirmed the power of television images of starving children to provoke a 
reaction from the audience. This reality was not lost on the British NGO sector, and 
within days the DEC had agreed, produced and aired a national appeal for ‘victims of the 
droughts in Ethiopia and the countries in the Sahelian zone’. The appeal was presented by 
Jonathan Dimbleby, and based around recycled clips from The Unknown Famine. The 
speed with which the previous DEC decision to not appeal for the Sahel was reversed 
highlighted how quickly the sector could be brought back to simplistic disaster relief by 
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television images. Indeed, DEC press advertising overtly encouraged philanthropy rather 
than political engagement from the public, stating ‘this is what you can do to help: Give 
money. That's the quickest, kindest way you can help over 2 million people in Ethiopia 
and the Sahel now on the verge of starvation’.145 The Unknown Famine established a 
deliberately depoliticised humanitarian narrative which both the NGO sector, and 
Dimbleby himself, knew was limited and misleading. Yet, the DEC also chose to endorse 
and reinforce this narrative through its own publicity. That the appeal raised a new record 
sum of £1.54 million demonstrated how effective this approach could be for the sector's 
own expansion. 
 The DEC also underwent a membership change at this point, as the Catholic Fund 
for Overseas Development (CAFOD) was permitted to join, although not in time to be 
featured in the Ethiopia appeal publicity. The official Catholic aid agency for England and 
Wales, CAFOD had been founded in 1962, growing steadily over the following years. As 
a member of Caritas (the Catholic equivalent of the World Council of Churches), it had 
provided support for the Joint Church Aid airlift in Biafra. CAFOD had also been 
agitating for entry to the DEC for a number of years, without success. For CAFOD, 
membership promised legitimacy as well as funding. In 1970, the organisation had been 
excluded from an NGO meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss relief efforts in 
Nigeria, on the grounds that only the ‘big five’ DEC agencies were invited.146 CAFOD's 
eventual entry in 1973 was facilitated by Christian Aid, who agreed that the Roman 
Catholic Church should be represented, and proposed that CAFOD be allowed in and 
share their appeals allocation. The other agencies felt obliged to accept, and the 
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broadcasters approved CAFOD's entry as a joint member with Christian Aid.
147
 
Subsequent DEC publications referred to ‘Christian Aid with the Catholic Fund for 
Overseas Development’ as a single member, and a single chair was allocated to the 
pairing at DEC meetings.
148
 
 Buoyed by a record appeal, the DEC agencies mobilised to undertake relief and 
development work not only within Ethiopia, but also across the entire Sahelian belt of 
Africa. Here they formed one small part of a much larger international aid programme 
made up of donor governments, intergovernmental agencies, and non-state actors. While 
these international aid efforts aimed to address the widespread food crisis affecting the 
region, in practice their effectiveness was restricted by a number of major obstacles. The 
logistical challenges of co-ordinating aid across such a vast geographical area were huge. 
Transportation of aid, equipment and supplies proved to be a substantial bottleneck, with 
airlift and airdrop operations necessary for remote areas. Ports were largely unequipped to 
handle the large volumes of aid required.
149
 Such were the ongoing difficulties that by 
early 1974, Oxfam voiced concerns within the DEC that both state and non-state agencies 
were ‘open to severe criticism in respect of the Sahel... the international media and 
general public are not going to be impressed by the apparent lack of concrete action to 
relieve effectively the drought situation’.150 In the same month, War on Want 
acknowledged that it was having serious difficulties in spending its DEC income 
responsibly in the Sahel.
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 Oxfam's fear that the public would be alienated by the lack of concrete progress in 
the field highlighted the gap between the simplistic images and narratives put forward on 
television, and the political complexities of the aid work being undertaken in the field. The 
Unknown Famine and its accompanying DEC appeal both depicted a one-dimensional 
view of famine, and the apparent ease with which NGOs could solve it if supported 
financially. This discourse was in stark contrast to the more sophisticated and overt 
political campaigning being undertaken elsewhere in the sector, such as through the 
World Development Movement. Indeed, the massive public response to The Unknown 
Famine also highlighted how relatively ineffective the sector's development education and 
advocacy activities had been in building up mass support for long-term development.   
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how, despite an increasing commitment to political advocacy on 
the causes of global underdevelopment, the leading humanitarian NGOs were consistently 
brought back to emergency relief over the course of the DEC's first decade. The growth of 
the sector over this period was largely the result of responding to major, high-profile 
Third World emergencies, such as those in Biafra, Bangladesh, and the Sahel. The DEC 
fundraising mechanism made a crucial contribution to this, as access to television raised 
the public profiles of its members. This in turn provided a supply of public support and 
donations for NGO relief work. In the process, the DEC also helped consolidate the 
dominance of its members within the sector, who increasingly came to resemble a 
humanitarian cartel.  
 NGO emergency appeals such as those made by the DEC promoted a simplistic, 
depoliticised form of humanitarianism, by focusing upon the suffering of individual 
146 
 
bodies while providing little concrete information about the structural forces which 
created and perpetuated it. The widespread dissemination of such images in the mass 
media during this period, in particular stereotypical images of starving children in Africa, 
helped consolidate an enduring image and particular understanding of the Third World. 
Central to this was a repackaging of traditionally imperial ideas of benevolent Westerners 
intervening to save helpless colonial subjects. Furthermore, this paternalistic view of the 
world was paradoxically being reinforced at the very same time that the principal 
development NGOs were attempting to undo it through their public education 
programmes. 
 Many individuals within the development community were aware of this 
contradiction, and often expressed frustration at the media's tendency to only pay attention 
to Africa and the developing world when dramatic scenes of crisis and human suffering 
were unfolding. During the Biafran War, Christian Aid staff commented that it was ‘the 
Congo story all over again... these tragedies should not be used simply as a stimulant for 
emergency action’. Instead, they called for media coverage to also ‘give point to the 
undramatic and un-newsworthy development projects of education, nation-building, youth 
leadership, and community welfare’.152 The acknowledgement that development projects 
were undramatic and un-newsworthy was itself an implicit admission of a lack of public 
engagement in international aid outside of immediate relief. However, while NGOs were 
apt to bemoan the practices of the media, they were also directly implicated in promoting 
this view of the Third World themselves, through their emergency appeals and publicity. 
Revealingly, when Oxfam set up its own Education Unit in the 1960s to promote 
development education work, its staff saw themselves as working to undo problematic 
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stereotypes of the Third World not only perpetuated by the mass media, but also by their 
own organisation.
153
 
 This tension between apolitical relief, and an emerging advocacy agenda suggests 
that linear historical narratives of NGOs progressing from being charities to advocacy 
bodies are overly simplistic.
154
 For instance, Clare Saunders argues that from the mid-
1960s British humanitarian organisations were politicised, as part of a ‘widespread 
political awakening’ of society as a whole during the decade.155 Florency Passy similarly 
draws a clear divide between traditional charitable humanitarianism, and the rise of a 
contemporary political ‘solidarity movement’ which emerged out of the new social 
movements which arose in the 1960s.
156
 Approaching the humanitarian sector from this 
social movement perspective is limiting, as it fails to capture the competing trajectories 
and processes at play with the sector. This chapter suggests that it may be more 
appropriate to characterise the 1960s as a period of professionalisation for humanitarian 
NGOs, rather than politicisation. Aid agencies experienced substantial financial growth 
and became more effective fundraisers, while also broadening out their involvement in 
operations on the ground for both emergency relief and grassroots development work.  
 The Janus-faced nature of the sector, in pursuing both depoliticised relief and 
developmental advocacy simultaneously, was inherently problematic. Perpetual 
emergency operations led to proportionately less resources being available for tackling the 
causes of poverty, which encouraged a critique of the practice of disaster relief to 
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crystallise within the more radical corners of the sector. Haslemere's equation of 
traditional charity with ‘tossing sixpence in a beggar's cap’ was an early example of this 
emerging viewpoint. By the early 1970s, War on Want in particular was losing patience 
with the continued demands of relief work. In reference to the crisis in the Sahel, in 1974 
War on Want called for a way to ensure that the DEC would ‘consider the long-term 
needs’, and ‘not react solely on the basis of... Dimbleby's emotive programmes that tell 
only a fraction of the truth’.157 While laudable, this critique failed to recognise how 
disasters were the fuel driving all of the sector's expansion and work. This was 
particularly evident in contexts such as Bangladesh and the Sahel, where a number of 
DEC agencies used income extracted from the public for relief to finance development 
projects. While it may not have been their intention, this contradiction arguably amounted 
to a deception of the public. Indeed, the history of the DEC during this period arguably 
suggests that the project of overseas development, as pursued by NGOs, was only made 
possible by a continuous cycle of major emergencies. 
 Finally, the presence of the British state looms large over this period. The 
government played an important role in the sector's move into long-term development, by 
encouraging co-ordination through the FFHC and VCOAD. It also did so indirectly, by 
stimulating political action through cuts to the official aid budget. The state then policed 
the boundaries of this political activity through the interventions of the Charity 
Commissioners. The state also shaped the sector in the field of humanitarian aid. The 
government worked closely with the DEC agencies in responding to major emergencies 
such as those in Biafra, Bangladesh and the Sahel, often channelling bilateral aid through 
them. In the process, the DEC mechanism also had the effect of raising the legitimacy of 
its members in their relations with the state. Accounts of contemporary humanitarianism 
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often draw attention to the close bonds that have developed between state and non-state 
actors. However, in practice there is a much longer lineage of interactions between the 
two, to the extent that historical emergence of NGOs cannot be fully understood without a 
corresponding appreciation of the role played by government. The following chapter 
explores this relationship at length. 
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Chapter Three 
Humanitarian Governance: NGOs, Disasters, and the State, 1942-74 
 
In June 1974, the British Government established the Disaster Unit, a specialised body 
within the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). The Disaster Unit was tasked with 
leading all aspects of emergency relief policy, including monitoring potential disasters, 
mobilising supplies, and liaising with other governmental departments. Crucially, the Unit 
also emphasised closer co-ordination with the humanitarian NGOs represented on the 
Disasters Emergency Committee. The creation of the Unit as a ‘focal point’ for 
humanitarian aid represented a departure for official relief policy. Over the course of the 
previous decade, media coverage of overseas disasters, along with the operations and 
publicity of NGOs, had gradually forced a shift in the attitude of government. Whereas the 
state had traditionally downplayed the political and geopolitical importance of emergency 
relief, it was now compelled by public pressure to accept increased responsibilities for 
humanitarian response. To do so, the ODM naturally looked towards closer co-ordination 
with the leading NGOs, whose own expansion and professionalisation over the previous 
years had raised their legitimacy and profiles in the eyes of the state. The overhaul of 
British relief policy represented by the Disaster Unit therefore also formalised the close 
relationship that had developed between the NGO sector and the state in the governance 
of overseas emergencies. 
 Chapters one and two of this investigation set out how the British humanitarian 
sector professionalised and expanded in the years between the Second World War and the 
early 1970s, largely on the basis of high-profile disasters in the Third World. This chapter 
examines the same chronological period and events, but does so through a ‘top-down’ 
perspective of how the emergence of NGOs was also shaped by their interactions with 
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government. To date, there has been no systematic historical overview of official British 
relief policy. While the emergency aid efforts in 1940s Europe have attracted significant 
attention (in which the British government played a major role, alongside the US and the 
newly founded United Nations), little attention has been paid to the trajectory of official 
relief policy in the following years.
1
 Barrie Ireton's recent history of British development 
policy does briefly touch upon disaster relief, although its focus is largely on the post-
Cold War era.
2
 This represents a significant gap. Non-governmental organisations have 
always been influenced and shaped by official authority, and a historical account of 
British humanitarianism is incomplete without an appreciation of the crucial role played 
by the state.  
 In Britain, there is a long history of interaction between NGOs and government.
3
 
Geoffrey Finlayson popularised the notion of a ‘moving frontier’ between voluntary 
organisations and the government, shifting back and forth at different historical junctures.
4
 
As the modern interventionist state developed, it often relied on voluntary associations to 
provide services, and accordingly made provisions for the funding of certain charitable 
organisations or sectors. The two World Wars further fuelled such collaboration, 
encouraging the professionalisation of the voluntary sector while bringing about increased 
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interdependence with the state.
5
 While the creation of the welfare state in the 1940s 
fostered concerns that voluntary action would consequently decline, in practice it also 
provided a myriad of new opportunities.
6
 In recent decades, successive governments have 
sought to forge a more formalised relationship with voluntarism, providing financial 
incentives for NGOs to provide welfare services once administered by the state. This has 
been particularly evident since the 1980s, as the state has moved towards a more 
‘contractual relationship’ through rationalising funding arrangements and increasing the 
levels of official financial support.
7
 These developments have also raised concerns about 
the independence of the voluntary sector, and whether modern NGOs have effectively 
been co-opted into becoming ‘cheap providers of services’ by a neoliberal state.8 
 These issues are particularly contentious for international aid agencies, who have 
been the recipients of substantial amounts of official funding in recent decades. This surge 
in official support is generally depicted as beginning in the 1980s, when aid donors 
supposedly turned to NGOs out of a belief that they were more efficient and effective 
implementers of grassroots development projects. The 1980s is thus often depicted as an 
‘NGO decade’, as aid agencies were feted for their perceived comparative advantage, 
receiving increasing amounts of official aid and gaining increased opportunities for 
participation in governmental and intergovernmental forums.
9
 This reconfiguration of the 
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NGO/donor relationship foreshadowed dramatic increases in the amount of official aid 
being channelled through aid agencies in the post-Cold War period, for both emergency 
relief and development assistance.
10
 For instance, in 2013 Oxfam received 44 percent of 
its total income from ‘government and other public authorities’.11 This phenomenal 
growth in official support has in turn given rise to anxieties that NGOs and donors may 
have become ‘too close for comfort’. For many commentators, official funding has 
stimulated the growth of NGOs, while also eroding their legitimacy and independence. It 
has been argued that high levels of official support renders aid agencies more accountable 
to donors than recipients, and more geared to the bureaucracy of ‘contract culture’ than 
political campaigning for global justice.
12
  
 Given these concerns, there is a clear need for more sustained historical analysis of 
the fluctuating relationship between humanitarian NGOs and the state. Such an analysis 
should shed further light on these issues than the largely ahistorical literature published to 
date, which tends to focus on single fixed points in time. Furthermore, the majority of this 
literature focuses on official funding for NGO development projects, and tends to take for 
granted that donors have a longer history of supporting non-governmental relief work. 
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There is therefore much that we still do not know about how the contemporary 
humanitarian industry emerged historically in Britain, characterised by strong 
interconnections between the leading NGOs and government. 
 This chapter undertakes such an analysis, focusing upon the period between the 
Second World War and the creation of the Disaster Unit in 1974. It is argued that although 
the state often funded NGO relief efforts in the past, the British government attached little 
political significance to humanitarian aid until the 1960s. It was during this decade that 
public demand for emergency relief work grew, as media coverage of overseas disasters 
and the publicity tactics of NGOs generated a new awareness of distant suffering. As the 
leading aid agencies expanded and professionalised during this period, they also raised 
their legitimacy in relation to the state, which recognised the practical and political 
benefits of collaboration. This was especially evident after the creation of the DEC in 
1963, which provided a rational channel between government and sector. Closer 
partnership with the state was further stimulated by the succession of major emergencies 
in Biafra, Bangladesh and the Sahel in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These crises led to 
soaring official expenditure on relief, large amounts of which were channelled through the 
DEC. By the end of 1973, public criticism of the government's response to these 
emergencies resulted in a radical overhaul of official relief policy, culminating in the 
Disaster Unit. The success of the DEC thus contributed to the state forging a closer 
relationship with the sector, as the Disaster Unit targeted closer integration with the 
Committee. It is therefore suggested that the 1970s was the crucial decade when donors 
turned to NGOs, rather than the 1980s as generally assumed. 
 To articulate this argument, this chapter is structured into three distinct analytical 
sections. As these cover the same chronological period as chapters one and two, many of 
the same events and emergencies are revisited (in particular the humanitarian crises in 
155 
 
Biafra, Bangladesh, and the Sahel). They are however approached from a different, top-
down perspective which focuses upon the role of the state, and its interactions with the 
NGO sector. Firstly, the British government's approach to disaster relief is examined, 
from its origins in the colonial period, to the mid-1960s. It is shown that for most of this 
history the state attached little political significance to humanitarian aid, with the 
exception of the relief efforts undertaken in Europe during the 1940s. This approach 
began to be destabilised in the 1960s, as public awareness of overseas disasters and distant 
suffering grew as a result of decolonisation, media coverage of emergencies, and the 
publicity of humanitarian NGOs. As public demand for a more effective humanitarian 
response grew, the concurrent expansion of aid agencies also encouraged a closer coming 
together between the government and the NGO sector, especially after the creation of the 
DEC in 1963. While emergency relief was still regarded as less important than 
international development by government at this time, there were clear indications that 
humanitarian aid was taking on increasing political significance. 
 The second section explores how the massive public responses to the Biafran crisis 
in 1968, and the East Pakistan crisis of 1970-71, marked a watershed for British official 
relief policy. Media images of suffering and starvation created a demand for relief well 
beyond the existing policy framework, and funds were diverted from the development aid 
budget as a result. The leading NGOs helped to foster this popular pressure through their 
appeals and publicity. Aid agencies also benefitted from increased official expenditure, as 
in practice large amounts were channelled through the DEC. This further consolidated the 
links between the Committee members and government, boosting their legitimacy. The 
perceived failure of the ICRC in Biafra also prompted calls for a new international 
machinery for disaster relief, setting in motion a broader global momentum towards 
increasing co-ordination which also impacted upon NGOs. 
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 Thirdly, the British government's response to the food crisis in Ethiopia and the 
Sahel in 1973-74 is explored. It is argued that the Sahel marked a culmination of all of 
these trends. Television images of famine in Ethiopia in late 1973 triggered a massive 
relief effort, and prompted stinging public criticism of the state's perceived inability to 
effectively respond to overseas emergencies. By contrast, the leading NGOs were widely 
depicted as being more efficient and effective than the official bureaucracy. This criticism 
sparked a re-examination of British relief policy, which was extended into a radical 
overhaul upon the election of the Labour government in early 1974. It was in this context 
that the ODM created the Disaster Unit as a new focal point, which placed heavy 
emphasis on integrating more thoroughly with the DEC. The fundraising success of the 
DEC therefore contributed to a reconfiguration of the relationship between the state and 
humanitarian NGOs, which was placed on a more formal and rationalised footing. This 
also reflected broader societal trends of the early 1970s, as a range of governmental 
departments attached new importance to working with the voluntary sector. It is 
ultimately suggested that this shifting nature of official relief policy, and the relationship 
between NGOs and states, raises challenging implications about the divides between 
governmental and non-governmental, and the impact of official support on the broader 
political agendas of development NGOs. 
 
 
Official Disaster Relief 
The origins of the British state's involvement in emergency relief are rooted in colonial 
history. Providing limited financial aid after natural disasters in the colonial territories 
(such as hurricanes in the West Indies) could deflect criticism and reaffirm imperial 
legitimacy. However, such amounts were limited and voted by Parliament on an ad hoc 
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basis - there was no coherent relief policy, or broader sense of obligation to humanitarian 
principles at this time.
13
 Prior to the twentieth century, international humanitarianism was 
instead advanced mainly by non-state actors, and the humanitarian imperative to provide 
emergency relief was institutionalised in the decades after the creation of the ICRC in 
1863.  
 In the early twentieth century, the magnitude of the First World War influenced 
the deployment of a multitude of voluntary organisations to meet the huge relief needs of 
refugees and civilian populations. While the British government provided some degree of 
financial support for these efforts in Europe after 1918, it was not until the Second World 
War that the state accepted responsibility for official regulation of humanitarian aid.
14
 
Allied planners agreed that the post-1918 relief efforts had been slow, insufficient, 
wasteful and poorly organised, reflecting a broader enthusiasm for the virtues of state 
planning which characterised the period. In this context, a particular significance and 
urgency was attached to addressing the major humanitarian crisis set to unfold after the 
Axis defeat, as relief would have to address this crisis before the new post-war era could 
be inaugurated.
15
 Mark Mazower adds that the US viewed relief as a mechanism to bring 
as much ‘international machinery’ into operation as possible, to shore up the support of 
the American public for continuing post-war international co-operation.
16
 
 The 1940s relief efforts have been widely depicted as a fundamental 
transformation in humanitarian action, as Western governments and intergovernmental 
organisations assumed authority for co-ordinating relief.
17
 As chapter one discussed, in 
                                                             
13 Matthew Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783 (Baltimore, MA: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2006), p.173; Barder, ‘Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from 
the UK Experience’, p.3; Ireton, Britain's International Development Policies. 
14 Steinert, ‘British Humanitarian Assistance’. 
15 Reinisch, ‘Introduction: Relief in the Aftermath of War’, pp.373-376. 
16 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012), p.200. 
17 See, for instance: Barnett, Empire of Humanity, pp.107-131. 
158 
 
Britain state intervention led to the creation of the Council of British Societies for Relief 
Abroad (COBSRA) in 1942. Set up by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in 1942, 
COBSRA was intended to mesh the leading humanitarian agencies with the state. The 
Council accepted the authority of both the Allied governments and militaries, extended in 
1943 to the newly formed the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA). COBSRA set a new precedent for co-ordination between British NGOs, which 
foreshadowed the creation of the DEC in the early 1960s. Working under governmental 
and military authority also motivated the leading agencies to further professionalise and 
raise their overall effectiveness in the field. The 1940s relief efforts have therefore been 
seen as ‘the end of the charitable phase of modern humanitarianism’, as aid became more 
planning-minded and expert-driven, giving rise to a new type of humanitarian regime.
18
 
 In the new post-war international environment that followed, Britain did 
experience a brief spurt of humanitarian generosity in the early 1950s. In 1953 alone, the 
British government provided substantial aid in response to natural disasters in the 
Netherlands, Greece, Italy and Turkey, in addition to aid for relief in the colonies.
19
 This 
increase was attributed to ‘a greater international-mindedness’, as well as a sense of 
obligation after Britain had itself benefitted from the Marshall Plan largesse in 1947. 
However, this new approach to relief did not last. By 1955, senior officials within both the 
Foreign Office and the Treasury were critiquing emergency aid as an unnecessary 
expenditure which generated few political benefits. Instead they advocated a return to pre-
war levels of emergency relief, which treated government assistance for disasters abroad 
as ‘the exception rather than the rule’.20  
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 A new relief policy was subsequently set out, which restricted humanitarian aid 
unless there was ‘positive political advantage’ to be gained from its provision. Man-made 
disasters (which included famines and civil wars) were also excluded, on the grounds that 
they were ‘predictable’, not ‘sudden and catastrophic’, and therefore did not merit a 
response on either political or humanitarian grounds.
21
 A limit of £10,000 expenditure for 
any one disaster was put in place, with overall decision-making authority assigned to the 
Foreign Office.
22
 These policy guidelines indicated a lack of political significance being 
attached to emergency assistance. This policy remained the norm throughout the 
remainder of the 1950s, with emergency aid only provided in exceptional circumstances 
such as the failed 1956 Hungarian revolution.
23
 Indeed, many officials shared a view at 
this time that British sympathy for disasters overseas was more appropriately expressed in 
public donations to the British Red Cross or similar agencies.
24
 
 The international relief efforts connected to the Second World War did not 
therefore bring about a lasting change in the relationship between the state and the 
humanitarian NGO sector, despite the closer co-ordination brought about by COBSRA. 
This was because, fundamentally, official attitudes within Whitehall towards humanitarian 
aid as a whole did not change outside of wartime. It was not until the 1960s that this 
conception of humanitarian aid began to be destabilised, as public awareness of overseas 
disasters and distant suffering began to grow. As chapter two explored, public support for 
disaster relief increased over the course of the 1960s, facilitated by decolonisation, media 
coverage of disasters, and the provocative publicity produced by leading humanitarian 
NGOs. These trends also drove the institutional expansion and increasing visibility of aid 
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agencies, which worked to bring them closer to the organs of the state. A key stimulus for 
this was the UN World Refugee Year initiative (WRY) in 1959. The Foreign Office 
supported the aims of WRY, but received little financial support from the Treasury. 
Instead, officials looked to support initiatives undertaken by voluntary organisations, who 
had ‘already shown their mettle in the campaign for Hungarian refugee relief in 1956 and 
1957’.25 This style of co-ordination was built upon and further extended by the UN 
Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC). The British FFHC national committee was 
largely financed by the state, with NGOs expected to carry out the campaign's core 
activities.
26
 
 As discussed in chapter one, WRY reshaped the sector and set in a motion a period 
of sustained NGO growth, as the leading agencies began scaling up their publicity budgets 
and making many more appeals to the public. As humanitarian NGOs raised larger 
amounts from the public for specific emergencies, they also raised their own legitimacy 
and profiles in relation to the state. For instance, Oxfam's aggressive fundraising drive for 
the Congo crisis in 1961 not only resulted in greater public recognition. The large sums 
raised also impressed government officials, and the Foreign Office developed closer links 
with senior Oxfam staff as a result.
27
 In 1963, War on Want's fundraising success for the 
Skopje earthquake enabled the organisation to play a major role in the field, and the state 
made £60,000 of long-term aid available for transporting the organisation's reconstruction 
materials. When a former War on Want engineer voiced criticisms of the agency's 
‘amateur and unprofessional approach’ in Skopje to the Charity Commissioners, official 
support also extended to political protection. The Foreign Office intervened to request that 
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the individual concerned keep such criticism ‘within the counsels of the Charity 
Commission’. The Foreign Office added that ‘the overall effect of War on Want has been 
good... we do not therefore feel that British-Yugoslav relations would be served by a 
public post-mortem into the spending of War on Want money in Skopje’.28 
 This official support for NGO relief efforts picked up further after the creation of 
the Disasters Emergency Committee in 1963. The DEC was welcomed by Foreign Office 
staff, who viewed the Committee as a positive step to minimise inter-agency competition 
and provide a rational channel of communication between themselves and the sector.
29
 
For their part, the DEC members had courted closer relations with the state, and Foreign 
Office officials were invited to attend and observe Committee meetings. In practice, 
official collaboration with the DEC tended to take the form of financial and political 
support for specific relief operations. For instance, when the DEC made its first joint 
appeal in August 1966 for an earthquake in Turkey, Foreign Secretary George Brown 
waived the costs of shipping supplies for the agencies to the disaster zone.
30
 Similarly, the 
Foreign Office encouraged the Committee to launch an appeal for the Middle East in June 
1967, and collaborated with the DEC to implement an emergency aid programme in South 
Vietnam following the Tet offensive in January 1968.
31
 This form of official co-
ordination, with its emphasis on logistical management and operational effectiveness, was 
similar in character to the work of COBSRA in the 1940s. It was also similarly military-
driven and depoliticised, and worked to reinforce the DEC's apolitical humanitarianism. 
 The emergence of NGOs as partners was formally acknowledged in relief policy at 
this time, revised in 1964 to state that ‘the voluntary societies in the UK will wish to offer 
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aid, and it is the intention of the Foreign Office to co-operate with the societies as far as 
possible’. Policy was also updated to introduce a distinction between ‘immediate first aid’ 
and ‘longer-term aid’ in disaster response. While the ceiling for immediate aid remained 
fixed at £10,000, additional funds could be provided for long-term aid if required from the 
overseas aid budget, administered by the newly established ODM. It was assumed that 
this long-term aid would be used mainly to pay for the transportation of NGO equipment 
and supplies for reconstruction.
32
 The new distinction of ‘longer-term aid’ reflected the 
emergence of a coherent development aid policy in the early 1960s, marked by the 
creation of the ODM in 1964.
33
 The ODM also embodied a developmental bias within 
government, and the new department had no mandate to provide disaster relief. A 
fundamental distinction was made at this time between disaster relief and development 
aid; the former was seen as a short-term measure, the cost of which could largely be borne 
by the affected nation, in contrast with the latter, which was capital-intensive and of 
crucial geopolitical significance. 
 There were, however, signs of relief taking on increasing political significance as 
the 1960s progressed. NGOs again played an important role in this, as large popular 
responses to disasters, expressed as donations to aid agencies, could also highlight a 
relative lack of action by the state. For instance, press coverage of famine conditions in 
the Congo in early 1961 (which Oxfam exploited so successfully) aroused considerable 
public attention, and opposition MPs used the popular outcry to call for increased aid and 
pressurise the government. The Foreign Office acknowledged its vulnerability to 
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‘criticism of the comparatively small scale of our contribution’, which quickly came to be 
depicted in certain sections of the press as government indifference to human suffering.
34
  
 The People published such a piece under the headline ‘Starving children scandal’, 
commenting that ‘welfare organisations were shocked last night by the disclosure of red-
tape bungling which is keeping huge consignments of food dumped on a British airfield... 
while Congolese children for whom the food is destined are dying of starvation’.35 In a 
similar vein, the substantial public funds raised by War on Want for the Skopje 
earthquake led to criticism of the official response within Parliament, as opposition MPs 
called for the government to match the £0.5 million raised by the agency.
36
 While these 
instances of public pressure were short-lived and minor in their political effects, they 
hinted at an inherent weakness in official relief policy. When television images of distant 
suffering resonated with the public, NGOs could generate funding for relief on a scale 
which outweighed the state's contribution. As a result, the state was vulnerable to being 
depicted as indifferent to human suffering and incapable of responding effectively. 
 Indeed, food shortages in India in 1966 directly challenged some of the 
assumptions underlying the government's attitude to disaster relief. Fears of a possible 
famine led to calls from within the ODM to make funding available for emergency food 
aid, outside of the development aid programme.
37
 The ODM had committed significant 
development aid to India in this period, as part of a wider British policy geared towards 
maintaining India's stability and Cold War allegiance.
38
 The US had similar objectives in 
the region at this time, exporting substantial amounts of its agricultural surpluses to India 
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during the 1960s.
39
 The Foreign Office acknowledged that the £10,000 immediate aid 
limit would therefore appear ‘derisory in relation to the size and nature of the problem and 
to our special relationship with India’.40 Instead, a £19 million interest-free loan was 
offered, as an advance instalment of development aid, to cover ‘special needs arising from 
the shortage of food and water’.41 The Foreign Office also covered the cost of shipping 
dried milk donated by the DEC agencies.
42
 This usage of development aid for emergency 
relief suggested a greater complexity to disasters than commonly assumed, and 
foreshadowed debates which would arise more forcefully in the following years. 
 
 
‘The Need for New Machinery’: Biafra and Bangladesh, 1968-72 
If the limitations of British relief policy had been briefly highlighted by the food shortages 
in India, then these limitations were emphatically exposed by the Nigerian Civil War in 
the late 1960s. Nigeria was a watershed in British relief policy, as the established 
approach was dramatically destabilised by the question of channelling relief to 
secessionist Biafra. In the process, a momentum towards significant changes in the 
formulation and implementation of official relief policy was also initiated, culminating in 
the creation of the Disaster Unit in 1974.  
 After the outbreak of civil war, the British position (as the former colonial power) 
was one of staunch support for the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG), due 
mainly to anxieties over the principle of tribal secession in Africa. Britain also had 
significant oil interests in Nigeria and acted as a major supplier of arms to the FMG, 
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which was seen as essential to maintaining influence in the region.
43
 Consequently, the 
upsurge of media images of Biafran starvation in the summer of 1968 (and the popular 
compassion these elicited) exerted immense political pressure on the Labour government 
for its pro-Nigeria policy. A statement from Howard Wilson to his cabinet in December 
1968 underlined how seriously his administration had been shaken by the Biafran 
controversy: 
 ‘The Nigerian question had aroused profound feeling in the country, in Parliament, and 
 indeed in the Cabinet itself. It could give rise to a political and Parliamentary crisis of the 
 utmost gravity. The Government might be defeated in the House, largely by the votes of 
 its own supporters and perhaps even on a vote of confidence, with incalculable 
 repercussions on sterling, on our whole economic situation, and on the future of the 
 Government itself... ’
44
 
 
As chapter two explored, NGOs played an important role in fermenting public opinion. 
Oxfam in particular launched an intensive publicity campaign which capitalised on and 
extended the public outcry. In the process the organisation brought further pressure to bear 
upon policymakers, exacerbated by radical voices such as Nicolas Stacey who openly 
criticised the government for a perceived lack of action.
45
 The magnitude of the crisis, and 
the strength of popular support for intervention in Biafra, created a huge demand for 
official relief well beyond the limits of the existing policy framework. Instead, the 
Minister of Overseas Development (Reginald Prentice) announced that £1 million would 
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be diverted from the development aid budget for emergency relief, in each of the years 
1969-70 and 1970-71.
46
  
 In practice these funds were to be spent entirely in Nigeria, channelled either 
through the ICRC or British NGOs.
47
 Aid agencies assumed a new level of prominence 
during the Nigerian emergency, stepping into the vacuum created by a lack of official 
intervention. Indeed, the crisis demonstrated to government officials the benefits of 
working through non-state actors, as NGOs provided a means to circumvent the refusal of 
the Biafran leadership to accept British bilateral aid.
48
 Working with the DEC members 
also provided a means for the British government to restrain Oxfam's political 
involvement. It did so by excluding the organisation from official missions to the region 
on the grounds that it had become too ‘partisan’. The state also limited its financial 
support to more moderate, apolitical agencies such as the British Red Cross and Save the 
Children. SCF in particular received generous funding from the aid programme, to support 
its Nigerian socio-medical teams at a cost of approximately £500,000.
49
  
 Overall, the prominent role played by the DEC members in Biafra worked to 
further boost the official legitimacy of the Committee. This was illustrated in January 
1970 when, following the Biafran surrender, a meeting was arranged between the Prime 
Minister and the voluntary organisations to discuss relief needs in the former secessionist 
territory. Despite vocal protestations from organisations such as CAFOD and Help the 
Aged for inclusion (which included speaking out in the press
50), only the ‘big five’ DEC 
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organisations were invited.
51
 Such cases of overt co-ordination with the sector also 
reflected a growing desire to draw upon the perceived capabilities and expertise of the 
voluntary sector within Whitehall. In 1970, Edward Heath's Conservative government 
entered office aiming to work more closely with the voluntary sector, and a number of 
governmental departments began exploring ways to draw upon the capacities of NGOs.
52
 
 In the aftermath of the Biafran war, the perceived failure of the ICRC to 
effectively co-ordinate relief also prompted calls for a new international machinery to be 
set up for major disasters within Whitehall. These calls were echoed more broadly at the 
intergovernmental level. Papers prepared in 1970 by the renamed Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) argued that the ICRC had ‘lacked the physical, human and 
political resources to cope adequately with the pressures facing them’. It was suggested 
that the ICRC was unsuited to conflicts such as Nigeria, where one of the combatants was 
not a government and hence had no commitment to the Geneva Conventions. FCO 
officials widely agreed that Biafra demonstrated ‘the need for new machinery’. They 
envisioned an international organisation which could take responsibility for administering 
relief, provide a channel of communication between donors and affected governments, 
and co-ordinate the necessary agreements to distribute assistance where it was needed.
53
  
 There was less consensus, however, on which organisation could take on such a 
role. The British press even presented the DEC as a potential model for an effective 
supranational relief body to emulate.
54
 The realistic option was the creation of a 
specialised UN relief agency, which could mobilise the UN's resources and expertise. 
However, to do so would also require sharp demarcation from the UN's political organs. 
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In Nigeria, the Federal Government had resisted all UN involvement, for fear that even 
limited intervention would grant the Biafran leadership a de facto international presence.
55
 
These FCO policy discussions mirrored debates taking place elsewhere at the international 
level, within both donor governments and the UN itself. The UN Secretariat discussed 
taking on a larger relief role throughout 1970, and in July 1970 both Britain and the US 
supported a UNHCR resolution to appoint a relief co-ordinator. It was envisioned that this 
co-ordinator could draw on UN resources, to deal with major man-made and natural 
disasters as and when they occurred.
56
 
 Similar debates were also taking place among NGOs, and in Britain the DEC 
agencies were invited to contribute to these Foreign Office proposals as they were drafted. 
The DEC members also called for a ‘a greater measure of co-ordination in emergency 
situations’, reflecting a broader momentum towards planning in humanitarian action as a 
whole. Save the Children commented internally that ‘co-ordination of relief activities at 
all levels was now very much the thing... we ought not to oppose it even though its value 
to SCF might be limited’.57 Much like the FCO, the DEC also lacked a clear vision of how 
this could be effectively implemented. An Oxfam proposal to create a DEC Disasters 
Operation Officer post, to co-ordinate the activities of all the agencies in the field, was 
rejected by the other members as ‘too far reaching and... curtailing unacceptably the 
freedom of action of individual agencies’.58 Instead the DEC opted to appoint a Liaison 
Officer, who could work in an advisory role to help enhance agency co-operation and 
                                                             
55 TNA: FCO 59/617: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘International Relief operations’, September 
1970. 
56 Ibid. 
57 SCFA: Box A423: Save the Children Fund, ‘The 286th Meeting of the Executive Committee’, 17 June 
1971: Disasters Emergency Committee appeal for India (E.4499.). 
58 Ibid. 
169 
 
mitigate competition for publicity. In practice the Liaison Officer was given minimal 
authority and influence, achieving few tangible results before being let go in 1973.
59
 
 These trends were reinforced and given fresh impetus by the East Pakistan cyclone 
in late 1970, and subsequent outbreak of civil war and mass refugee displacement in the 
Indian subcontinent in 1971. The cyclone came shortly after the election of Edward 
Heath's Conservative government in October 1970, which rebranded the ODM as the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and incorporated it into the Foreign Office. 
In practice the ODA still remained relatively self-contained, with its own minister, 
policies, procedures and staff.
60
 Television news reports of the suffering caused by the 
cyclone generated substantial public concern. British officials observed that ‘sudden 
human tragedy on such a scale has rarely occurred since the advent of mass media, and 
this calamity touched off a response of exceptional sympathy and generosity in many 
parts of the world’.61 As chapter two explored, this public outcry also translated into a 
record fundraising sum for the DEC's cyclone appeal. Indeed, FCO officials commented 
that ‘the response of the British public and voluntary bodies has been recognised in East 
Pakistan as outstanding’.62 
 In response to this public commotion, the new Minister for Overseas Development 
(Richard Wood) immediately committed £1 million for emergency relief, to once again be 
drawn from the development budget.
63
 This financed a large-scale relief operation 
spearheaded by the Royal Navy (Operation Burlap), which involved diverting ships to the 
Bay of Bengal. These ships carried tons of food, clothing and supplies, as well as 
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helicopters, boats and personnel to move materials to the disaster area.
64
 Privately the 
relief effort was viewed as a logistical success. However, political unrest within Pakistan 
over ‘the landing of foreign troops in... the name of relief’ led to a Ministerial decision to 
conclude Operation Burlap and withdraw all military elements from the region by mid-
December.
65
 In their absence, the FCO instead turned to the DEC agencies, commenting 
that ‘charitable organisations, under the direction of the Pakistan authorities, will remain 
primarily responsible for the continuing British effort in the rehabilitation period’.66  
 From this point on the British government utilised the DEC agencies as key 
instruments in their Pakistan relief plans. Following the outbreak of civil war in East 
Pakistan and the start of mass refugee movements into India, the Foreign Secretary (Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home) determined that ‘the main [relief] effort should be made, and seen to 
be made, by private charities but... the Government should give whatever discreet help is 
possible’.67 As in Nigeria, working through NGOs was politically advantageous for the 
British government, permitting aid to be discretely channelled while minimising the risk 
of destabilising relations with either Pakistan or India. FCO officials stressed that British 
assistance in West Bengal ‘must be presented as a venture by private charities... we wish 
to avoid publicity about [the government's] involvement’. For the FCO, camouflaging 
their involvement through aid agencies would ensure ‘a good reception by the Pakistan 
Government for any major relief effort we might later wish to make in East Pakistan’.68 
The DEC mechanism contributed to this closer coming together of the state and NGOs, as 
it provided its members with the necessary resources and visibility to take on a more 
expansive role. 
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 Bangladesh also gave fresh impetus to debates over the need for a new 
international machinery for disasters. Faced with a rapidly escalating refugee crisis, the 
Pakistan Government formally requested that the UN assume authority for co-ordinating 
relief in May 1971.
69
 A substantial UN relief mechanism was quickly put in place, 
involving most of the specialised UN agencies. The UNHCR acted as a ‘focal point’ for 
all assistance, tasked with overall co-ordinating authority.
70
 British expenditure on relief 
soared in this period as the government contributed over £16 million to UN appeals for 
aid for the Pakistan crisis. As in Nigeria, this funding was diverted from the official 
development programme (graph 3.1 and graph 3.2).
71
 The East Pakistan crisis 
demonstrated that Biafra was not a unique phenomenon, and to adequately respond to 
such major, internationalised emergencies would require a new level of co-ordinated 
response. The following year, the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator (UNDRO) was created. The result of two years of protracted debate, UNDRO 
was weakened from the outset. Under-financed, isolated within the UN system, and with 
an intentionally vague mandate, UNDRO limped along with few tangible achievements 
over the following decade. However, what UNDRO did reflect was a new international 
will for enhanced co-ordination of major relief efforts - despite a lack of consensus over 
what such co-ordination meant in practice.
72
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Graph 3.1: Annual expenditure by British government on humanitarian aid, 1966-1975.
73
 
 
 
 
Graph 3.2: Annual expenditure by British government on humanitarian aid, as a percentage 
of total bilateral aid expenditure, 1966-1975.
74
 
 
Within the British government, the diversion of significant funding from development to 
emergency relief sparked heated debate concerning the future direction of the aid 
programme. Many officials within the ODA were against such practices on the grounds 
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that any expenditure on relief was a detriment to development, which should always be 
the department's primary purpose. This group included Minister for Overseas 
Development Richard Wood, who voiced concerns that relief was ‘already becoming a 
significant part of the expenditure under a programme which is intended for 
development’. Wood added that ‘parliamentary and public opinion will... look to us to do 
something additional rather than merely diverting what would otherwise have been spent 
on aid’.75 However, a growing number of ODA officials argued that humanitarian aid 
should be incorporated into the aid programme permanently, which would also shift 
authority for relief from the Foreign Office to the ODA. While this shift would allow large 
sums to be released quicker for major emergencies such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, this 
was not the only rationale. It was also suggested that as the aid programme was 
‘associated in the public mind with disaster relief as much as with development aid’, 
public support for development aid ‘might be weakened if aid funds were not available for 
relief’.76 
 This assumption that the public's support for overseas aid was motivated by 
humanitarian rather than developmental concerns was also a tacit acknowledgement of the 
impact of media images of disaster. Indeed, it is revealing that this soaring relief 
expenditure also overlapped with cuts to the overseas aid budget. Growing public 
responses to overseas emergencies placed increased pressure on the government to react 
more effectively to disasters (and to be seen to be reacting more effectively). For instance, 
in responding to an earthquake in Nicaragua in late 1972, FCO staff commented on how 
‘considerable emphasis has been placed by the Prime Minister's Office on the importance 
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of good publicity in connection with our relief effort in Nicaragua... the interest aroused 
by the disaster is likely to lead to public interest in our assistance for reconstruction’.77 
 In linking the need to satisfy popular demand for emergency relief with the 
development aid programme, British officials were also thinking along similar lines to the 
NGO sector. That is, despite a bias towards developmental objectives, it was recognised 
that apolitical media images of disaster were evoking the strongest response from the 
British public. While consensus on how to address these issues was not yet forthcoming, it 
was clear that the state was gradually moving towards accepting a more expansive and 
interventionist humanitarian aid policy. Similar trends were also affecting other donor 
governments, as well as UN agencies and NGOs, as the global spread of television and 
advances in communications technology brought a new immediacy to distant suffering, 
and stimulated international humanitarian empathy.
78
 
 
 
The Turn to Disaster: Ethiopia and the Sahel, 1973-74 
These trends all culminated in the aftermath of a major international aid effort in the Sahel 
region of Africa, which peaked in 1973-74. Despite being in the grip of a severe drought 
since 1968, the international community was largely unresponsive to the growing 
problems in the Sahel until the end of 1972, when the FAO and World Food Programme 
(WFP) began publicising the crisis and calling for aid. By this point, five years of 
successive drought had led to huge relief requirements throughout the region. The FAO 
was appointed as the UN lead agency in co-ordinating relief for the Sahel, with the WFP 
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also given a key role due to its expertise in distributing food aid.
79
 UNDRO had little 
involvement in the Sahel operation, due to UN in-fighting and a lack of executive 
authority.
80
 Appeals for aid were made by UN agencies and the Sahelian countries 
themselves throughout 1973; in May the FAO appealed to member states for £6 million 
worth of aid, as well as for aircraft to transport supplies from ports to the interior.
81
 Britain 
responded by making RAF aircraft available for transporting supplies, at a cost of 
approximately £2.5 million (paid for from the development aid budget).
82
 
 These multilateral appeals also drew the attention of the world's press to the 
drought, and media coverage of the Sahel gradually increased throughout 1973, especially 
as conditions worsened after the failure of the 1973 rains. A Guardian report from Mali in 
September 1973 observed the ‘sudden worldwide concern for the [Sahel] after years of 
indifference... Western nations are now practically competing with each other to show 
their humanitarian concern for the several million Africans threatened with famine...’.83 
This media scrutiny intensified after the ITV broadcast of Jonathan Dimbleby's 
documentary on famine in Ethiopia in October (The Unknown Famine), which 
transformed Ethiopia into a major international news story, as discussed in chapter two. 
British officials later acknowledged the documentary's direct impact, commenting that  
‘Jonathan Dimbleby's television report on Ethiopia stirred consciences in many countries 
and provoked an enormous response... it even galvanised government machines’.84 The 
sudden exposure also raised major questions about how the famine had happened and the 
lack of an adequate international response, and relief efforts were quickly scaled up in 
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intensity. As Peter Woodward comments, after The Unknown Famine the ‘wheels of the 
relief juggernaut rolled a little faster’.85 
 Subsequently, in November 1973 the FAO launched an appeal for 500,000 tonnes 
of food and $30 million to fund emergency relief in the Sahel and Ethiopia. At the same 
time, Britain (along with other donors) agreed to participate in an international 
programme of long-term development assistance throughout the Sahel. Britain also rolled 
out a major rural development programme in Ethiopia after Dimbleby's film. In January 
1974, the European Community announced that five per cent of the EEC's total budget for 
that year (amounting to approximately £110 million) would be earmarked for food aid, 
targeted primarily at the Sahel and Ethiopia.
86
 Leading NGOs were also involved. In 
Britain, the DEC agencies participated in the expanding African aid programme, funded 
by a record DEC appeal based on footage from The Unknown Famine. As with previous 
operations, the ODA worked closely with the DEC, financing the transportation of 
equipment and supplies to the region for Committee members.
87
 
 The public outcry generated by broadcast of The Unknown Famine also resulted in 
widespread public criticism of the British government for its slow response, which was 
depicted as bureaucratic failure and indifference to human suffering. The Deputy Director 
of Christian Aid openly criticised the government for delays in distributing aid to the 
Eastern Sahel nations, referring to ‘a lack of vigour, a lack of imagination, and a lack of 
ground representation that goes beyond red tape or bureaucracy’.88 Richard Wood 
observed the ‘considerable concern in the House of Commons, reflecting the concern in 
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the country as a whole, that the British Government had repeatedly found itself reacting to 
crisis situations which might perhaps have been foreseen earlier’.89  
 The ineffective response of the state was often publicly contrasted with leading 
NGOs, who were commonly depicted as efficient, apolitical, non-bureaucratic actors. The 
ODA identified a ‘feeling in the press that the Government... was incapable of responding 
as quickly as voluntary societies to potential disaster situations’.90 ODA staff also reached 
a conclusion that such relief work was ‘more appropriate to the function of the voluntary 
agencies’, and that that improving the official relief response would require closer co-
ordination with the NGOs.
91
 In practice this was to be implemented through the DEC, 
which was now increasingly being promoted as ‘an essential part of the coordinating 
machinery’.92 The increasing recognition of aid agencies at this time reflected their 
growth and high visibility in responding to emergencies such as Biafra and Bangladesh. It 
also mirrored ongoing shifts in development theory, as dissatisfaction with the state-led 
model fostered a view of NGOs as less bureaucratic and more effective at reaching 
grassroots communities than their official counterparts.
93
   
 Media coverage of distant suffering played a crucial role in bringing about these 
changes. The ODA acknowledged that ‘the quick access of news media to disasters and 
their presentation, especially by television, has created a Ministerial and public demand 
for a more immediate and fuller response’.94 Richard Wood observed a ‘change in public 
opinion over the last few years, with the result that British Governments were now 
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expected to do more in distant countries than they had been’.95 This assumption within 
government that public opinion now expected a speedier and more effective humanitarian 
response indicated the extent to which humanitarian philanthropy had risen to prominence 
in the previous decade. As one ODA representative summarised, ‘public and 
parliamentary opinion... will not permit [the government] to do nothing’.96 
 Consequently, a re-examination of relief procedures and policy was initiated 
within the FCO and ODA. A policy paper in early 1974 opened with a revealing statement 
that ‘the problem of disaster relief in developing countries is one of which governments 
are becoming increasingly aware’.97 There were once again renewed calls for the ODA to 
assume authority for disaster relief, and finance it entirely from the development aid 
budget. The department had previously resisted this measure, on the grounds that it would 
be ‘at the expense of development’. However, there were now sufficient precedents of 
using the aid programme to fund relief, and officials observed that ‘the public generally 
hardly distinguish between relief and development, or relief and rehabilitation’. It was 
therefore recommended that ‘disaster relief for developing countries will fall on the Aid 
programme’.98  
 The election of Howard Wilson's minority Labour government in March 1974 
sped up and extended these proposals further. The new administration altered the ODA to 
again become a separate Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), and Judith Hart 
replaced Richard Wood as the Minister for Overseas Development. Judith Hart had briefly 
served as Minister in 1970, and had been Labour's Shadow Minister in the years since. 
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Hart was familiar with the cutting edge of development theory, and sympathised with a 
number of socialist critiques of orthodox state-led development gaining currency at this 
time.
99
  
 Hart had also been a vocal supporter of improving international relief co-
ordination through the UN
100
, and understood the power of television to shape aid 
interventions. Following the broadcast of Dimbleby's film in October 1973, Hart arranged 
for it to be shown at the House of Commons, which she then used to call for increased 
official aid.
101
 Upon entering office in March 1974, Hart watched a private screening of 
Dimbleby's follow-up documentary, and invited him to attend private talks at the ODM.
102
 
Hart designated relief policy as one of her key priorities upon entering office, especially in 
relation to man-made disasters. Hart privately saw herself as being ‘in the firing-line’ for 
disaster policy failures, and supported the idea that the ODM take over all relief 
responsibilities.
103
 Hart also attacked the previous administration for treating relief in the 
Sahel as ‘a vexatious affair which detracted from their proper task of promoting pure 
development’. ODM officials commented that ‘the only people who have emerged with 
credit from these disasters are the media’, referring specifically to ITV and Jonathan 
Dimbleby.
104
 
 Hart and her department subsequently set about overhauling the governmental 
machinery for relief. Proposals were put forward for the creation of a specialist unit within 
the ODM, to deal exclusively with the emergency relief stage of disasters. In doing so, 
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relief responsibilities for man-made disasters would also be formally removed from the 
FCO, and vested in the ODM as an integral aspect of overseas aid policy. Privately a 
senior ODM official commented that the new ideas were ‘unorthodox and uncomfortable. 
They are meant to be... the existing bureaucracies have failed disgracefully’. The same 
individual added that ‘developmentally minded officials will never quite measure up to 
this task... they will have to have their comfortable ways upset if this very real need is to 
be met, and if Parliament and the media are to be satisfied that we are capable of a human 
response’.105 
 The result of these proposals was the creation of the Disaster Unit in June 1974. A 
specialist body within the ODM, the Disaster Unit was to be responsible for disaster 
planning, earmarking supplies, liaising with other government departments, monitoring 
reports on potential disasters, and leading the initial response to ‘man-made’ and 
‘predictable’ disasters in developing countries (including famine, drought, war and civil 
disturbances).
106
 The Unit was designed to be a new focal point for disasters, regarding 
emergency relief as a primary consideration, rather than a distraction from the pursuit of 
development. The Disaster Unit marked a new significance for disasters in Whitehall, as 
relief structures were to be expanded and capacity built up at. Other donor governments 
established similar bodies at this time, institutionalising the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance.
107
  
 The Disaster Unit regarded the improvement of relief co-ordination as one of its 
primary objectives, and emphasised its intention to ally more closely with the NGO 
sector. ODM staff stressed a need to ‘make sure our efforts were integrated with 
[voluntary organisations]... we wish to plan and work in collaboration with these bodies at 
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all stages, since their role will continue to be an essential one’.108 This prioritisation of 
NGOs reflected how aid agencies were now increasingly being feted by the state, for their 
perceived efficiency, expertise, lack of bureaucracy, and capacity to reach the poorest 
communities. The DEC played an integral role in facilitating this official recognition of 
NGOs, as it fuelled the growth of its members while providing a channel between 
themselves and government. The emphasis placed by the ODM on co-ordination also 
represented a broader increase of state support for the voluntary sector in the 1970s, as a 
number of governmental departments looked for ways to liaise with NGOs and draw upon 
their distinctive capacities and methods. Matthew Hilton et al. argue that the government 
also sought to shape the sector at this time, by bringing NGOs under increased official 
oversight.
109
 
 The Disaster Unit accordingly designated the DEC as its preferred vehicle for co-
ordination, and began to build up closer relations with the Committee. In June 1974 the 
DEC Chairman (Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh) confirmed an approach by the ODM, who 
expressed ‘a strong desire to make closer contact with the voluntary agencies, and to 
develop much further joint relief enterprises’. The DEC members did not engage with this 
proposal uncritically. Alan Brash, Director of Christian Aid, commented that the 
Committee members were ‘anxious about... the tendency of this Government to draw all 
available groups into its orbit of good will, and to expect a degree of common cooperation 
and common action which is probably beyond the real interests of the voluntary agencies’. 
He added that ‘cooperation with the Government agencies may often be a good thing, but 
ought not at the same time to be uncritically expected as a general principle’.110 That the 
DEC members ultimately supported the Disaster Unit, despite their concerns of possible 
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co-option, demonstrated how years of close collaboration with the state had also tied the 
sector into a broader momentum towards integration that it was unable, or unwilling, to go 
against. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The closer coming together of the DEC members and government over this period 
reinforces how humanitarian NGOs and the state have a long history of interaction and 
collaboration. The British government drew upon the capacities and expertise of aid 
agencies to enhance their own capabilities. Working through NGOs also yielded political 
benefits in volatile contexts such as the Nigerian Civil War, or the East Pakistan crisis. In 
turn, NGOs also shaped official relief policy through their own expansion, interventions, 
and publicity, which helped increase popular support for humanitarian action. An official 
preference for working through the DEC also conferred legitimacy and prestige upon its 
members, consolidating the Committee's oligarchy within the humanitarian NGO sector. 
Collaborating with government to implement relief from the 1960s onwards also enrolled 
the DEC members into the broader momentum of the international aid system towards 
increased integration post-Biafra. What all this all ultimately suggests is that the history of 
the British humanitarian sector cannot be presented as separate or distinctive from the 
state. Rather, their complex interactions and interconnections dictate that they should be 
examined in tandem, and in practice the two have often been mutually co-constitutive. 
The question often asked today of whether NGOs and donors have become ‘too close for 
comfort’ is arguably misleading, as it implies there was a previous era when NGOs acted 
independently outside of government. In practice, the two have been intertwined for 
longer than generally assumed. 
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 The overhaul of disaster relief enacted by the ODM in 1974 formed part of a 
broader shift in British overseas aid policy as a whole. Following the lead being set by the 
World Bank and other multilateral institutions, in 1974 Judith Hart implemented a re-
orientation of official development aid towards a ‘basic needs’ approach, which 
emphasised poverty reduction through rural, small-scale, grassroots development.
111
 This 
new approach was to the benefit of leading development NGOs (such as Christian Aid and 
Oxfam), who were now widely perceived as more effective at reaching such micro-
environments than official bureaucracies. These organisations had collaborated with the 
ODA to implement development projects in Ethiopia in 1973, which raised the possibility 
of the state providing financial support for NGO development projects, to make ‘better 
use of the special capacity of these agencies’.112 
 The ODM subsequently introduced its Joint Funding Scheme (JFS) in 1975, to 
make bilateral aid available for suitable NGO development programmes on a pound-for-
pound basis. Despite modest beginnings, the JFS would eventually develop into an 
important source of funding for the leading development agencies.
113
 The 1980s has been 
widely depicted as the critical juncture when donors turned to aid agencies and the effects 
of official funding became visible. The evidence put forward in this chapter suggests that 
it was actually during the 1970s that this shift took place, facilitated by events in the 
1960s. Furthermore, it is revealing that upon entering office, Hart's administration felt it 
necessary to address the issue of disaster relief first. Arguably, the ODM understood that, 
since the public supported emergency relief more than development aid, criticisms of the 
official humanitarian response had to be defused before a new development policy could 
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be implemented. Furthermore, it was collaboration between the state and NGOs in the 
provision of humanitarian aid which helped forge the connections and infrastructure that 
made official support for grassroots development possible. 
 The creation of the Disaster Unit in 1974 represents an important point in the 
history of British humanitarianism, as it formalised the relationship between the state and 
the NGO sector. Closer integration also further enrolled the leading aid agencies into an 
emerging international aid architecture. The increasing financial and logistical support for 
NGO relief work heralded by the Disaster Unit suggested a further growth in the influence 
and size of aid agencies. It also raised the possibility that a more instrumental approach 
could co-opt and contain the sector as a whole, by turning development NGOs into service 
providers for apolitical relief. The following chapter explores how these trends unfolded 
in the decade after the creation of the Disaster Unit. 
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Chapter Four 
NGOs and the Technocratic Disaster Relief Industry, 1974-84 
 
The creation of the Disaster Unit in 1974 formalised the relationship between the 
Disasters Emergency Committee and the state. Over the course of the following decade, 
the Unit frequently responded to overseas emergencies of varying magnitudes. In the 
process, the Unit regularly channelled financial and logistical support through the DEC 
agencies, utilising them as instruments for the delivery of official humanitarian aid. This 
trend became more pronounced in the early 1980s, as the new Conservative government 
downgraded the importance of development aid while simultaneously directing more 
funding through the voluntary sector. Closer collaboration with government, and 
increasing official financial support, further stimulated the expansion and 
professionalisation of the humanitarian sector. This expansion of NGOs was also driven 
by growing popular support for emergency relief operations, a continuation of long-
running trends (graph 4.1). The British public responded generously to media reports of 
distant suffering, the impact of which was heightened by technological advances such as 
the spread of colour television. For instance, popular outcry at media images of 
Cambodian suffering in late 1979 led to huge public demands for relief, which Oxfam was 
leveraged to double its income in less than a year. All of these trends contributed towards 
the gradual development of an expansive and integrated disaster relief industry in Britain, 
in which the leading humanitarian NGOs were deeply embedded. 
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Graph 4.1: Cumulated income (£m) of the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam and the 
Save the Children Fund, 1973-83 (adjusted for inflation, 2009).
1
 
 
This building up of an infrastructure for humanitarian aid also overlapped with a more 
systematic engagement by agencies such as Christian Aid, Oxfam, and War on Want in 
the complexities and politics of international development. As the 1970s progressed, these 
development NGOs articulated a distinctive non-governmental methodology of aid, 
influenced by alternative theories of development emanating from the global South. This 
new approach emphasised sustainable grassroots programmes, working in partnership and 
solidarity with the global poor to help them liberate themselves from unjust economic and 
political conditions. This multifaceted and more radical approach also fostered a greater 
recognition of the need for development to be twinned with effective advocacy and 
education programmes. Development NGOs expanded their activities, taking up specific 
and overtly political Third World issues in national and transnational arenas. Crucially, 
more radical advocacy also stimulated a critique of humanitarian aid from within the 
NGO sector. For many within the development community,  disaster relief increasingly 
                                                             
1 Income data sourced from Matthew Hilton et al., ‘7.3: Cumulated income of international aid and 
development NGOs, 1945-2009’ (Adjusted for inflation, 2009), Non-Governmental Organisations 1945-97 
project datasets: http://www.ngo.bham.ac.uk/appendix/Figures_Chap_7/Figure%207.3.xlsx [accessed 31 
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came to be perceived as outdated and ineffective in the struggle for long-term structural 
change.  
 The NGO sector thus came to be characterised by a growing paradox over the 
course of this period. Despite the evolution of a sophisticated and overtly political 
advocacy agenda, which explicitly looked beyond short-term relief, the leading aid 
agencies continued to grow by responding to successive major emergencies. This chapter 
explores these contradictory trajectories, and sets out how despite an increasing political 
focus within the sector, a more integrated and depoliticised apparatus for humanitarian aid 
took shape. The principal British NGOs were enmeshed in this technocratic infrastructure, 
as service providers for the delivery of humanitarian aid channelled from the British 
government. 
 A number of commentators have depicted this instrumentalisation of NGOs as 
characteristic of the post-Cold War period. This is often attributed to dramatic increases in 
international expenditure on emergency relief since the 1990s, and the growing tendency 
of donors to channel this assistance through international NGOs. Mark Duffield argues 
that this has resulted in aid agencies being absorbed into a ‘mutual web of overlapping 
objectives’, which ties them to the policy objectives of donor governments, UN agencies, 
and Western militaries.
2
 John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen similarly 
point to a sophisticated ‘cross-cutting governance network’ of government agencies, inter-
governmental organisations and international NGOs, which delivers humanitarian aid in a 
variety of contexts.
3
 For Duffield, the NGO movement is now no longer external to the 
state, but has instead reinvented itself as ‘intrinsic to its reconstruction and power 
                                                             
2 Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007), p.28. 
3 John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International Development 
Cooperation (London: Zed, 2003), pp.199-215. 
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projection’.4 A number of authors have portrayed NGOs as becoming ‘governmentalised’ 
in this way, spreading the language and techniques of governance (and global governance) 
to the micro-level.
5
 
 Profound increases in the amounts of official humanitarian aid being channelled 
through non-state actors has also raised concerns that this diverts NGOs away from long-
term development and advocacy concerns. This represents an extension of long-standing 
debates over whether NGOs and donors have become ‘too close for comfort’.6 It has been 
argued that instrumentalisation leads to aid agencies becoming preoccupied by 
bureaucratic donor demands for accountability, evaluation and results-based 
management.
7
 Katie Bristow states that these pressures have undermined the potential of 
NGOs to articulate alternative notions of development. Instead, they have moved towards 
the ‘pro-market (neoliberal) and technology-orientated agenda’ of donor states and 
                                                             
4 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, p.29. 
5 Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and 
Power’, International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006, pp.651-672); Janice Gross Stein, ‘Humanitarian 
Organisations: Accountable - Why, to Whom, for What, and How?’ in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. 
Weiss (eds.), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, 
pp.124-142); Janice Gross Stein, ‘Background knowledge in the foreground: conversations about competent 
practice in “sacred space”’, in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds.), International Practices 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.87-107), p.94; Patricia Noxolo, ‘Freedom, Fear & 
NGOs: Balancing Discourses of Violence & Humanity in Securitising Times’, in Mark Duffield and Vernon 
Hewitt (eds.), Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Suffolk: James Currey, 
2013, pp.130-145). 
6 Stephen Commins, ‘NGOs: ladles in the global soup kitchen?’, Development in Practice, 9:5 (1999, 
pp.619-622); Michael Edwards and David Hulme, ‘Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on 
non-governmental organisations’, World Development, 24:6 (June 1996, pp.961-973); David Hulme and 
Michael Edwards (eds.), NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997). 
7 Thomas F. Carroll, Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development (Hartford, CT: 
Kumarian, 1992), p.18; Tina Wallace et al., Standardising Development: Influences on UK NGOs’ Policies 
and Procedures (Oxford: WorldView, 1997); Tina Wallace et al., The Aid Chain: Coercion and 
Commitment in Development NGOs (Warwickshire: ITDG, 1999); Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The 
NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action’, 
International Security, 27:1 (Summer 2002, pp.5-39); David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji, Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
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intergovernmental agencies.
8
 In short, the increasing bureaucracy and managerialism 
which accompanies closer integration with donors is also seen to have a depoliticising 
effect. Acting as service providers for emergency aid arguably contains NGOs within a 
broader system of humanitarian governance, which restricts their freedom to campaign 
against the structural causes of global poverty.
9
 
 What this literature does not make clear is how this humanitarian infrastructure 
developed historically, instead largely presenting it as a product of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, emphasis on a perceived process of governmentalisation can also imply that 
humanitarian NGOs have been passive receptors for the co-option of government, without 
agency themselves. This chapter demonstrates how in Britain this technocratic aid 
industry actually took shape in the 1970s, following the creation of the Disaster Unit. The 
Unit pursued a managerial approach to relief which emphasised logistical efficiency and 
technical expertise, drawing upon the capacities of the DEC members to augment its own 
response. In the process, integration between the Disaster Unit and the DEC consolidated 
a depoliticised form of humanitarianism which contradicted the political advocacy agenda 
also being articulated within the sector. This process was further reinforced by the actions 
of the television broadcasting authorities, who actively worked to restrain the political 
activity of the DEC members. However, it is also argued that NGOs themselves 
exacerbated these trends through their own deliberate decision-making, as they utilised the 
populist appeal of emergency appeals to fuel their own expansion. 
                                                             
8 Katie S. Bristow, ‘Transforming or Conforming? NGOs Training Health Promoters and the Dominant 
Paradigm of the Development Industry’, in Anthony J. Bebbington et al. (eds.), Can NGOs Make a 
Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives (London: Zed, 2008, pp.240-260), p.240. 
9 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (London: Villiers, 1997), 
pp.141-143; Anthony Bebbington, ‘Donor–NGO relations and representations of livelihood in 
nongovernmental aid chains’, World Development, 33:6 (June 2005, pp.937-950); Jude Howell, ‘Post-9/11 
Global Security Regime and Non-Governmental Public Action’, in Jude Howell (ed.), Global Matters for 
Non-Governmental Public Action (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp.41-65), p.64. 
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 To articulate this argument, this chapter is structured into four distinct analytical 
sections. First, the history of NGO advocacy over the course of this period is set out, 
continuing on from earlier chapters. As development NGOs engaged more systematically 
with alternative theories of development during the 1970s, their philosophy and approach 
to aid evolved to emphasise increased solidarity with the global poor. This in turn fuelled 
a more radical and sophisticated advocacy agenda, which openly targeted the structural 
causes of Third World suffering. By the early 1980s, this advocacy was increasingly 
professionalised and expert-driven in character. Becoming more overtly political also 
stimulated a self-critique of emergency relief from within the sector, as NGOs looked to 
shift the focus of their work away from traditional philanthropy. Stereotypical media 
images of starving children, ubiquitous in NGO emergency appeals in the 1960s, began to 
be denounced for perpetuating unethical stereotypes of the developing world. Particular 
attention is paid here to War on Want, which as the most radical voice in the sector 
articulated a powerful critique of both disaster relief in general, and the DEC specifically. 
War on Want eventually exited the Committee altogether in 1979, ostensibly to focus 
solely on long-term development. 
 The second section explores how, despite this political trajectory, the sector was 
contained by the building up of a sophisticated infrastructure for humanitarian aid by the 
British government. Closer integration between the Disaster Unit and the DEC granted 
increased authority to the Committee at the official level, while also tying its members 
into a relief apparatus that was inherently technocratic and depoliticising. The channelling 
of official emergency relief through NGOs became more overt after 1979, as the new 
Conservative government downgraded the significance of development aid and raised the 
relative importance of humanitarian assistance. The state also restricted the political 
activities of the sector more directly, through the interventions and oversight of the 
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Charity Commissioners. Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want all attracted the scrutiny 
of the Commissioners in the late 1970s for their political activities, setting up a period of 
increased surveillance in the 1980s. 
 A third section explores how this process of containment was reinforced by the 
actions of the television broadcasting authorities. The BBC and the IBA also enacted 
closer co-ordination with the DEC during this period, which strengthened the authority of 
the Committee members within their sector. However, the broadcasters also strongly 
resisted attempts by the DEC to broaden out the types of emergencies and crises they 
could appeal for. This resulted in a series of bitter disputes between the broadcasters and 
the DEC in the early 1980s, as the Committee attempted to expand their mandate to cover 
more complex, overtly political man-made disasters in Africa and Latin America. In the 
process, the broadcasters imposed a conception of voluntary action upon the DEC which 
was fundamentally apolitical. This represented an effective policing of the NGO sector's 
political boundaries by the television authorities, and highlighted the broadcasters' 
important and active role in shaping the British humanitarian industry. 
 Finally, the extent to which NGOs were themselves implicated in these trends is 
examined. While the NGO sector was politically contained by more powerful forces, the 
agencies also exacerbated this further through their own deliberate decision-making. The 
DEC members regularly requested emergency appeals, and were complicit in 
depoliticising global poverty despite their own awareness of the problems in doing so. 
Ultimately, humanitarian NGOs understood that dramatic disaster appeals in the media 
were far more effective at generating public support than their broader long-term 
development work. This support in turn translated into increased donations, fuelling 
further institutional expansion. This was apparent in Oxfam's response to a major 
emergency in Cambodia in late 1979, as an intensive publicity campaign and a public 
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association with the relief efforts helped double the organisation's income in less than a 
year. The effectiveness of NGO political advocacy was also limited by divisions within 
the sector, which reflected the broader problems associated with charitable organisations 
entering the political arena. It is ultimately concluded that this period represents a critical 
period in the modern history of humanitarianism, which sheds light on broader issues such 
as the implication of aid agencies in governance, the relationship between the media and 
voluntary action, and the types of political participation fostered by NGOs. 
 
 
NGOs and Advocacy 
Chapters one and two outlined how, beginning in the early 1960s, a number of 
organisations within the humanitarian sector began publicising the root causes of global 
poverty and underdevelopment. In doing so, they intended to mobilise public support for 
international development. The stimulus for this new direction was the involvement of 
agencies such as Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want in initiatives linked to the First 
UN Development Decade. Of particular importance was the UN Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign (FFHC), which helped raised awareness of the needs of post-colonial nations. 
NGO collaboration on development was extended over the course of the decade, aided by 
co-ordinating initiatives such as the Voluntary Committee for Overseas Development 
(VCOAD). VCOAD took over the FFHC's remit, and strove to integrate the development 
programmes and educational activities of its member agencies. As the 1960s progressed, 
NGO campaigns gradually became more political in character, based on a realisation that 
only governments and intergovernmental institutions could bring about lasting long-term 
change. More overt lobbying of policymakers risked confrontation with the Charity 
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Commissioners, as well as exacerbating divisions within the sector regarding the 
acceptable limits of political engagement.  
 The 1960s concluded with a widespread recognition that the Development Decade 
had largely failed to lift Third World populations out of extreme poverty.
10
 However, 
humanitarian NGOs still entered the political arena with hesitation, restricted by the 
constraints of charity law, and anxieties concerning how overt political engagement would 
be interpreted by the general public. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that 
more radical campaigns emerged, although these were revealingly rarely undertaken by 
the leading agencies directly. Instead, this political activity was hived out to external, non-
charitable bodies such as the Haslemere Group, the World Development Movement, and 
New Internationalist magazine. While these institutions were legally distinct from the 
mainline agencies, in practice organisations such as Christian Aid, Oxfam, and War on 
Want all financed and supported them either directly or indirectly. 
 As the 1970s progressed, education and advocacy programmes continued to 
evolve and take on more importance, driven by the emergence of a distinctive NGO 
approach to development. As the First UN Development Decade came to an end, orthodox 
state-led development models were increasingly criticised for failing to address extreme 
poverty and inequality in the developing nations.
11
 Disillusionment with economic growth 
also fostered a greater understanding of the interconnectedness of rich and poor nations, 
                                                             
10 Maggie Black, A Cause for our Times: Oxfam, the First Fifty Years (Oxford: Oxford University 
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and the structural forces which worked against long-term change.
12
 In this climate, 
development NGOs engaged more systematically with various alternative theories and 
frameworks of development emanating from the global South. This included ideas of 
appropriate technology, liberation theology, and support for Julius Nyerere's experiment 
with ujaama in Tanzania.
13
 A particularly influential concept was the notion of 
‘conscientisation’, or consciousness-raising, associated with Brazilian theorist Paulo 
Freire.
14
  
 What united all of these ideas was a focus on bottom-up community development, 
and NGOs gradually incorporated these theories into a new conception of overseas aid in 
the 1970s. Whereas NGOs had supported official development policy in the 1960s, they 
now promoted an alternative model which emphasised sustainable grassroots 
programmes, working in partnership with local communities.
15
 In the process, these 
organisations were adopting a more socialist ideology, viewing their development work as 
a means to empower the global poor to liberate themselves from unjust economic, 
political and social conditions.
16
 Organisations such as Oxfam undertook a major 
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evolution in their programming as a result, moving from traditional missionary projects to 
a ‘multifaceted development process based on educational enlightenment’.17 
 Becoming practitioners of alternative development also stimulated debates within 
NGOs, concerning their philosophy of aid as a whole. Aid agencies explored ways to link 
their project work with their wider roles, aiming to scale up their efforts into broader 
schemes of alternative development. This shift in focus fostered a greater recognition of 
the need to twin grassroots development with more substantial educational and advocacy 
initiatives. Christian Aid and Oxfam both invested more substantially in this aspect of 
their work during the 1970s as a result. For instance, in 1974 the Oxfam Council of 
Management began allocating five per cent of all un-earmarked income to public 
education. A year later, the organisation set out a new mission statement which 
incorporated various radical theories of alternative development (in particular 
conscientisation) into its institutional character. Maggie Black has depicted this new 
statement as a ‘turning-point’ in the history of Oxfam, as a sense of solidarity with the 
poor displaced ‘the old idea of beneficence towards them’.18 
 Like Christian Aid and Oxfam, War on Want also pursued a more radical path 
over the course of the 1970s. War on Want's origins as a political campaigning body had 
generally allowed the organisation to navigate this course less problematically than other 
agencies. However, War on Want's overall effectiveness had been hindered in the late 
1960s by its financial dependency on Frank Harcourt-Munning. Harcourt-Munning had 
been central to the revival of War on Want as a mainline NGO at the end of the 1950s, as 
discussed in chapter one. His insistence that ‘not one penny would be deducted from gifts 
for overseas aid to meet the costs of administration’ also increasingly stifled the 
                                                             
17 Black, A Cause for Our Times, pp.177-202, quote at p.197. 
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organisation as the 1960s progressed.
19
 This amateur ethic was in stark contrast to other 
NGOs (especially Oxfam), who were professionalising and spending more on marketing 
to fuel organisational growth. War on Want's finances became increasingly unstable, and 
Harcourt-Munning was forced out in 1969.
20
 His exit unleashed a process of 
professionalisation, as a well as a further shift to the political Left. War on Want 
developed an extensive ideological attachment to grassroots development as the 1970s 
progressed, which also involved committing to a more vigorous campaigning role in 
Britain.
21
  
 This new outlook could be seen in War on Want's connection to the famous baby 
milk campaign. The campaign originated in a 1973 New Internationalist article on health 
problems and deaths among infants in the Third World, caused by the aggressive 
marketing of infant formula by baby food companies.
22
 The following year, War on Want 
produced a investigative report (The Baby Killer) which documented the mis-selling and 
subsequent misuse of infant formula by transnational corporations such as Nestlé.
23
 War 
on Want's report publicised the story, and received wide circulation in the British press. 
The report was also translated and disseminated internationally, giving rise to a 
transnational advocacy campaign on the link between baby milk and Third World 
malnutrition. The movement had an immediate and lasting impact, resulting in an 
organised, international consumer boycott of Nestlé products. The campaign also led to 
the implementation of international Codes of Conduct, and a closer coming together of 
                                                             
19 Matthew Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p.71. 
20 Ibid., pp.71-72. 
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Northern and Southern NGOs in shared advocacy.
24
 The importance of The Baby Killer in 
sparking this movement was a major advocacy success for War on Want, and the 
organisation continued to campaign on the baby milk issue into the 1980s and beyond. 
 The baby milk advocacy network also represented a prototype for a new form of 
global campaigning by NGOs. This advocacy was characterised by diverse coalitions of 
transnational actors coming together on specific international issues, operating outside of 
traditional diplomatic and political channels. For instance, Christian Aid, Oxfam and War 
on Want all participated to some extent in the global anti-apartheid movement of the late 
1970s, as part of a much broader transnational advocacy network.
25
 Christian Aid and 
War on Want also began to engage with transnational human rights campaigning in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, much of which was spearheaded by human rights NGOs such 
as Amnesty International. This was partly influenced by their work in Latin America, 
which experienced a rising spiral of political violence largely initiated by authoritarian 
military regimes.
26
 What these various initiatives all pointed to was an increasing 
momentum of development NGOs taking up specific and more overtly political Third 
World issues in national and transnational arenas. In 1980 the General Secretary of War 
on Want acknowledged the intention to ‘gradually push forward the frontiers of War on 
Want's charitable objectives’. This was to specifically include ‘human rights, some 
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political angles, international economic relations, race relations... [and] international 
politics.’27 
 In the process, NGO advocacy became more professional. Maggie Black 
documents how Oxfam's Public Affairs Unit had evolved into an efficient and effective 
research body by the early 1980s. The Unit published well-researched and sophisticated 
reports on specific issues, such as the misuse of pesticides and medicines in the 
developing world by multinational corporations. This approach to advocacy was based 
upon the authority of technical expertise, and was specifically directed at powerful actors 
in governmental and professional spheres rather than the general public.
28
 This diverse 
range of NGO activities all fed back into a trajectory towards more overt political 
engagement on the root causes of poverty. In 1983 Oxfam underwent an internal 
reorganisation, increasing its education and campaigning staff numbers, and updating its 
charitable objectives. The organisation added to its mandate an aim to ‘educate the public 
concerning the nature, causes, and effects of poverty, distress and suffering... to conduct 
and procure research concerning these and to publish or otherwise make the results 
thereof available to the public’.29 
 Crucially, increasing emphasis on advocacy also implied a shift away from 
emergency relief concerns, which were equated by many within the sector as traditional 
philanthropy, outdated and ineffective in the struggle for long-term change. An early 
example of this self-critique was the Haslemere Declaration in 1968, which likened 
charitable relief to ‘tossing sixpence in a beggar's cap: money given by those who have no 
intention of changing the system that produces beggars, and no understanding that they 
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are part of it’.30 More generally, this attitude was also reflected in a critique of NGO 
emergency advertising, which emerged from within the development community in the 
1970s. This critique denounced the perpetuation of simplistic images of starving children 
as unethical, exploitative, and misleading. For instance, in 1973 Oxfam publicly 
announced its intention to stop using such imagery altogether, and instead seek to ‘educate 
rather than incite pity’. The agency went on to state that ‘people have become blunted by 
disaster, so we now intend to concentrate on the constructive aspect of our work in 
advertisements and to rely on local groups to do the follow-up in fundraising’. War on 
Want added at the same time that ‘the starving child has really been flogged to death, and 
we now make the assumption that the energy we used to give to advertising for funds 
must be spent on education of the public here’.31 
 These criticisms reflected how many individuals within the NGO sector were 
interpreting the short-term objectives of charitable fundraising as contradictory to the 
longer-term aims of advocacy and education work. Instead, a growing number of 
commentators implicated this style of representation in advancing an unethical and 
colonial depiction of the Third World, which did not fit with the new rhetoric of 
empowerment, participation, and solidarity with the global poor. In an influential article in 
New Internationalist in 1981, Jørgen Lissner referred to such images as being 
‘pornographic’, in that they exhibited ‘the human body and soul in all its nakedness, 
without any respect and piety for the person involved’.32 Initially quite radical, this 
critique permeated through the development community in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
33
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 As the DEC was a central instrument for disaster relief, it also was subjected to 
this critique, advanced primarily by War on Want. Indeed, War on Want's radical 
trajectory in the 1970s stimulated within the organisation a growing dissatisfaction with 
the entire practice of humanitarian aid. Agency staff commented in 1973 that they no 
longer wished to have an ‘ambulance function’, arguing that they were ‘not a disaster 
organisation... every attempt the organisation had made to participate in a disaster 
situation had diverted its efforts to carry on the task it was created to do’.34 War on Want 
subsequently pushed for the DEC to evolve beyond a simple relief fundraising 
mechanism, and work instead towards development and public campaigning. By 1974, the 
War on Want Council of Management was discussing leaving the Committee altogether, 
although it was instead agreed to remain with a long-term objective to ‘replace the 
existing DEC with a consortium for development’.35  
 War on Want was not alone in this dissatisfaction with the Committee's emphasis 
on short-term crisis. Oxfam proposed that the DEC be renamed the ‘Disaster Appeals 
Committee’, arguing that the alteration would ‘remove the “emergency” connotation 
whilst retaining the disaster concept’. It was envisaged that this would ‘facilitate the 
change of emphasis from immediate relief into short-term rehabilitation and hopefully 
longer-term development’. The proposal was given serious discussion by the DEC, to the 
point of being put forward to the BBC and IBA for their consideration.
36
  
 War on Want further criticised the DEC for its unbalanced approach towards aid 
and publicity, and placing ‘too much emphasis on short-term relief rather than long-term 
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rehabilitation’. Instead they proposed that the DEC should function as an ‘information-
gatherer’, and have a Charter which would ‘include donor education among its 
functions’.37 By 1977, War on Want's discomfort hardened to the point of simply giving 
away their proceeds from a DEC appeal for a cyclone in India, to the Indian Red Cross 
and other relevant bodies (including Oxfam). The agency subsequently sent out a letter to 
supporters indicating that ‘War on Want does not plan to support every disaster’.38 For 
War on Want, the issue was fundamentally one of political engagement. In 1977, disputes 
within the Committee over a proposed appeal for Mozambique were reported in the 
British press, and War on Want took the opportunity to publicly state that ‘relief agencies 
cannot pretend not to be political. All aid involves political choices’.39 
 Tensions between War on Want and the DEC came to a head in early 1979. 
Referring to the Indian cyclone appeal, General Secretary Mary Dines commented in 
January on the need to ‘start thinking seriously about whether we continue our 
membership of the DEC... we should reconsider our position during the year’.40 A month 
later, War on Want terminated its membership of the Disasters Emergency Committee. 
Agency staff attributed the DEC exit to Mary Dines, and her ideological conviction that 
War on Want should be engaged solely in long-term development.
41
 Dines had been an 
outspoken activist for migrant and refugee rights in Britain prior to joining the 
organisation in 1976, and under her leadership she pushed for War on Want to take up a 
more radical approach to development. This included overtly political campaigning in 
Britain, such as highlighting ‘the links between development aid and imperialism’.42 
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Subsequently, when the DEC launched an appeal for East Africa in 1980, War on Want 
publicly stated that ‘our limited resources can be better utilised in working with organised 
groups in developing countries in their efforts to ensure future development’. The same 
statement added that War on Want was ‘not a relief agency as such. It is a development 
agency’.43 
 While War on Want represented the radical edge of the sector, its criticism of the 
DEC did reflect a more general desire within the development community to downgrade 
the importance of emergency relief, and place more emphasis on addressing the root 
causes of global poverty. However, despite this discernible will to explore different 
avenues for NGO action, in practice the sector continued to be drawn back to disaster 
relief, which was presented publicly as apolitical. This was particularly evident in the 
consistent fundraising success of NGO emergency appeals, such as those made by the 
DEC. This appears to represent a significant paradox in the history of humanitarian 
NGOs, which requires unpicking.  
 
 
The State and Technocratic Relief 
The crucial driver in NGOs extending their involvement in emergency relief, despite an 
increasing political focus, was the British government. Indeed, the role of the state is 
integral to the historical development of humanitarian NGOs during this period. As 
chapter three documented, the creation of the Disaster Unit within the Ministry of 
Overseas Development (ODM) in 1974 reflected an acceptance by government of the 
need for a more effective relief machinery. This mirrored similar developments in other 
Western nations and intergovernmental forums, as reforms were initiated on a number of 
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fronts with the aim of improving relief co-ordination and effectiveness. Donor 
governments and UN agencies set up dedicated emergency units, and UNDRO was 
empowered as a central focal point. NGOs entered into new networks and coalitions, and 
a swathe of disaster research groups were established. What Randolph Kent termed the 
‘international disaster relief network’ thus began to take shape at this time.44 A recent 
paper has depicted a transnational humanitarian ‘knowledge community’ as emerging 
during this period, as the objectives of a network of interconnected actors ‘began to 
coalesce into collective methods for improving humanitarian response’.45 
 Within Britain, the Disaster Unit was intended to act as a focal point for 
emergency relief, mirroring similar institutions established in other donor governments.
46
 
Initially only responsible for ‘man-made’ and ‘predictable’ disasters, the Disaster Unit's 
key functions included providing emergency aid, liaising with UN agencies, and liaising 
with British NGOs. The Unit was also responsible for monitoring potential disasters, and 
advising the ODM and FCO on disaster related issues such as planning, research and 
training. The Unit placed strong emphasis on logistical management, maintaining a fleet 
of vehicles which could be deployed to disaster zones at short notice. While the Unit's 
executive responsibilities were all related to short-term immediate relief, it also advised 
the ODM and FCO on post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction needs.
47
 
 From the outset, the Disaster Unit attached considerable importance to integrating 
its work closely with the leading humanitarian NGOs, using the DEC as a vehicle. The 
reflected the ODM's aim to enhance its capabilities by drawing upon the existing capacity, 
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experience and expertise of the NGO sector. For instance, the Disaster Unit held 
equipment reserves at a British Red Cross warehouse, and when it needed to obtain 
further supplies it would use the Red Cross as a purchasing agent.
48
 This emphasis on 
working with the DEC also reflected how the voluntary sector as a whole was being 
afforded a new level of official recognition in the 1970s. Successive governments sought a 
more formalised relationship with NGOs, in which the tangible benefits of collaboration 
were clearly identifiable and measurable.
49
 More specifically, the use of the DEC as a co-
ordinating mechanism also reflected how the Committee members had consolidated their 
position as leading players in the humanitarian sector. The Disaster Unit was represented 
at DEC meetings after 1974, often seeking the expert advice of its members, and in 1978 
the ODM began funding the costs of the DEC secretariat.
50
  
 Collaboration between the DEC and the state usually involved the Disaster Unit  
taking up a co-ordinating role, overseeing and directing NGO relief efforts, for which it 
provided financial and logistical support. For instance, in April 1975 the ODM made a 
grant of £250,000 to the DEC, to fund emergency relief measures in South Vietnam and 
Cambodia. The grant formed part of a larger £1 million aid package for ‘humanitarian 
needs in Vietnam and Cambodia’, as the Vietnam War drew to a conclusion. Minister for 
Overseas Development Judith Hart announced the grant in the House of Commons, 
stating that ‘the [NGOs] are already working out the logistics with help from my Disaster 
Unit’. The ODM grant for Indochina also set a new precedent, as the first time the DEC 
mechanism was used to finance relief efforts without making an appeal to, or raising any 
funds from, the British public.
51
 The Disaster Unit continued to work closely with the 
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DEC throughout the 1970s, co-ordinating and making grants for NGO relief operations. In 
1976 the state channelled funding through the Committee in response to an earthquake in 
Guatemala. This was undertaken despite the Guatemalan government turning down an 
offer of bilateral aid from the British government due to political differences over 
Belize.
52
 In the same year, the Disaster Unit also made funding and support available to 
the DEC for relief efforts in response to an earthquake in Turkey, and the ongoing Civil 
War in Lebanon. Neither of these operations involved a DEC broadcast appeal to the 
public.
53
 
 Initiatives such as these provided an additional revenue stream for the DEC 
members, further building up their relief capacities. In the process, an infrastructure for 
humanitarian aid gradually took shape, in which NGOs had an integral role as instruments 
of official aid policy, delivering emergency relief in return for government grants. 
Crucially, this nascent relief industry was also technocratic in character. The Disaster Unit 
emphasised logistical efficiency and technical expertise, based around notions of metrics, 
planning, resources and strategy. ODM staff acknowledged the divergence between the 
Unit's conception of emergency assistance, and the approach traditionally followed by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): 
 ‘The Unit concentrates on humanitarian aspects, applying accumulated knowledge, 
 experience and expertise; the FCO sees disaster relief as mainly political in character 
 although they too have experience of disaster responses. The Disaster Unit's horizons are 
 wide in that all available related data is taken into account; the FCO concentrate their 
 efforts on a dialogue with the Head of Mission, responding usually in relation to what they 
 think they are best able  to do - invariably cash, medical supplies, tents, blankets...’.
54
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The ODM staff utilised this perception of technical expertise to justify the Disaster Unit 
also assuming authority for responding to natural disasters, taking over from the FCO in 
late 1976. From this point on, the Unit was elevated into the focal point in government for 
‘all questions arising from disasters in developing countries’.55 Indeed, ODM staff argued 
that comparing the FCO and the Disaster Unit was an ‘an almost amateur-professional 
comparison’.56 The Disaster Unit's approach was also inherently depoliticising of 
humanitarian crises and distant suffering, approaching them as technical problems that 
could be solved by more effective logistics, management and distribution. The exclusive 
focus on the immediate relief stage of disasters also implied an institutionalisation of 
humanitarian emergencies, as long-term causes and effects went unaddressed.  
 The incorporation of the DEC agencies into this infrastructure influenced them to 
operate in a similar way, sharing in the same language of technocratic expertise and 
planning as the Disaster Unit. Indeed, the Unit's professionalism reflected a broader 
standardisation of humanitarian action ongoing throughout this period, and the DEC 
considered the Unit to be an effective and reliable partner. Standardisation also implied a 
homogenisation of NGOs, and a move to the centre-ground ideologically. Following the 
ODM's assumption of authority for natural disasters in 1976, the DEC revealingly 
commented that they were ‘very pleased to hear that the Disaster Unit has now been 
assigned to deal with immediate relief aid for natural disasters as well as man-made 
disasters... we would like to express our congratulations’.57 
 This integrated approach to relief co-ordination was apparent in the British 
response to a cyclone in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, in November 1977. The 
cyclone killed approximately 10,000 people, as well as causing widespread damage to 
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livestock, crops and housing.
58
 The Disaster Unit immediately took up a co-ordinating 
role, directing the DEC agencies (who also launched a broadcast appeal), contributing 
£190,000 for the purchase and transportation of NGO relief supplies, and supplying 
vehicles for DEC usage.
59
 The reliance of the Unit on NGOs was financially and 
materially beneficial for the DEC members. It also represented an instrumentalisation of 
the sector, and the Unit's emphasis on administration and co-ordination reinforced the 
apolitical humanitarianism promoted by the DEC. War on Want revealingly played no 
part in the cyclone relief efforts, stating outright that they ‘would not... be making any 
claims on government funds’.60  
 Once the initial relief needs had been met, the ODM then turned its attention to 
implementing rehabilitation and development projects in the cyclone region. As bilateral 
aid was unacceptable to the Indian government in this context, the ODM proposed to 
channel official aid through the DEC instead, ‘for medium and long term rehabilitation 
projects’.61 The increasingly close relationship between the ODM and the DEC at this 
time reflected an extension of governance beyond the formal state apparatus, as NGOs 
gradually became governmentalised. 
 This building up of a wider relief infrastructure by the state became more 
pronounced in the 1980s, as Britain's overseas aid policy was dramatically altered after the 
election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government in 1979. The new 
administration downgraded the importance of development assistance, with more weight 
attached to commercial, industrial and political objectives. ODM staff numbers were cut, 
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and the Ministry itself was incorporated into the FCO and once again renamed as the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA). The official aid budget consequently fell 
from 0.52 percent of gross national product (GNP)  in 1979, to 0.32 percent by 1988.
 62
 
While these cuts represented a step backwards for the progress of long-term development, 
they also raised the relative importance of official disaster relief. In 1980 approximately 2 
percent of the ODA budget was spent on humanitarian aid, rising to 11 percent by 1987.
63
  
 Significant amounts of this funding were channelled through the NGO sector by 
the Disaster Unit, which retained its prominent role and reputation for professionalism in 
the 1980s.
64
 For instance, a record sum of £6.1 million raised by a DEC appeal for 
refugees in East Africa in 1980 was inflated by a contribution of £500,000 from the 
ODA.
65
 This also established a trend of the government making direct financial 
contributions to DEC broadcast appeals, which continues today.
66
 The 1980s therefore 
witnessed a significant increase in the provision of disaster relief from the state to aid 
agencies, foreshadowing the prominence of NGOs as the preferred channel for 
humanitarian aid from donor governments and UN agencies in the post-Cold War era.
67
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Furthermore, these increases in official funding were facilitated by the rationalising of 
arrangements between the DEC and the state in the 1970s. 
 This building up of what increasingly resembled a technocratic humanitarian aid 
industry had an unstated outcome of containing the sector's political activities. The 
channelling of increasing amounts of disaster relief through aid agencies meant that the 
DEC members were all increasing their capacities for relief, despite the intention of the 
development-oriented organisations to focus on other aspects of their work. Furthermore, 
increasing official support also imposed new demands upon the sector for accountability 
and evaluation. The state also worked to restrict the sector's political involvement more 
directly in this period, through the interventions of the Charity Commissioners.  
 The principal development NGOs had attracted the scrutiny of the Commissioners 
in the 1960s, and the taking up of more radical advocacy in the 1970s by Christian Aid, 
Oxfam and War on Want risked further clashes. By the end of the decade all three were 
facing official reprimands for their activities. Oxfam was cautioned for a Young Oxfam 
publication in 1978, which was found to be ‘undoubtedly of a political nature and... 
beyond what was permissible for a charity’.68 Christian Aid was flagged for supporting 
the Commission on Churches Participation in Development, an overtly political body 
within the World Council of Churches which engaged in ‘financing political action and 
effecting changes in society’.69 In both cases, Christian Aid and Oxfam accepted the 
Commissioners rulings and sought to downplay their own politicisation, presenting 
themselves as moderate bodies to avoid further sanctions. In this context, maintaining and 
extending a capacity for emergency relief also allowed development agencies to present 
themselves as apolitical when it was pragmatic to do so. 
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 In contrast, War on Want became embroiled in direct and open confrontation with 
the Charity Commissioners. The organisation's donation to strikers at the Grunwick Film 
Processing Laboratories in London in 1976 created an outcry in the right-wing press, 
triggering a period of intense scrutiny by the state.
70
 A subsequent meeting between War 
on Want and the Commissioners in 1978 turned into an extended recital of the NGO's 
unacceptable political activities: 
 ‘In addition to the unacceptable nature of some of the Charity's publications, its activities 
 on research, in promoting campaigns, and on certain aid projects had also been said at the 
 meeting to be open to legitimate criticism. Research into international trade unionism and 
 investigation of the activities of tobacco firms, multinational companies, and defence 
 expenditure seemed remote from the Charity's object of conducting research into the 
 causes  and ways of relieving poverty. The War on Want campaigns based on its 
 investigations into drug companies, the arms trade, the sale of powdered milk, 
 multinational companies and tobacco companies all appeared to fall within the term 
 “propaganda”...’.
71
 
 
War on Want stated in its defence that it wished to ‘move away from the traditional forms 
of relief and to concentrate on overcoming the causes of poverty’. However, the 
Commissioners concluded that ‘the political and propaganda nature’ of many of its 
publications and activities were ‘inappropriate to a charity’, and ‘right outside the 
legitimate scope of the charitable field’.72 War on Want's overt advocacy thus brought the 
organisation into direct conflict with the institutional structures of the state. The dispute 
resulted in War on Want being forced to sell off its print department, which produced 
material for a number of clients who were deemed to be radical and non-charitable.
73
 The 
organisation also had to set up a separate company (WOW Campaigns Limited) as a non-
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charitable entity, to continue its more controversial work. Indeed, WOW Campaigns 
defined its objective as to ‘support War on Want in all its activities and carry on efforts 
which were prohibited... by charity law’.74 
 Increasingly overt political involvement by NGOs in the 1970s attracted the 
interest of the political Right. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed a series of attempts by 
right-wing organisations and lobbies to ascribe illegitimacy to the campaigning and 
educational activities of development NGOs. For instance, the Daily Telegraph published 
a hostile piece in 1978 which attacked Christian Aid and Oxfam for their financial 
backing of New Internationalist, depicted as a ‘politically extremist’ Marxist-Leninist 
publication.
75
 Thatcher's Conservative government also worked against NGO advocacy by  
removing official funding for development education activities, which Labour had 
provided increasing support for between 1975 and 1979. After 1979 this source of finance 
was cut off, reflecting the government's view that such initiatives were better conducted 
by voluntary organisations outside of the official sphere.
76
 
 While the Conservative administration cut support for development education, it 
continued and extended the financial support for NGO development programmes 
introduced by Labour in 1975 (the Joint Funding Scheme, or JFS). Furthermore, it did so 
despite moving away from Labour's original rationale of directing aid to the poorest 
communities in the global South.
77
 This extension of the JFS was largely a reflection of 
the government's commitment to addressing welfare issues with non-state solutions, and 
was consistent with the Conservatives' wider faith in privatisation. Indeed, Peter Burnell 
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argues that maintaining the JFS permitted the ODA to ‘retreat some way from a direct 
commitment’ to global poverty reduction, by privatising this responsibility out to the 
NGO sector.
78
 Furthermore, financing NGO projects also allowed the government to 
present itself as supporting international development, despite making reductions to the 
official aid budget. The growth of official funding for NGOs in this period can be 
interpreted as an undermining of more radical campaigning and containing the sector 
within the agenda of government, as resources for advocacy were reduced by the 
pressures of meeting the demands of ‘contract culture’.79  
 The development-oriented DEC members were certainly aware of this possibility. 
War on Want declined to apply for official support from the JFS in 1977, on the grounds 
that additional staff would be required to set up the machinery necessary to meet ODM 
procedures and evaluation requirements. By contrast, Christian Aid and Oxfam both re-
assigned extra staff for this very purpose.
80
 What this all points to is that a diverse range 
of state institutions were working to keep the sector focused upon apolitical disaster relief, 
and restraining the more radical advocacy increasingly being articulated within the 
development community.   
 
 
The Power of Television 
This process of political containment was also reinforced by the media, in particular the 
actions of the television broadcasting authorities. Closer integration between the DEC and 
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the state also developed in parallel with increasing co-ordination between the Committee 
and the BBC and IBA, which reflected the crucial role of television in mobilising 
humanitarian responses. While the broadcasters had been content to approve successive 
DEC appeal requests during the 1960s without comment, the authorities gradually became 
more interventionist over the course of the 1970s. The initial catalyst for this was the 
massive public response to Jonathan Dimbleby's documentary on famine in Ethiopia (The 
Unknown Famine), aired by ITV in October 1973, as discussed in chapter two. 
 The popular outcry caused by The Unknown Famine prompted a closer 
examination of the entire broadcast emergency appeals mechanism. The IBA interpreted 
the film's impact as a new phenomenon in broadcasting, where a disaster ‘fails to make 
the news headlines and instead hits the public through a single documentary’. The 
authority therefore argued that the broadcasters would benefit from being in ‘a better 
position to respond’ to such disasters in future. One proposed solution was in ‘relaxing the 
controls’ of emergency appeals, so that programmes such as The Unknown Famine could 
be explicitly linked with a DEC appeal at the time of broadcast. To do so required closer 
collaboration between the broadcasters and the DEC, and television production companies 
were subsequently required to consult with both bodies in advance if they were producing 
current affairs programmes or documentaries on Third World disasters.
81
 For instance, the 
IBA anticipated a public response to a 1974 documentary on floods in Bangladesh, and 
arranged for the eventual broadcast to be accompanied by a limited DEC advertising 
campaign. Furthermore, they did so despite a consensus among the DEC members that the 
situation inside Bangladesh did not merit a full national appeal.
82
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 While this closer coming together of the DEC and the broadcasters reinforced the 
Committee's status as a leading humanitarian instrument in Britain, it also concealed a 
divergence of views between the two regarding the DEC's importance. For its members, 
the Committee's significance was that it prevented inter-agency competition and provided 
a single channel between themselves and television. However, for the broadcasters, the 
DEC's utility was that it provided a convenient and efficient funnel for the public 
sympathy that was inevitably generated by television coverage of major disasters. The 
BBC Board of Governors stated that the DEC existed to ‘respond to humanitarian feelings 
in a British public already alert to a disaster emergency’.83  
 While this arrangement worked effectively for large-scale emergencies that 
suddenly captured the news headlines, it also reinforced a limited, apolitical conception of 
the NGO sector as emergency-oriented. As this chapter has documented, this image was 
increasingly in opposition to the growing political ambitions of the majority of the DEC 
members. Indeed, Oxfam's proposal in 1975 that the DEC be renamed the Disaster 
Appeals Committee to facilitate a ‘change of emphasis from immediate relief into short-
term rehabilitation and hopefully longer-term development’ represented a deliberate 
attempt to broaden out this definition of the DEC's work. However, in practice both the 
BBC and the IBA quickly dismissed the idea, taking the position that the present name 
was ‘the most appropriate and definitely the most effective’. Reflecting its deference to 
the broadcasting authorities, the DEC quietly dropped the idea.
84
 
 Attempts by the DEC members to expand the Committee's mandate in the early 
1980s, to make appeals for slow-onset and unpublicised man-made emergencies, resulted 
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in a series of bitter disputes between themselves and the broadcasters. These tensions 
began with a DEC request for an appeal in 1980 for ‘starving, drought stricken people in 
the Horn of Africa’. The appeal was in response to the huge refugee problems affecting 
the Horn region and was very ambitious in scope, covering Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya.
85
 The appeal was also very different in character to previous 
DEC appeals. The BBC Appeals Secretary observed the ‘little recent coverage of these 
problems in the press’, which contradicted the perceived need for broadcast emergency 
appeals to be geared towards a ‘demonstrable outburst of public feeling’. The same 
official added that the BBC was not in favour of ‘trying to institute a third stage of 
appeals, for... annual appeals to provide aid to particular parts of the world’. It was argued 
that to do so could ‘destroy the DEC system which has worked well over the years’.86  
 The perception that the DEC was trying to institute a new ‘stage of appeals’ 
indicated a hostile reaction to the Committee's request, which was seen as a departure 
from standard practice. Lewis Waddilove, Chairman of the Central Appeals Advisory 
Committee (CAAC), similarly interpreted the East Africa request as evidence of the DEC 
‘virtually dictating the terms on which they shall make their appeals’. Waddilove stressed 
that the DEC did ‘not have some right to television time on the two channels to make 
appeals whenever they think some issue has arisen which justifies asking the public for 
support’.87 
 While the appeal eventually went ahead in June 1980, raising a unexpected record 
sum of £6.1 million in the process, the request undermined the relationship between the 
DEC and the broadcasting authorities. These tensions were further exacerbated by a DEC 
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request in 1982 for an appeal to aid ‘refugees and displaced persons in El Salvador and 
other Central American countries’. El Salvador had been in a state of civil war since 1980, 
and a violent climate of insurgency and state-sanctioned repression led to massive refugee 
displacements into neighbouring countries. The BBC was troubled by the request, as like 
East Africa there was no apparent ‘outburst of public feeling to which the broadcasting 
authorities were responding’.88  
 In requesting these appeals, the DEC members were attempting to utilise the 
broadcast appeals mechanism to raise public awareness of complex, long-term, and 
politically volatile humanitarian crises which had gone largely unreported in the British 
media. The requests were partly a reflection of a changing global humanitarian 
environment, as a number of armed conflicts generated massive refugee displacements in 
the late 1970s.
89
 It also reflected a changing humanitarian context in Britain, as 
institutional growth, professionalisation, and an increasing political focus all contributed 
to the principal NGOs expanding their ambitions to tackle more controversial issues.  
 Indeed, the BBC was especially troubled by the ‘possible political difficulties’ of 
airing an emergency appeal for Central America.
90
 This referred to how the region had 
become a highly politicised geopolitical flash point in the early 1980s, as the US 
government designated El Salvador to be a key battleground in its renewed battle with 
Soviet communism. For the BBC, airing an emergency appeal was to risk also giving 
implicit political ‘endorsement of a particular relief programme’.91 This situation was 
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complicated by public allegations that humanitarian NGOs, including Oxfam, had 
channelled funding to ‘left-wing guerrillas’ fighting the El Salvadorian military regime.92 
The BBC even sought guidance from staff in the Foreign Office, who advised that the 
government was ‘aware that the situation in El Salvador was highly politicised’. The 
Foreign Office added that the refugee displacements would most likely result in ‘a growth 
of anti-American feeling among people who thought also that the government should 
declare opposition to present American policies’.93 The BBC's consultation with the FCO 
was later leaked to the press by an unnamed DEC member, further fuelling a hostile 
atmosphere.
94
  
 The BBC's anxieties over being associated with a political stance on Central 
America reflected the Corporation's long-standing commitments to impartiality and 
political neutrality, bound up in its ethos of public service broadcasting.
95
 Humanitarian 
NGOs had been restricted by this emphasis on neutrality before. Christian Aid had to 
make last-minute alterations to a BBC television appeal in 1968, as the Corporation 
objected to the statement ‘we are the ones who erect barriers against the exports of the 
poorer nations’ as being too political. Christian Aid's head of communications notably 
conceded that ‘in this instance one must buckle under, because the BBC give free TV time 
to charities on the understanding that they say nothing “political”’.96 This also fitted into a 
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longer lineage of the BBC regulating and restricting the political content of charitable 
appeals in the broadcast media.
97
 
 The BBC was particularly sensitive to not appearing political in the 1980s, as both 
the Conservative Party and Conservative government initiated a series of attacks upon the 
Corporation for its alleged left-wing bias. This also led to the BBC Board of Governors 
gradually becoming stacked with Conservative appointments over the course of the 
decade.
98
 Indeed, in this hostile political atmosphere both the BBC and development 
NGOs were under similar scrutiny from the political Right. BBC staff notably 
acknowledged that the El Salvador dispute had been compounded by the ‘overt political 
involvement of some of those who worked for charities’.99 The BBC Board of Governors 
eventually allowed the Central America appeal to go ahead, on the grounds that to reject it 
would also be interpreted as a ‘political gesture’. There was therefore ‘less danger’ to the 
Corporation to agree to the broadcast.
100
 Notably, both the BBC and the IBA refused to 
provide any of their own staff to present the appeal, which led to the unique situation of 
DEC Chairman Lord Hunt presenting his own organisation's appeal.
101
 In a reflection of 
the heated debates that had taken place, the appeal's script emphasised at the outset that it 
was ‘not concerned with politics’.102 
 The BBC's admission that the El Salvador issue had been complicated by the 
‘overt political involvement’ of certain NGOs was revealing. It suggested that increased 
awareness of the advocacy work of development NGOs had also impacted upon these 
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agencies' collective room to manoeuvre. Now, established institutions such as the BBC 
and IBA were less prepared to tolerate what they regarded as inappropriate political 
engagement by charitable organisations. Furthermore, the heavy reliance of the DEC upon 
the broadcasters for continued access to television meant that in practice, the NGOs were 
compelled to defer to their authority and accept their decisions. This was despite the 
voicing of harsh critiques of the broadcasters within the privacy of Committee meetings, 
such as an internal DEC report which referred to the BBC's ‘petty bureaucratic 
wrangling’.103  
 DEC Chairman Lord Hunt was a key moderating influence in this regard, 
persuading the member agencies that they could ‘not just assume the co-operation of the 
broadcasting authorities... these facilities were a privilege rather than a right’.104 
Following the El Salvador appeal, the DEC made a deliberate effort to restore its relations 
with the broadcasters. The DEC Handbook (which laid out the Committee's policies and 
procedures) was gradually revised over the course of 1982 and 1983, with the 
broadcasters closely involved throughout. The new Handbook, finalised in January 1984, 
laid down stricter guidelines for when the DEC could request an appeal, stipulating three 
criteria that all had to be met: 
 ‘(i) that an emergency has arisen; (ii) that the DEC charities are committed to an 
 immediate and effective response; and (iii) that there is a sufficient degree of public 
 awareness of an emergency to make probable a substantial response’.
105
 
 
The new Handbook also wrote into DEC policy that the Broadcasters would have ultimate 
authority over all appeals, in consultation with the CAAC. The broadcasters thus 
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effectively ensured that ‘creeping’ disasters such as those in East Africa and El Salvador 
would no longer automatically qualify for broadcast appeals. Furthermore, the 
requirement for a ‘sufficient degree of public awareness’ upheld the broadcaster's limited 
conception of the Committee as a mechanism to provide ‘a single focus for public giving, 
and a single body to oversee the distribution’.106 What the Central America dispute 
demonstrated therefore was an overt policing of the political boundaries of the 
humanitarian sector by the television broadcasters, especially the BBC. This also 
reinforced the significant gap between the simplistic, apolitical emergency fundraising of 
the DEC, and the broader developmental campaigning being carried out by certain 
elements within the sector. Indeed, the actions of the broadcasters arguably undermined 
this advocacy work altogether, in that it ensured that one of the most high-profile means 
of communication between the sector and the public would continue to be concerned 
solely with depoliticised images and narratives of human suffering. 
 The deliberate confining of the DEC's mandate to publicised major disasters was 
also an acknowledgement of the power of television images of human suffering to evoke a 
popular response. Indeed, by the late 1970s an assumption that television coverage was 
essential to effective humanitarian response had become embedded within the NGO 
sector. An initial reduced public response to the 1977 DEC Indian cyclone appeal was 
attributed directly to a ‘lack of TV, radio and press coverage’.107 It took the return of 
representatives from the disaster area (who were then interviewed on television), and the 
screening of another Jonathan Dimbleby documentary, to reinvigorate the appeal and 
capture the attention of the public. This reliance on the mass media was not lost on the aid 
agencies. The Director of Christian Aid asked publicly in the Times ‘have our minds been 
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so satiated with images that our imaginations remain unkindled without that visual 
reporting?’108 The record public response to a DEC appeal for East Africa in 1980 of £6.1 
million appeared to provide an answer. The DEC Secretary summarised the fundraising 
total as ‘a magnificent result... a demonstration of the powerful effect that television can 
have in engendering public support’.109 
 The consistent impact of provocative images of disaster also served to highlight 
the lack of television attention to more complex development issues, or indeed to broader 
events in the developing world as a whole. A substantial body of literature has 
documented how Western media reporting of the developing world, especially television, 
tends to be heavily biased towards dramatic emergencies or crises. By contrast, it is 
argued that the mass media provides little reporting of substance on routine economic or 
politic events in the global South, especially in Africa. This is generally attributed to the 
news values and judgements institutionalised within the mass media, which attach less 
importance to events the farther they occur away from home.
110
  
 The history of British television during this period suggests that this depiction is 
accurate. Influential journalists such as Jonathan Dimbleby have stated how they felt 
obliged to downplay their pro-development opinions in their programmes during this 
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period, as ‘development was then a minority interest’.111 There were some successes in 
raising the profile of international development on television in the early 1980s, in 
particular the organised lobbying of newly-founded Channel 4 to commit to development 
education in 1982. This resulted in the creation of the International Broadcasting Trust, 
which brought together a Consortium of NGOs to produce Third World programmes.
112
 
However, on the whole, television coverage of aid and development issues was deeply 
biased towards simplistic accounts of disasters and human suffering during this period. 
 This lack of media interest in Third World events was exacerbated by the rapid 
institutional and technological changes that were taking place within the global media 
industry. Television news was revolutionised during the 1970s by the parallel 
developments of communications satellites and electronic news-gathering processes. As 
television news departments moved from using traditional film to portable video cameras 
and satellite linked delivery systems, the time delay between capturing and broadcasting 
footage was dramatically reduced.
113
 However, in becoming more immediate, the quality 
of reporting on foreign events was also downgraded. The ‘relentless search for instant 
news’ led to a shortening of deadlines and added pressures on news editors, increasing 
tendencies toward simplification.
114
 The high costs of maintaining television crews 
overseas, in comparison to the costs of accessing satellite material, resulted in the BBC 
and ITV significantly reducing their number of specialist foreign correspondents by the 
early 1980s. Instead, the broadcasters relied on international news agencies, and non-
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specialist reporters who were quickly flown in and out to cover major stories. The British 
press experienced a similar trajectory during this period, as the number of specialist 
correspondents in Africa dwindled to almost zero.  
 This decline in specialist knowledge of the developing world, especially Africa, 
further skewed reporting of the region towards ‘the spectacular, the bizarre or the truly 
horrific’.115 Consequently, negative popular conceptions and stereotypes of Africa and the 
Third World were reinforced, further undermining the effectiveness of NGO advocacy 
campaigns while increasing support for humanitarian philanthropy. Indeed, the impact of 
visual images of distant suffering upon the popular imagination was also strengthened by 
technological developments which improved picture quality, such as the spread of colour 
television in the mid-1970s.
116
   
 
 
The Agency of NGOs 
This chapter has shown how the power and influence of the state politically contained the 
humanitarian NGO sector, by building up an infrastructure for emergency relief around 
the DEC. The television broadcasters also actively reinforced this trend. However, 
focusing solely on this process of instrumentalisation can also imply that the DEC 
members were passively incorporated into an emerging aid architecture, without any 
agency themselves. In practice, the principal NGOs actively contributed towards building 
up a depoliticised disaster industry, as a result of their own deliberate and short-termist 
decision making. Despite expressing discomfort with the characteristics of emergency 
relief, the DEC agencies recognised that dramatic disaster appeals in the media were 
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unmatched in their effectiveness at capturing popular attention. Provocative images of 
suffering children therefore remained the most efficient method of driving fundraising and 
organisational growth within a crowded humanitarian marketplace. Furthermore, NGOs 
also struggled with the deeper-rooted dilemmas raised by becoming more political, which 
fostered divides within the sector and subtly encouraged aid agencies back towards 
familiar, apolitical charitable relief. 
 The most obvious demonstration of this agency of NGOs was the frequent DEC 
requests for broadcast emergency appeals. While the DEC was often obliged to make 
sudden appeals when disasters suddenly broke into the news cycle, the Committee also 
met regularly to discuss operations and pool information. The DEC also monitored for 
disasters which were considered serious enough to warrant an appeal, and the agencies 
often put forward requests to the broadcasters. When granted, these broadcast appeals all 
conformed to a typical model for emergency fundraising which was by now deeply 
embedded in the sector. As in the 1960s, these DEC appeals were designed to elicit an 
emotional response from the viewer, through an emphasis on provocative images of 
human suffering and simplistic accounts of humanitarian altruism. Furthermore, the 
Committee did so despite the emerging critique of this form of representation being 
articulated from within the sector. For instance, both Christian Aid and CAFOD expressed 
concerns within the DEC regarding a planned appeal for refugees in Indochina in 1979, 
stressing ‘the danger of misleading the public into thinking of this as a problem which can 
be met adequately by extra funds’.117 However, despite this unease, the final production 
was a crude and simplistic overture to the viewer to ‘do something special for the 
children’.118 In a similar vein, the DEC appeal for East Africa in 1980 raised a record 
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amount on the basis of exploitative images of starving African children which were being 
denounced as ‘pornographic’ by a growing number of critics (image 4.1). 
 
 
Image 4.1: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘East African Emergency’ press appeal, June 
1980.
119
 
 
The perpetuation of this publicity style indicates how the growth of NGOs during this 
period was ultimately a process being driven by emergencies. Despite Oxfam's statement 
in 1973 that people had become ‘blunted by disaster’, public support for emergency relief 
increased, spurred by continued advances in communications and media technologies. The 
potential of media-driven humanitarianism to fuel the rise of aid agencies was 
emphatically demonstrated by the crisis in Cambodia in late 1979. Cambodia suffered 
greatly under the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge in the latter half of the 1970s, and 
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the sudden removal of Pol Pot from power in early 1979 left the country in ruins. Media 
exposure of the widespread suffering of the Cambodian population in Autumn of that year 
thrust the region into the international limelight, paving the way for a massive aid 
intervention.
120
 
 For the British humanitarian sector, the entry of Oxfam into Phnom Penh in 
August 1979 before any other major international NGO allowed the organisation to 
monopolise publicity for Cambodian relief. This was aided by the coinciding of Oxfam's 
mission to Phnom Penh with a visit by outspoken journalist John Pilger and his team to 
the region, to film a documentary for ITV. Pilger's account of the suffering inside 
Cambodia, first published in a ‘shock issue’ of the Daily Mirror in September, depicted 
Oxfam as the only aid organisation making a positive contribution. In contrast, Pilger 
savagely criticised the ICRC and the UN, and the international community in general, for 
alleged inaction and indifference in failing to address the crisis. Pilger's reports triggered a 
massive reaction and demands for relief from the public, which also ensured a huge cash 
response for Oxfam.
121
 Further impetus was provided by the eventual airing of Pilger's 
Cambodia documentary on ITV in October (Year Zero), which was framed in a similar 
manner to his Daily Mirror reports.
122
 Brian Walker, Oxfam's Director during this period, 
later wrote that the ‘massive external media coverage triggered by Pilger's “Killing 
Fields” article... alerted European and North American populations to the disaster and its 
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scale, stimulating an enormous public response’.123 As with Biafra a decade earlier, 
Oxfam's monopolisation of publicity also resulted in the DEC mechanism being sidelined, 
as the majority of the public preferred to donate to Oxfam directly.
124
 The DEC was also 
impeded in this regard by the membership of the British Red Cross. The ICRC was 
presented in a very negative light in Pilger's media reports, and many of those who 
donated to Oxfam stipulated that none of their contribution should go through any Red 
Cross bodies.
125
 
 Galvanised by the huge popular response, Oxfam launched an intense publicity 
drive, based on simplistic discourses of suffering children and Christmas generosity 
(image 4.2). Oxfam featured prominently throughout press and television coverage of the 
crisis, becoming strongly associated with Cambodian relief in the popular imagination. 
The BBC Children's television programme Blue Peter launched an appeal for Cambodia 
which was explicitly undertaken in support of Oxfam, and linked to the organisation's 
fundraising apparatus. The Blue Peter appeal was a great success, raising over £3 million 
for Oxfam by the time it closed in December.
126
 The huge funds being tapped fuelled an 
intensive and remarkable period of expansion. Oxfam's income rose from £9.64 million in 
April 1979 to £18.76 million in April 1980, a 94 per cent rise in the space of just twelve 
months.
127
 This in turn enabled the organisation to plan and execute a comprehensive aid 
mission that dwarfed any previous non-governmental undertaking. Oxfam led an NGO 
consortium of 31 voluntary organisations to implement an aid programme inside 
Cambodia, which involved bringing in regular barges loaded with relief supplies, 
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including food aid and vehicles.
128
 The programme ran at a cost of £2million per month, 
and Oxfam UK's leadership was reflected by it contributing half of all funding.
129
 
 
     
Image 4.2: Oxfam press appeals for Cambodia, October 1979.
130 
 
The scale of Oxfam's response to Cambodia attested to how aid agencies could capture the 
imagination of the public with simplistic, emotional representations of disaster relief. 
Oxfam and its NGO partners also benefitted from a depiction of themselves in the media 
as bold, non-bureaucratic actors who had ‘broken through the political barriers’ to get aid 
to those who most needed it. This was often contrasted to the indifference of donor 
governments and intergovernmental bodies, a narrative which it was in the institutional 
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interest of the NGOs to maintain.
131
 The moral question of ‘can you ignore the cries of a 
hungry child?’ created an effective international appeal that disassociated the Oxfam 
Consortium from the political complexities and diplomatic wrangling that had ensnared 
the intergovernmental aid agencies. This approach deeply resonated with the general 
public, and popular compassion rallied behind Oxfam. According to one survey, over 80 
percent of the British population supported Oxfam's work in Cambodia.
132
 The 
unprecedented scope of the NGO Consortium aid programme also indicated how the 
continued growth and professionalisation of aid agencies had created new opportunities 
for prominence within the emerging disaster relief system. 
 The substantial donations that high-profile disaster relief operations generated also 
sharpened competition within the humanitarian sector. Competitive pressures and tensions 
worked to undermine shared advocacy goals, as NGOs instead became preoccupied by 
short-term institutional growth. While the DEC had been designed as a means to dampen 
this competition, rivalries could quickly erupt between its members if the Committee was 
sidelined, as was the case with Cambodia in 1979. Indeed, Oxfam's monopolisation of 
publicity for Cambodian relief resulted in heated confrontation within the privacy of the 
DEC, especially after the broadcasting of John Pilger's documentary Year Zero. The 
production company responsible for Year Zero (ATV) had anticipated a strong public 
response to the footage, and included within the programme details of a Cambodia Fund 
for viewers to donate to. Within three days the fund had reached £250,000, eventually 
rising to over £1 million. However, the Cambodia Fund also bypassed the established 
procedures for broadcast emergency appeals, which stipulated that the DEC was the only 
recognised channel for public contributions. Despite this policy, ATV and Pilger resisted 
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handing over the funds to the DEC, stating that it would be ‘embarrassing’ for the British 
Red Cross to receive any proceeds given the sharp criticisms made of the ICRC in Pilger's 
film. Instead, the filmmakers preferred to channel the donations directly to Oxfam, 
handing over the first £250,000 to the Oxfam NGO Consortium.
133
 
 This decision provoked outrage from the other four DEC agencies. The Director of 
Christian Aid wrote to the IBA on their behalf, stating that ATV's actions were a 
‘departure from all earlier practices’, and that the Cambodia Fund had no genuine legal 
standing. For the agencies, the incident was a deliberate undermining of the established 
system, which risked a ‘diminution of confidence’ in the broadcasters in future.134 The 
British Red Cross was also incensed by Pilger's public ‘denigration’ of the ICRC, and 
attempted to gain assurances from the IBA that the film would not be distributed 
internationally (without success).
135
 Within the DEC, conflict flared up between Oxfam 
and its Committee partners. At a meeting between the DEC, the IBA and ATV in early 
1980, Oxfam Director Brian Walker openly stated that his organisation:  
 ‘...does not recognise the right of the DEC to dictate how funds are spent or through which 
 channels, once the closing date of a DEC appeal has passed... ATV, in Oxfam's view, 
 were entitled to decide to whom, and through which channels their donations should be 
 spent...  Oxfam recognises that the DEC would have been a sensible reference point from 
 which ATV could seek guidance as to how they might distribute their funds - but not as a 
 DEC right. The  power of decision can and must lie with ATV/IBA’.
136
 
 
The dispute was eventually settled by the intervention of the Central Appeals Advisory 
Committee, which made a pragmatic decision to allocate the remaining funds equally 
                                                             
133 ITA/IBAA: Box IBA/00439, file 5081/2/62/3 (vol. 1): ‘Pilger: Cambodia’, 31 October 1979; ITA/IBAA: 
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135 ITA/IBAA: Box IBA/00439, file 5081/2/62/3 (vol. 1): Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, ‘Letter to the Lady 
Plowden’, 6 November 1979. 
136 ITA/IBAA: Box IBA/00440, file 5081/2/62/3 (vol. 2): Brian Walker, ‘Aide-Memoire to Members of 
ATV/IBA and DEC attending the meeting on 26 February 1980’, 20 February 1980. 
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among the DEC members. The DEC accepted the solution and drew a line under the issue, 
stating that in future they hoped to ‘avoid a repetition of the slightly embarrassing 
situation which arose out of the very effective Pilger film’.137 While it was resolved 
amicably, the Year Zero dispute highlighted how quickly competitive pressures could 
emerge within the increasingly congested humanitarian sector. This competition also drew 
the leading development NGOs back to charitable relief, despite calls for a shift in focus 
towards more overtly political advocacy on the structural causes of poverty. Indeed, these 
competitive tendencies indicated how professionalised NGOs were prone to act according 
to their own institutional self-interest, using their association with high-profile 
emergencies to extract funding from the public and drive spurts of rapid expansion. 
 These massive popular responses to images of disaster also highlighted a relative 
failure of aid agencies to achieve tangible results in their development education and 
advocacy work. Opinion polls of the British public taken between 1969 and 1981 
concluded that popular support for overseas aid had actually diminished. While ODA 
officials acknowledged in 1981 that this reflected a period of national economic 
difficulties, they also interpreted the data as evidence that ‘the majority of the UK public 
is ignorant of aid and development issues’.138 The downgrading of the importance of 
development aid by the Conservative government, and corresponding cuts to the official 
aid budget, also reduced the motivation for government officials to reverse this trend. 
Furthermore, NGO emergency appeals contributed to this public ignorance, as they put 
across a simplistic, apolitical depiction of disasters and the Third World which the 
agencies themselves knew was misleading. In the process, development NGOs 
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paradoxically helped to create a persistent problem of public engagement which 
undermined their own advocacy. 
 This lack of public enthusiasm for long-term development was illustrated by the 
trajectory of War on Want after exiting the DEC in 1979. Deprived of the proceeds from 
joint emergency appeals, the organisation quickly descended into financial crisis. 
Throughout the 1970s it had relied on DEC funding, and by 1982 the organisation was 
forced to initiate redundancies and aggressive cost-cutting measures.
139
 Mary Dines's 
successor argued that War on Want should have never allowed itself to withdraw from the 
DEC, as it had relied so heavily on its income.
140
 Furthermore, the lack of support War on 
Want received from the other Committee members in its calls to modify the DEC and 
replace it with a ‘consortium for development’ suggested that a pragmatic decision had 
been taken on the part of the other agencies to retain a capacity for relief.  
 The lack of support from within the sector for War on Want also pointed to a more 
complex set of issues confronting NGOs, regarding the acceptable limits of overt political 
engagement. War on Want's clashes with the Charity Commissioners brought the entire 
sector under increased scrutiny, and the organisation's staff have since suggested that 
other agencies exerted pressure upon them to stop ‘rocking the boat’.141 War on Want's 
exit from the DEC has been commonly attributed to a desire within the organisation to 
focus solely on long-term development. However, Mary Dines notably later suggested 
that the exit was also deliberately engineered by Oxfam, due to her organisation's 
controversial political activities and relatively small size in comparison with the other 
DEC members.
142
 What this suggests is that organisations such as Christian Aid and 
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Oxfam found it useful to present themselves as moderate and less political in comparison 
to War on Want, and disaster relief provided a method to do so. In doing so, they were 
effectively taking a pragmatic decision to avoid official sanctions and maintain the 
support of the public.  
 
 
Conclusions 
The emergence of a relief infrastructure in the late 1970s and early 1980s represented a 
new phase in British humanitarianism. The relationship between the NGO sector and the 
state was placed on a more formal footing, enrolling aid agencies into a broader project of 
humanitarian governance while also bringing about containment and co-option. This shift 
can be interpreted as an example of Foucauldian governmentality, as the increased role for 
the DEC agencies to carry out humanitarian aid was not in itself a transfer of power from 
state to non-state, but more a changing rationality of government which extended forms of 
governance beyond the formal state apparatus.
143
 While a number of scholars have 
depicted humanitarian NGOs as becoming ‘governmentalised’ in this way in the post-
Cold War era, these trends can be detected in Britain as early as the 1970s. Furthermore, it 
is also evident that NGOs were not passive bystanders to these trends, but were rather 
active agents in building up a more sophisticated infrastructure for disaster relief, despite 
an increasing political focus on the root causes of global underdevelopment. 
 In responding to overseas emergencies during this period, humanitarian NGOs 
continued to recycle simplistic and depoliticised images of starving children and human 
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suffering in their publicity. Crucially, they did so despite the emerging critique of this 
form of representation from within the NGO community. Such images further 
consolidated a public association of aid agencies with apolitical relief, while also 
reinforcing problematic stereotypes of the developing world. The perpetuation of this 
form of representation demonstrates how emergency fundraising continued to be attractive 
to NGOs as means to generate public donations and support in a competitive marketplace. 
Indeed, this period would appear to lend credence to Kate Manzo's suggestion that images 
of suffering children are crucial to the construction of a ‘humanitarian identity’ by 
publicity-oriented NGOs.
144
 
 The mass media was an integral actor in shaping an emergency relief infrastructure 
in Britain, especially television. News footage of Third World disasters and suffering 
regularly sparked powerful responses from the viewing public. The remarkable spurt of 
financial growth experienced by Oxfam in the year between 1979 and 1980 can be 
directly attributed to the organisation's high visibility in the media in relation to 
Cambodia. By contrast, the relative lack of attention given to more complex development 
issues on television also contributed to a lack of popular support for development 
advocacy. Furthermore, the television broadcasting authorities (the BBC and the IBA) 
were also implicated in building up a disaster relief industry more directly. The 
broadcasters implemented closer collaboration with the DEC during this period, 
confirming the Committee's exclusive status in their charitable appeals mechanisms. This 
reinforced the legitimacy of the DEC, and strengthened the oligarchy of its members 
within the humanitarian sector. However, the broadcasters also strongly resisted any 
attempts by the Committee to broaden out its mandate and the types of emergencies it 
could appeal for. In the process, the broadcasters (in particular the BBC) effectively 
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policed the boundaries of the humanitarian sector, imposing their interpretation of what 
was politically acceptable or not for British charities. 
 Public opinion was a crucial factor in all of these trends, acting as a consistent and 
powerful constraint on the political ambitions of NGOs throughout the period. While 
statistics on public opinion and overseas aid in this period are limited, and we should be 
wary of treating public opinion as a monolithical entity, opinion polls did indicate a 
general lack of understanding of, or support for, international development issues during 
this period. By contrast, popular support for disaster relief operations increased, as evident 
in the increasing sums generated by NGO emergency appeals in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. What this all suggests is that the simplistic images and narratives of emergency 
relief put forward by aid agencies helped construct a problematic relationship between the 
humanitarian NGO sector and the general public. This relationship was ultimately passive 
and one-sided, characterised by a reliance on moral rhetoric and individual philanthropy, 
rather than concrete information and political engagement. By contrast, the more complex 
and radical public engagement called for in the advocacy campaigns of Christian Aid, 
Oxfam and War on Want was ultimately only ever the activism of a minority. 
 As the early 1980s progressed, the humanitarian sector was thus characterised by a 
growing paradox in how it operated and presented itself. An increasingly sophisticated 
and political advocacy agenda was twinned with growing prominence within a 
technocratic, professionalised and overtly apolitical disaster relief system. This system 
was given added impetus by growing public support for emergency assistance, reflected in 
massive public responses to specific disasters, such as Cambodia in 1979, or East Africa 
in 1980. Growing popular demand for humanitarian aid was also connected to institutional 
and technological changes in the mass media. The ODM was funnelling increasing 
amounts of official aid through the DEC members, further fuelling the growth of NGOs 
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while raising challenging questions about how this support impacted upon the sector's 
legitimacy and independence. These trends all culminated in a massive humanitarian 
response to famine in Ethiopia in late 1984, which has been widely depicted as a seminal 
moment in the history of humanitarianism. The following chapter explores this 
intervention at length. 
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Chapter Five 
Band Aid Humanitarianism: NGOs and Famine in Ethiopia, 1984-85 
 
In October 1984, a single BBC news item galvanised an international aid effort 
unprecedented in its size and intensity. This now iconic report captured harrowing scenes 
of human suffering at a relief camp in northern Ethiopia, afflicted by a severe famine. The 
disaster was memorably described by reporter Michael Buerk as ‘biblical’, a powerful use 
of religious imagery which presented the famine as originating outside of historical forces 
and human agency. In reality, it was also the result of a series of brutal civil wars being 
waged by the authoritarian Ethiopian government. Television images of starving 
Ethiopian children gripped the conscience of the British public, instantly elevating the 
famine from an invisible disaster into a major domestic issue. The BBC footage quickly 
spread globally, transforming Ethiopia into an overnight cause célèbre. The media frenzy 
that followed triggered a huge fundraising boost for aid agencies, as public donations 
flooded into the humanitarian sector.  
 As the largest and most recognised aid agencies, the five DEC members captured 
the majority of this income in Britain, fuelling a period of sustained growth (graph 5.1). 
The popular response to Ethiopia was also extended and given added momentum by the 
Band Aid phenomenon, a fundraising initiative famously spearheaded by musician turned 
celebrity humanitarian Bob Geldof. Band Aid raised millions of pounds for famine relief 
through its innovative fundraising methods, in particular the iconic Live Aid concerts of 
July 1985. Watched by a global audience of almost two billion, Live Aid raised a 
remarkable $150 million for aid projects in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. 
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Graph 5.1: Cumulated income (£m) of the British Red Cross, CAFOD, Christian Aid, 
Oxfam and the Save the Children Fund, 1980-89 (adjusted for inflation, 2009).
1 
 
The Ethiopian famine has been widely presented as a major epochal event in the history of 
humanitarian action. The central role of television coverage in driving huge public 
donations to NGOs has been depicted as a turning point in charitable fundraising, 
resulting in the rise of a professionalised competitive aid industry.
2
 The emergence of 
Band Aid has often been seen as sparking a new era of celebrity humanitarianism, in 
which high-profile stars have increasingly engaged publicly with both humanitarian and 
international development issues.
3
 Tanja Müller refers to the famine in Ethiopia as 
marking a watershed in relation to ‘the combined forces of media representation, celebrity 
humanitarian engagement and... the subsequent meteoric rise of global NGOs based on 
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compassion’.4 The problematic issues which encountered the relief operations inside 
Ethiopia, in particular control and manipulation by the Ethiopian government, have also 
been seen as a crucial signpost in raising awareness of the political complexities of 
distributing aid during complex emergencies.
5
  
 This chapter examines the impact of the Ethiopian famine and Band Aid upon the 
British humanitarian sector, locating the period within the longer history of NGOs and 
emergency relief set out in previous chapters. The majority of scholarship on the famine 
shares an assumption that Ethiopia was a watershed in the history of humanitarianism and 
the rise of NGOs. By contrast, this chapter argues that while Ethiopia did accelerate the 
growth of a professionalised aid industry, this was actually a continuation and extension 
of prior trends. The public response to television images of famine in late 1984 was 
indeed substantial. It was also the culmination of a longer trajectory of increasing popular 
support for NGO disaster relief efforts over the previous years and decades. The particular 
representation of the famine promoted by both the media and Band Aid, which 
emphasised simplistic apolitical explanations and images of starving children, followed a 
formula for charitable fundraising embedded within the sector by years of NGO 
emergency appeals. 
 Band Aid had a substantial impact upon the leading aid agencies, as it reinforced a 
message of depoliticised humanitarianism and undermined the efforts of development 
NGOs to harness popular support for famine relief into advocacy campaigns. While Band 
Aid therefore represented a step backwards for the sector (and arguably humanitarianism 
in general), it is also shown that the leading NGOs exacerbated these problems through 
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their own decision-making. Competitive pressures within the sector pushed NGOs to 
become overly occupied by fundraising, institutional expansion, and inter-agency 
rivalries. These long-running trends all helped consolidate the rise of a technocratic 
disaster relief industry.  
 This chapter draws on a blend of NGO, media and governmental sources to 
articulate this argument, and is structured into three distinct sections. First, the impact of 
Ethiopia upon the financial and institutional growth of NGOs is examined. While the 
sector as a whole received a massive influx of donations, the majority of this income was 
directed either to the five DEC members, or to Band Aid. This income was also 
supplemented by the channelling of official relief aid through the DEC. This revenue 
fuelled a period of intensive institutional expansion, as NGOs increased their staffing 
levels and project commitments, and further professionalised. This growth was clearly 
driven by the popular appeal of simplistic, apolitical accounts of famine, as reflected in 
the BBC Buerk report. The response to Ethiopia therefore fitted into a longer lineage of 
successful NGO emergency fundraising campaigns. 
 Secondly, it is shown that the development-oriented NGOs were uncomfortable 
with the link between their own growth and reductionist images of disaster, which they 
attempted to resolve through initiatives aimed at grassroots political mobilisation. 
However, the emergence of Band Aid negatively impacted upon the effectiveness of this 
advocacy work. Band Aid promoted a depoliticised conception of humanitarianism which 
delinked the effects of famine from its broader economic, political and social causes. 
Band Aid therefore represented a significant step backwards for the sector, giving rise to 
an increasingly sharp critique of the initiative from within the development community. 
 Thirdly, the contribution of NGOs to this process is examined. It is argued that the 
leading aid agencies were also guilty of the same criticisms that they directed at Band Aid. 
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The DEC was complicit in systematically distorting the famine and its causes as early as 
1983, establishing a narrative for the media and Band Aid to later reproduce. Indeed, 
Band Aid's fundraising methods shared a number of characteristics with the DEC, as both 
prioritised income maximisation and simplification over public education and complexity. 
Furthermore, the leading NGOs exacerbated these trends further through their collective 
focus on organisational growth and competing with one another for resources. These 
competitive pressures manifested in a 1985 dispute between the DEC and a group of non-
member agencies over the Committee's perceived oligarchy within the sector. It is 
ultimately suggested that this period reflects not only a culmination of long-running 
trends, but also reveals how the very legitimacy of voluntary action was being altered in a 
new era of neoliberal politics. 
 
 
The Aid Industry Expands 
The BBC decision to air footage of famine in Ethiopia as a leading news story in October 
1984 had immediate and dramatic consequences. Viewers flooded the BBC with calls and 
enquiries, and the report was quickly carried by 425 of the world's broadcasting stations, 
reaching a potential audience of 470 million people.
6
 Western journalists deluged Addis 
Ababa as media coverage of Ethiopia soared exponentially, and donor governments came 
under intensive pressure to respond. Within the British government, this pressure resulted 
in a Ministerial decision to deploy two RAF Hercules aircraft to airlift supplies within the 
region, as well as making relief funds available for NGOs.
7
 Official international aid to 
Ethiopia soared from $417 million in 1984 to $784 million in 1985. The majority of this 
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increase could be attributed to the US, which committed over $500 million for 
humanitarian aid between 1984 and 1986.
8
 
 For British NGOs, the transformation of Ethiopia into a major issue resulted in an 
immediate surge of public donations. The DEC had previously made a joint appeal for 
‘Famine in Africa’ in July that year, which raised a record sum of £9 million and 
indirectly led to the BBC despatching reporter Michael Buerk to Ethiopia. However, the 
appeal largely failed to generate any sustained media or public interest in the famine.
9
 The 
DEC quickly re-opened this appeal in October, and further donations flooded in. 
Furthermore, the large public profiles of the DEC members ensured that they were well 
positioned to feature prominently in press coverage and capture the majority of public 
donations to individual agencies. This was especially true for Oxfam and Save the 
Children, who benefitted from having operational relief workers in the field to provide 
interviews and quotes to Western journalists.  
 Statistics compiled by the DEC revealed that just under £100 million was donated 
by the public to humanitarian NGOs for Ethiopian relief in the period between April 1984 
and September 1985. This figure included £34 million given directly to Band Aid (chart 
5.1). Outside of Band Aid, the five DEC members collectively dominated with a 
cumulated total of £56.2 million, both through the DEC mechanism and as donations to 
individual agencies. While non-DEC agencies also experienced impressive financial 
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growth (War on Want's annual income grew by 540 percent between 1984 and 1985
10
), 
their total takings were largely dwarfed by the DEC members.
11
  
 
 
Chart 5.1: Voluntary donations from the British public to humanitarian NGOs, specifically 
for famine relief in Africa, from 1 April 1984 to 30 September 1985.
12 
 
This income boost was supplemented by the channelling of official relief aid from the 
British government through the DEC agencies, reflecting an increasing provision of 
humanitarian aid by the state to aid agencies that had begun in the mid-1970s. The 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) relied on British NGOs to distribute the 
majority of bilateral food aid allocated to Ethiopia between 1984 and 1986, which 
Christian Aid acknowledged as ‘breaking new ground... UK bilateral food aid has not 
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12 Ibid. 
Voluntary income of British NGOs for 
famine relief in Africa, 1984-85 (£m)  
Band Aid (£34m) 
Save the Children (£15.8m) 
DEC (£15.2m) 
Oxfam (£11.8m) 
CAFOD (£5.7m) 
Christian Aid (£4.8m) 
Tear Fund (£4.5m) 
British Red Cross (£3m) 
World Vision UK (£0.9m) 
War on Want (£0.7m) 
Total: £97.3m 
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gone through NGOs before’.13 Substantial cash grants were also given directly to NGOs 
from the state, channelled through the DEC by the Disaster Unit.
14
 Indeed, prior to 
October 1984, the ODA had already donated £1 million to the DEC's July ‘Famine in 
Africa’ appeal, in addition to a number of smaller financial grants to individual member 
agencies.
15
 This official emphasis on working through the DEC stemmed partly from a 
recognition of NGOs as flexible, efficient actors equipped to deliver aid in remote regions. 
It also reflected a deliberate policy of avoiding giving aid directly to the Ethiopian 
government, a Cold War rival suspected of corruption and diversion of relief.  
 This preference for using NGOs was also shared by other donor governments. The 
US channelled over 95 percent of its official relief aid to Ethiopia through bodies such as 
the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).
16
 Mark Duffield has presented the heavy 
reliance of Western governments on NGOs in Ethiopia as a critical moment when NGOs 
began to be absorbed into a ‘thickening web of overlapping aims and mutual interests 
connecting donor states, recipient governments, UN agencies, and militaries’, which 
would become more overt after the conclusion of the Cold War.
17
 As chapter four of this 
investigation argued, in practice the British government had been forging a more 
integrated and instrumentalised relationship with the DEC members since the 1970s, and 
Ethiopia marked a further step in consolidating this shift. 
 The sudden influx of income into the NGO sector fuelled a period of rapid and 
sustained institutional growth, accelerating the emergence of a professionalised aid 
industry. Oxfam increased its staff substantially, from 480 employees in 1983 to 726 in 
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1986, reaching 1153 by 1990.
18
 CAFOD and Christian Aid both roughly doubled their 
budgets and staff levels in the late 1980s.
19
 Save the Children's institutional expansion 
was particularly impressive, fuelled by a massive jump in income from £16.5 million to 
£42.5 million between 1984 and 1985. SCF subsequently underwent an internal 
reorganisation, dramatically increasing its number of overseas staff, with an emphasis on 
recruiting paid professionals rather than amateur volunteers. The Fund also opened up a 
spate of new local branches and branch shops across Britain, and committed substantial 
resources to sustaining its new scale and profile. Expenditure by SCF on administration 
accordingly increased from £455,00 in 1983 to £767,000 in 1986, hitting £1.26 million by 
1989.  
 While this financial and institutional expansion opened up new opportunities for 
NGOs to increase their project commitments and influence, it also posed new challenges. 
To sustain this new level of operation required more intensive marketing, fostering 
competition within the sector. Save the Children adapted to this new environment by 
significantly scaling up its expenditure on fundraising, from £1.65 million in 1983 to £3.2 
million in 1986, reaching £5.1 million by the end of the decade. SCF also diversified its 
sources of revenue, in particular by forging closer links with the corporate sector.
20
 This 
increased intensity of fundraising further shaped the humanitarian sector into a more 
professionalised, competitive, and business-like environment. 
 It was self-evident that this spurt of NGO growth had been driven by the strength 
of the public's response to decontextualised television images and narratives of African 
famine. The iconic BBC report of October 1984 memorably referred to the famine as 
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‘biblical... the closest thing to Hell on Earth’. This description coded the famine as a 
sudden, apocalyptical event existing outside of history or human agency. The report 
featured lengthy and graphic images of the suffering of starving children (image 5.1). It 
also made no reference to the direct link between this suffering and a series of brutal civil 
wars being waged in the Northern provinces by the authoritarian Ethiopian government.
21
  
 
 
Image 5.1: Image from BBC News report on Ethiopia, 23 October 1984.
22 
 
Reporter Michael Buerk later conceded that a deliberate act of self-censorship had taken 
place during the report's production, stemming from a concern that communicating these 
political realities also risked ‘inhibiting people from coughing up their money’.23 Jonathan 
Dimbleby notably made similar claims for his ITV documentary on famine in Ethiopia 
which aired over a decade earlier.
24
 The Buerk report unleashed a torrent of media texts 
related to Ethiopia, as public opinion shifted firmly in favour of humanitarian relief 
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efforts. The majority of this publicity was characterised by simplistic narratives of drought 
and relief, and the perpetual recycling of provocative images of starving Ethiopian 
children. Indeed, the image of the Ethiopian child became ubiquitous in the media during 
this period, reflecting its power to solicit an emotional response from the public (image 
5.2). 
 
Image 5.2: Article in the Observer on famine in Ethiopia, November 1984.
25
 
 
While the intensive public reaction to these images and subsequent rapid growth of NGOs 
has been widely depicted as a watershed moment in humanitarian action, there was much 
that was familiar about this period. There were many similarities between Ethiopia and 
previous televised major disasters, such as Biafra in 1968, the Sahel in 1973, or Cambodia 
in 1979. In all of these cases, television images of human suffering provoked the 
sympathy of the public, which translated into substantial donations for aid agencies 
(especially the DEC). These public responses accelerated the growth of the sector, while 
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also further associating NGOs with disaster relief in the public imagination. Indeed, 
previous chapters of this investigation have shown how public donations for humanitarian 
aid had been steadily rising since the Second World War. This trend accelerated during 
the 1960s and 1970s as television coverage of disasters improved, and NGOs 
professionalised their marketing practices. Ethiopia consolidated this trajectory, 
underlined by a jump for international aid as a proportion of all voluntary income in 
Britain, from 11 percent in 1984 to 22 percent in 1985.
26
 This also resulted in leading 
domestic organisations such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children (NSPCC) and Barnardo's reporting significant shortfalls in their 1984 income 
projections.
27
 
 
 
Band Aid Humanitarianism 
As with previous major emergencies, the principal development NGOs were 
uncomfortable with the public's response to simplistic images of suffering children, and 
the implications of this for their wider advocacy roles. As chapter four discussed, NGO 
involvement in political advocacy and public campaigning had continued to evolve and 
professionalise in the early 1980s. Once vague and untargeted, this advocacy was now 
characterised by a focus on more specific Third World issues, and lobbying aimed at 
specific actors and structures.
28
 NGOs such as Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want 
gradually pushed forward the frontiers of their activities, seeking to campaign more 
openly on the political dimensions of global poverty and injustice. In this context, the 
massive public mobilisation for famine relief in Ethiopia was inherently problematic. For 
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those within the sector, it was based on a simplistic representation of famine which 
aroused popular compassion, but made no contribution to public awareness of the 
structural issues connected to global underdevelopment. 
 This problem was understood by the development agencies from quite early on. 
During the discussions for the DEC ‘Famine in Africa’ appeal in July 1984, Oxfam called 
for the content of the appeal to clarify that it was ‘not only for the immediate emergency 
needs’, but also for ‘future work which would be carried out’. Oxfam's concern was that it 
planned to launch ‘a campaign for Food and Hunger’ later in the year, and was ‘worried 
about the effect of the DEC appeal... they would be debating the needs for food not only 
for today but for the future’. The DEC Chairman agreed on the need to stress to the BBC 
appeal production team that development aid was also required, stating that ‘there were 
many factors which had precipitated the situation and it should not be over-simplified’.29 
In practice the final produced appeal was indeed a crass over-simplification, and after 
October 1984 the leading development NGOs looked for ways to channel public 
compassion into grassroots activism and political action. 
 Oxfam's popular campaign (alluded to in the July DEC discussions) was launched 
in October as ‘Hungry for Change’. The initiative aimed to build up public support for 
structural change in a global system that produced food surpluses in Europe, but 
malnutrition in Africa. The broadcast of the Buerk report in the same month gave the 
campaign an added poignancy, and it generated significant support, aided by a blitz of 
Oxfam publicity. One of the major political objectives of the campaign was to exert 
pressure on the government to increase official aid to Ethiopia, and reverse a planned six 
percent cut to the overseas aid budget.
30
 The World Development Movement (WDM) also 
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orchestrated a nationwide campaign in November 1984 in opposition to these cuts. 
Already under pressure from the public to visibly do more in Ethiopia, this opposition 
resulted in a Conservative backbench revolt, and the proposed aid budget reduction was 
scrapped.
31
 In late 1984 the WDM also launched a ‘Famine in Africa’ petition, in 
conjunction with six development NGOs (CAFOD, Christian Aid, Euro-Action Accord, 
Oxfam, Save the Children and War on Want). This petition called on the British 
government to not only provide emergency assistance to Ethiopia for the foreseeable 
future, but to also ‘increase the quantity and quality of long term development aid to avert 
future famines in Ethiopia and elsewhere’.32 The petition attracted approximately 750,000 
signatures, indicating a significant swelling of public support for aid agencies.
33
 
 It was evident that the leading development NGOs were trying to channel public 
interest in famine relief into support for their politicised advocacy work. Indeed, just three 
weeks after the Michael Buerk footage was broadcast, the Times reported that a number of 
Oxfam directors were ‘tired of spending a third of Oxfam's budget on famine relief, year 
after year, while the causes of famine remain relatively unexamined and untouched’. The 
same piece revealingly added how it was ‘surprising’ that ‘such a venerable charity should 
have felt it necessary to enter an arena that is broadly speaking “political”’.34  
 The major advocacy success during this period came in October 1985, a year on 
from the Buerk report and only three months after Live Aid. The WDM co-ordinated a 
mass lobby of parliament, supported by the leading NGOs and Churches, calling for 
increased official aid. 20,000 people descended on the House of Commons, and 15,000 of 
these gained entry to personally lobby their MPs. The event attracted significant media 
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interest, and featured the leaders of the three opposition parties all pledging their support 
for increases to the aid budget. In the weeks after the event, the government announced a 
boost of £47 million for the aid programme, despite a request by the Treasury for further 
cuts.
35
 The announced increase was interpreted as a major success for the development 
lobby. The WDM stated that ‘the Government is finally beginning to catch up with the 
people of Britain’.36 Maggie Black argued that the reaction to Ethiopia ‘ushered in a mood 
of concern about world hunger in Britain not seen for 20 years... the long years of agency-
promoted development education in the classroom and the cultivation of interest in the 
media seemed at last to be paying dividends’.37 
 It was in this context that the Band Aid phenomenon emerged and took shape. The 
story of Band Aid's rise has been well documented, as popular musicians Bob Geldof and 
Midge Ure captured the imagination of the public and raised millions for famine relief in 
late 1984 with the release of a star-studded charity record (Do They Know It's 
Christmas?). Geldof overcame a series of bureaucratic barriers to produce the record and 
bring it to market, often through sheer force of will, and the public responded generously. 
Geldof subsequently established the Band Aid Trust as a registered charity in January 
1985 to administer these funds, and began planning further fundraising ventures. These 
plans culminated in Live Aid in July 1985, an extravagant multi-venue concert held 
simultaneously in London and Philadelphia to raise funds for famine relief. Live Aid 
surpassed all expectations, watched by a global audience of 1.9 billion people and raising 
a staggering £150 million worldwide, cementing itself in the popular imagination as an 
iconic moment of the 1980s.
38
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 Less attention has been paid to the complex relationship between Band Aid and 
the established NGOs, which was characterised by both co-operation and competition. 
Upon setting up the Band Aid Trust in early 1985, Geldof and his staff met regularly with 
the leading agencies to discuss how they could use their funds effectively in Ethiopia, 
without duplicating the work of other organisations. Oxfam distilled their experience in 
planning and executing relief operations into a series of short papers for Band Aid's 
usage.
39
 However, Geldof also expressed his distaste for ‘the rivalry-ridden world of the 
agencies’, and declined to allocate any funds raised by the Band Aid single to other NGOs 
on the basis that his organisation could ‘do their own shopping and get relief items free or 
at cut-prices because of Band Aid publicity’.40  
 Within the DEC, there was also a perception that the Committee was ‘not well 
looked upon by Band Aid’, with suspicions that Geldof himself was ‘anti-DEC’.41 The 
DEC members also had little involvement in the Live Aid concerts. Christian Aid staff 
observed they were all ‘the targets of Band Aid's policy of seeking free access for its aid 
programme and of bypassing traditional channels of aid’. This restricted them to doing 
little more than offering staff ‘just back from Ethiopia’ for media interviews.42  
 Despite this will to ‘bypass’ the established aid organisations, Band Aid's massive 
fundraising success impacted heavily upon the sector. Band Aid's populist appeal had 
allowed it to reach constituencies with which the established agencies traditionally had 
little success, in particular young people and non-professionals. Despite its reliance upon 
simplistic images of famine and relief, many established aid agencies interpreted Band 
                                                             
39 CAA: Box CA4/A/16, file CA4/A/16/7: Tony Vaux, ‘Meeting with Bob Geldof, Peter Coleridge and 
Tony Vaux, at his home on 24 January 1985’, 26 January 1985. 
40 Geldof, Is That It?, p.309; CAA: Box CA4/A/16, file CA4/A/16/7: Mary Galvin, ‘Band Aid’, 22 February 
1985. 
41 CAA: Box CA4/A/16, file CA4/A/16/7: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘Minutes of the meeting of 
Chief Executives, Operational and Appeals Staff’, 24 July 1985. 
42 CAA: Box CA4/A/16, file CA4/A/16/7: John Montagu, ‘Band Aid concert appeal’, 5 July 1985. 
253 
 
Aid's tapping of these new donor groups as a potential vehicle to harness unprecedented 
levels of public support for aid and development issues. Indeed, a number of political 
commentators and observers initially observed Band Aid in these terms. Stuart Hall 
memorably spoke in 1986 of a ‘famine movement’ having crystallised, in opposition to 
Thatcherite hegemony.
43
 The Daily Star described Live Aid as evidence that ‘pop stars 
and the people could achieve what politicians had been powerless to do - raise millions for 
the starving around the world’.44 Aware of its widespread appeal, established aid workers 
discretely lobbied throughout 1985 for Band Aid to assume a more professionalised 
developmental approach which incorporated donor education into its activities.  
 This pressure contributed to the Band Aid Trust committing half of its proceeds 
from Live Aid into development programmes, which in practice involved established 
organisations submitting project proposals for Live Aid funding. Many leading 
international NGOs received significant proceeds from Band Aid for such projects, 
including Christian Aid, CARE, Caritas, CAFOD, Concern, MSF, Oxfam, Save the 
Children, and World Vision.
45
 However, in a move reminiscent of the DEC in the 1970s, 
Band Aid's use of donations for long-term development projects was never fully 
communicated to the general public. 
 Despite securing a commitment to rural development, the established agencies 
were unable to persuade Band Aid to adopt a more overt educational role on the political 
dimensions of hunger and suffering in the Global South. Such concerns were particularly 
prevalent within the sector post-Live Aid, which was perceived as having captured the 
global conscience with simplistic messages of disaster and philanthropy. Christian Aid 
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noted the need for discussion within the sector regarding the ‘long-term future of this type 
of fundraising’, particularly in regards to how to ‘improve development education and 
political aspects in any future event’.46 Oxfam similarly commented after Live Aid that 
‘there is a very real potential for [Band Aid] to be making public statements which 
challenge some of the myths and stereotypes of famine in Africa’.47 Optimism for doing 
so quickly gave way to frustration and criticism of Band Aid, which had largely dismissed 
these calls and instead focused on developing further fundraising initiatives cast in the 
Live Aid mould.  
 This was demonstrated by the announcement of a Band Aid ‘Schools for Africa’ 
campaign in August 1985, which did much to dampen any optimism within the sector that 
the public support for Live Aid could be harnessed into overt political action. The 
‘Schools for Africa’ campaign involved appealing to British school children for donations 
of food, on the basis that ‘one more cheap item added onto the shopping list of every 
family could save thousands of starving people’.48 Oxfam immediately circulated a 
document among other development agencies, criticising the new venture as having ‘the 
potential to set back development education considerably’. This was because it was seen 
as promoting a ‘negative and racist image of Africa’ as dependent on the generosity of 
white Westerners. It was also attacked as doing nothing to ‘raise questions about the 
causes of famine or challenge widely held misconceptions’. This was followed by a more 
general critique of Band Aid as a  whole, for reinforcing ‘negative and racist stereotypes 
of Africa and black people generally... fundamental questions about why this crisis in 
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Africa is being allowed to happen are being raised... Band Aid/Live Aid are not coming 
up with the answers’.49 
 Other agencies were thinking along similar lines. Christian Aid circulated a 
document to its staff and volunteers in September 1985, which outlined an increasingly 
stinging critique of Band Aid. Christian Aid criticised the ‘Schools for Africa’ initiative as 
‘a very expensive way to feed the hungry’, which offered an ‘over-simplified solution to 
Africa's problems’, in that all that was needed was more food. More generally, the entire 
Band Aid project was also attacked for relying on the ‘starving baby image’. For Christian 
Aid, this image promoted ‘an oversimplified understanding’ of relief and development as 
something ‘rich, educated whites’ do for ‘poor, ignorant blacks’. Christian Aid accused 
Band Aid of promoting a ‘racist view of the world’, which was reinforced by all the artists 
involved in the British Live Aid concert being white. Finally, Band Aid was attacked for 
having ‘no educational element’, no attempt to ‘look at the causes of the situation’, and 
for putting forward a ‘paternalistic view of development’ through its commitment to 
twinning and sponsorship.
50
  
 An article also appeared in the education supplement of the Times at this time, 
published under the name of the National Association for Development Education Centres 
(NADEC), but in practice authored by individuals connected to the leading development 
agencies. This piece observed that ‘development education experts are uneasy about the 
way schools are being used in the Band Aid project to aid Ethiopia’. Once again, the use 
of images of starving children attracted significant criticism, the article stating that ‘the 
worry to main-line aid agencies is that the images reinforces the stereotypes that began in 
the Biafran War: Africans leave babies to starve, are unable to run their own affairs, and 
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only Europeans can help’.51 These debates continued within the sector throughout the 
remainder of 1985. In September the Band Aid Trust published a new statement of 
general policy, which spoke of the need to ‘draw public attention to the complex causes of 
famine and underdevelopment’.52 However, other NGOs found that requests for 
clarification from the Band Aid Trust on what this actually involved in practice led only to 
its staff ‘talking rather vaguely about general publicity and its importance... [Band Aid] 
would not be more specific despite being pressed for more details’.53  
 Band Aid went on to plan and execute further fundraising initiatives, such as Sport 
Aid in 1986, which raised approximately £30 million for famine relief through sponsored 
runs around the world. Such events followed a similar fundraising model to Live Aid, in 
that they were geared towards the creation of media-friendly spectacles and celebrity 
endorsement. Their perpetuation also reflected how the established NGOs had been 
unable to force Band Aid to take up a more overt educational or political position. 
Suzanne Franks has depicted Band Aid as having ‘missed the chance’ to harness its efforts 
for long-term change and consciousness-raising.
54
 It is more accurate to state that Band 
Aid was simply never interested in this form of engagement. The Band Aid Trust defined 
itself explicitly as a ‘non-political organisation’, and it was designed from the outset to be 
geared towards short-term crisis management. The records and internal discussions of the 
Band Aid Trust in this period reveal little consideration was given to educational or 
advocacy programmes, instead focusing upon administration, logistics, and publicity.
55
 To 
draw on David Korten's typology, Band Aid resembled a ‘first generation’ NGO, designed 
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to address the temporary alleviation of the symptoms of poverty, rather than the root 
causes.
56
  
 Band Aid therefore represented a step backwards for the NGO sector, and 
arguably humanitarian action in general. It promoted a populist, non-political form of 
emergency humanitarianism which was extraordinarily effective in gaining public support 
and raising funds, but was largely incompatible with the forms of political engagement 
called for by the established aid agencies. Geldof's public statements throughout this 
period repeatedly presented Band Aid in morally unambiguous terms, displacing the 
complexities of politics with rhetorical appeals to morality. Indeed, Geldof stated 
explicitly that ‘Band Aid was a moral issue: whether you were of the right or left was 
irrelevant’.57 Band Aid therefore worked to depoliticise African hunger and poverty, by 
presenting these as moral issues which required an individual moral response, expressed 
in the act of donating money. The obtaining of a moral authority for these non-political 
answers also implied that the form of humanitarianism promoted by Band Aid had no 
need to justify itself. This deliberate positioning of Band Aid as a movement existing 
outside of established politics and formal bureaucracies clearly played a crucial role in its 
appeal. It also diverted attention away from the broader economic, political and social 
factors which created and perpetuated this suffering, by focusing upon individual 
obligation instead of collective solidarity.  The massive popular support for this form of 
engagement therefore also represented a further undermining of development advocacy.  
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NGOs and Emergency 
The failure of Band Aid to engage politically fostered legitimate criticism within the aid 
and development community. However, the principal humanitarian NGOs also 
exacerbated this depoliticising process, through their own poor decision-making. The 
leading NGOs were therefore culpable of many of the criticisms they had levelled at 
Geldof and the Band Aid project. For instance, the accusation that Band Aid was 
presenting an ‘over-simplified solution to Africa's problems’ could also be applied to the 
DEC from the very outset of the Ethiopian crisis. The Committee had made a joint 
broadcast appeal for Ethiopia as early as 1983. However, concerns that to publicise 
Ethiopia's ‘political situation’ (a veiled reference to the civil wars being waged by the 
Ethiopian government) would place the organisations and their partners at risk led to the 
appeal being deliberately restrictive in the information it communicated.
58
 Instead, the 
appeal highlighted the humanitarian imperative to save lives, represented by images of 
vulnerable Ethiopian women and children. The DEC also provided no explanation for the 
famine beyond vague allusions to drought (image 5.3). As previous chapters have argued, 
this style of representation had been a consistent characteristic of the DEC since its 
inception. In the process, the DEC also established a narrative framework for Ethiopian 
famine reporting that the media would later take up more forcefully.  
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Image 5.3: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘Ethiopia Famine’ press appeal, April 1983.59 
  
Similar discussions shaped a further DEC appeal for Ethiopia in July 1984, which was 
designed to accompany an ITV documentary on the famine entitled Seeds of Despair.
60
 As 
with the 1983 appeal, DEC publicity emphasised the widespread suffering throughout the 
region (referring to ‘the greatest famine in living memory’), and the urgent need for 
donations for ‘humanity's sake’. No information was communicated on the causes of 
famine, or the complex political conflicts affecting the distribution of aid in the region. 
Instead the appeal focused upon emotive images of starving Ethiopian children, taken 
directly from the Seeds of Despair film (image 5.4). Acknowledging the criticism such 
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images were now generating within the sector, an internal Christian Aid memo to staff 
commented that the appeal ‘shows the face of a starving child from the Ethiopia film... 
you have been warned!’61 The appeal produced a steady flow of public donations, aided 
by the BBC despatching reporter Michael Buerk to film a news piece on the famine to 
accompany the appeal. In a visit hastily arranged by Oxfam, Buerk visited a small agency 
operation in the South of the country. There, he was able to capture scenes of food 
shortages and malnutrition despite being far removed from the famine epicentre in the 
North. Reflecting Oxfam's influence, Buerk's July report provided a neatly simplified 
judgement of the causes of famine, stating that ‘the simple truth is that the rains have 
failed. The complicated truth is that the land can no longer support the number of people 
on it’.62   
 
     Image 5.4: Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘Famine in Africa’ press appeal, July 1984.63 
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With the sudden upsurge of media reporting on Ethiopia that followed the October BBC 
news report (which was actually a follow-up piece by Michael Buerk), the leading NGOs 
continued to promote simplistic discourses of famine. This included providing quotes 
from aid workers, making emergency appeals, and playing up to ethnocentric press 
reporting which contrasted the heroic benevolence of Western donor publics with the 
tragic plight of famine-afflicted Ethiopians. An overt example of this was Oxfam and 
Save the Children's participation in a media stunt arranged by the Daily Mirror. Shortly 
after Ethiopia became a major news story, the Mirror despatched its publisher Robert 
Maxwell in a blaze of publicity on a ‘Mirror mercy flight’ to the famine zone, loaded with 
food aid and relief supplies. The Mirror's comment that ‘the response of the British people 
to the Ethiopian crisis is as magnificent as the plight of the Ethiopian people is desperate’ 
was typical of how the tabloid press responded to Ethiopia at this time.
64
 This dominant 
media narrative contributed to a broader popular perception of the famine as a sudden 
natural disaster which was now being ameliorated by aid agencies, backed by the financial 
and moral support of the public. 
 NGOs engaged in this deliberate simplification of the famine for both pragmatic 
and institutional reasons. There was a genuine anxiety that to draw public attention to the 
role of the Ethiopian government in creating famine, and manipulating relief for its own 
purposes, would lead to expulsion from Ethiopia. This in turn would not only mean an end 
to NGO relief projects in the region, but also place the local partners many agencies 
worked through at risk of reprisal. A number of NGOs were also involved in a cross-
border operation to channel relief aid from Sudan to the relief wings of liberation 
movements in the Northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigray. This operation could only 
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function effectively if it remained clandestine.
65
 These were rational reasons to restrict the 
flow of the information in Britain about the famine. However, this simplification also 
reflected an approach to representing emergency relief well rehearsed within the sector, 
particularly within the DEC. This publicity style aimed to maximise fundraising through 
the use of decontextualised images of suffering and apolitical moral appeals. It also 
simplified the relationship of the NGOs with the British public, as massive donations 
exerted pressure upon these organisations to maintain a public appearance of effectively 
using the money to alleviate suffering. To speak out on the causes of famine, and 
communicate the complex and harsh realities of delivering aid inside Ethiopia, risked 
losing the trust and financial support of the general public.  
 Within the British NGO sector, one notable exception to this was War on Want, 
which led two separate non-governmental Consortia to channel funds to Eritrea and 
Tigray.
66
 War on Want had also developed an ideological conviction to Eritrean 
independence in the 1970s. The agency openly campaigned for increased aid to the two 
war-plagued Northern provinces throughout 1984, frequently attacking the Ethiopian 
government for its role in creating famine. In December 1984, War on Want General 
Secretary George Galloway stated in the Times that ‘long drought and consequent famine 
in Ethiopia is now, thanks to television, widely known... Much less well known, however, 
is the culpability of the Ethiopian government both in the scale of the hunger and in its 
politically-motivated obstruction of the relief effort’. Galloway pulled no punches, writing 
that: 
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 ‘A ruthless military government in Ethiopia is, in fact, presiding over a famine of historic 
 proportions, deliberately starving out whole areas of its country... oiling the wheels of its 
 near-bankrupt economy with the proceeds of black market sales of free western food aid, 
 and steadfastly refusing any international involvement in the supervision of its famine 
 relief operation’.
67
 
 
However, press reports such as these were a rarity, and failed to impact upon the 
overwhelming public perception of the famine and its connected relief efforts. War on 
Want was also hindered by its marginal status, receiving far less publicity, public support 
and funding than the DEC agencies. Crucially, the leading NGOs also declined to publicly 
support War on Want, which included rejecting the agency's request to be included in the 
July 1984 DEC appeal.
68
 ODA officials notably referred to War on Want as ‘the enfant 
terrible of the major British development agencies... a thorn in the side of the Ethiopian 
government’. The ODA added that their visibility ‘causes some risk for the work of 
voluntary and international agencies in the contested areas’.69 Galloway revealingly 
commented in a further press article that War on Want had been criticised by other NGOs 
for ‘rocking the boat’, stating that ‘there comes a time when to pretend that the famine 
relief effort is going well is to render a disservice to those people in Ethiopia who are 
most in need’.70  
 What this all suggests is that Band Aid's deliberately simplistic and apolitical 
approach was following a model for successful emergency fundraising embedded in the 
British humanitarian sector by the DEC and its members. The criticisms made of Band 
Aid by the established NGOs for having ‘no educational element’, and no attempt to ‘look 
at the causes of the situation’, were actually very similar to criticisms made of the DEC by 
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War on Want in the late 1970s. Notably, War on Want's calls to modify the Committee 
then were not supported by the other members, including the increasingly political 
Christian Aid and Oxfam.  
 The NGO sector also exacerbated the impact of Band Aid by rushing to ape its 
publicity methods, and entering into increased competition with one another for public 
donations. There was a detectable sense of awe within the humanitarian community at the 
massive popular response to Live Aid, neatly voiced by the Director of Christian Aid's 
simple observation that ‘yes - the world is changed’.71 A report prepared in 1986 for the 
Central Appeals Advisory Committee (CAAC) captured this feeling, stating that Live Aid 
had contributed to a ‘transformation in the image of charitable giving and appeals’: 
 ‘Charitable giving has shed its image of a largely individual, ‘amateur’ and upper class 
 activity centred around balls, lunches and jumble sales and taken on some of the classless 
 glamour, excitement and interest of those are who seen publicly to represent it. Charity 
 has moved from being worthy, boring and patronising, to being newsworthy and exciting - 
 as Geldof has put it, “making compassion hip”’.
72
 
 
A number of scholars have supported this depiction of Live Aid fuelling a 
‘transformation’ in philanthropy, giving rise to a new era of slick, media-friendly celebrity 
humanitarianism.
73
 What such accounts fail to capture is a longer history of celebrity 
involvement in charitable causes
74
, as well as how humanitarian NGOs had been 
unceasingly professionalising their publicity practices since the 1960s, if not earlier. Band 
Aid did however provide further impetus to these trends, as the established aid agencies 
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looked to capitalise on the initiative's populist appeal. Typical proposals included the 
Christian Aid campaign designed ‘with Live Aid in mind, to appear in the popular and 
music press, and Time Out’.75 War on Want overhauled its approach to fundraising after 
Live Aid, to place stronger emphasis on ‘the use of the media, presentation, style and 
ambition’. Recommendations for putting this into practice included closer relations with 
the press, associating with local or national celebrities, and building campaigns around 
simple slogans and ‘theatrical’ images.76 More broadly, voluntary organisations from a 
variety of sectors further incorporated these principles of corporate promotion and 
marketing into their communication practices in the immediate post-Live Aid years. This 
broader professionalisation of voluntary action contributed to the IBA relaxing its 
restrictions on charity advertising in 1989, which permitted British NGOs to appeal for 
funds and promote their aims in paid-for advertisements in the broadcast media.
77
  
 This maturation of a professionalised humanitarian aid industry also heralded a 
more competitive and growth-oriented environment for aid agencies. Increased 
competition also impacted upon the effectiveness of advocacy efforts, as market pressures 
encouraged NGOs to prioritise their own material interests. This competition was 
especially evident in relation to the DEC, as the sheer scale of the donations received for 
Ethiopia by its members gave rise to an organised challenge to the Committee's oligarchy 
by a grouping of five external agencies. This group, comprised of Action Aid, Help the 
Aged, the Salvation Army, UNICEF UK and War on Want, persistently lobbied the 
broadcasting authorities throughout 1985 to end the ‘monopoly of television time enjoyed 
by the DEC’. A letter from Action Aid to the CAAC captured how the cartel-like 
behaviour of the DEC was a long-running issue: 
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 ‘The present arrangements would be less discriminatory if other agencies could join the 
 DEC, but this has proved virtually impossible in practice. The only change in the make-up 
 of the DEC since its formation over twenty years ago is that CAFOD has replaced War on 
 Want - all other approaches by other reputable agencies have been rejected’.
78
 
 
For these organisations, the DEC mechanism had come to represent a ‘form of censorship’ 
which deprived non-members of access to television, and provided the DEC agencies with 
a level of free public exposure that others could not match. For the non-members, this was 
an inequitable situation which the DEC had deliberately perpetuated, stating that the 
Committee had shown ‘no inclination of sharing the great advantages accruing from their 
position’, instead choosing to ‘refuse applications from outsiders without discussion and 
with little sign of serious consideration’. The five organisations therefore demanded that 
the BBC and ITV ‘terminate forthwith the monopoly accorded to the DEC and negotiate 
an arrangement giving equal access to a new Committee of charities concerned with 
overseas relief’.79 
 The DEC responded by strongly resisting any calls for expanding the membership, 
in which they were aided by the reluctance of the broadcasters to involve themselves in 
inter-agency politics (who instead emphasised their ‘full support’ for the Committee).80 
DEC Chairman Lord Hunt commented to the BBC that the DEC system had ‘worked 
reasonably well over the years and has wide public acceptance’. Lord Hunt added that it 
would ‘be a pity to upset this and it may be therefore that nothing needs to be done about 
the frustration felt by some non-DEC charities over the Famine in Africa appeal’.81 
Without the support of the broadcasters the five non-members faced an uphill struggle, yet 
they continued to challenge the Committee throughout 1985. Now represented by former 
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Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley, the five external NGOs continued to lobby the 
broadcasters on the grounds that ‘new organisations have developed in the overseas 
disaster/relief field in this country during the 22 years since the DEC was created’. For 
these agencies, a Committee membership of only five NGOs could ‘no longer be regarded 
as nationally representative of the many charities now heavily involved in such 
situations... its operations have become a monopoly which handicaps others’.82 Kirkley 
also went on to set out just how influential the DEC mechanism had been in shaping the 
sector, stating that its members had been able to raise through the DEC ‘more than 25% of 
their total annual income’, while ‘the currency of a DEC appeal’ had resulted in ‘a refusal 
of any mention of other organisations programmes in the same area of activity’.83 
 Despite this pressure, the broadcasters still refused to involve themselves in the 
dispute, instead stating that ‘neither the BBC nor the CAAC are themselves in a position 
to judge which charities may be eligible to join the Committee’. Any decision to change 
the DEC membership was therefore ‘a matter for the DEC to decide alone’.84 Without the 
support of the broadcasters, the organised challenge of the non-members was effectively 
over. Instead, three of the five (Action Aid, Help the Aged and UNICEF UK) elected to 
apply directly to the DEC for membership. The response of the Committee to these 
applications in 1986 once again reflected its oligarchical outlook: 
 ‘We have reluctantly reached the conclusion that even on the most liberal interpretation of 
 the existing criteria neither Help the Aged nor Action Aid qualify for membership at the 
 present  stage of their development. We also feel that we have to rule out the UK 
 Committee for  UNICEF completely, on the grounds that it does not have direct control 
 over funds raised in this country’.
85
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Instead, the Committee proposed offering a limited form of access to Action Aid and Help 
the Aged as ‘associate members’. Under this new designation, these NGOs would be 
attached to the DEC and entitled to attend operational meetings. They would also receive 
‘automatic consideration for participation in DEC appeals for countries where they have 
declared an interest’. However, the established members still retained their authority over 
the mechanism, as the decision to include associate members in any specific emergency 
appeals was still at their discretion.
86
 Action Aid and Help the Aged accepted associate 
membership of the Committee in December 1986, with the agreement of the television 
broadcasters. This brought to an end the challenge to the DEC's oligarchy, although 
dissatisfaction with the Committee continued to exist within the sector as a whole.  
 The commitment of the DEC members to maintaining their humanitarian cartel 
also demonstrated how Band Aid could not be held solely responsible for generating 
increased competition within the sector. As much as Band Aid undermined public support 
for political campaigns, this outcome was also exacerbated by the deliberate decisions of 
leading NGOs. Despite a stated commitment to tackling the root causes of global poverty 
and suffering, the principal aid agencies also subverted these aims by prioritising their 
own institutional self-interests. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Ethiopia was clearly an important period in the history of modern non-governmental 
humanitarianism. The intensive financial growth of NGOs, coupled with the further 
development of corporate marketing techniques post-Band Aid, marked a rapid expansion 
and professionalisation of the humanitarian sector. The high visibility and resources 
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commanded by NGOs in this period, and their closer enmeshing with donor governments, 
foreshadowed the prominent role they would attain in humanitarian interventions in the 
post-Cold War period. However, this chapter has also argued that Ethiopia was not a 
watershed in the history of non-governmental humanitarianism, as widely assumed.  
 Rather, the 1984-85 period marked the culmination of a long-running trajectory of 
humanitarian NGOs building up their capacities and public support for emergency relief. 
The principal aid agencies did so despite internal discomfort concerning how this 
impacted upon their educational and advocacy activities. The channelling of bilateral 
humanitarian aid through the DEC by the British government for Ethiopia was also a 
continuation of ongoing integration between the sector and the state. These trends all 
contributed to the acceleration of a professionalised and technocratic disaster relief 
industry in Britain, in which the leading NGOs were enrolled as prominent agents.  
 Development agencies were well aware of the problematic foundations on which 
their growth was built. The perpetuation of graphic media images of starving Ethiopian 
children also gave added momentum to the critique of this form of representation, which 
had gathered pace within the development community since the 1970s. In 1985 the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) initiated a joint project with European and 
African NGOs to examine information material dealing with Africa. Oxfam coordinated 
the project in Britain, publishing its findings in 1987. This landmark report concluded that 
the dissemination of famine images by the media and NGOs in 1984-85 had created a 
‘particular public consciousness of Africa’, rooted in colonial conceptions of Africans as 
barbaric, primitive, and underdeveloped.
87
  
 This self-examination resulted in the formulation of various internal guidelines and 
Codes of Conducts within aid agencies, to encourage ethical and responsible practices of 
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representation. A number of NGOs also underwent structural reorganisation to reduce the 
tension between their fundraising and campaigning staff. After 1987, many organisations 
aspired to utilise more ‘positive’ imagery which moved away from a reliance on 
stereotypical images of starving babies.
88
 However, the continued recycling of negative 
imagery by aid agencies in the years since, especially in the immediacy of responding to 
major disasters, attests to the enduring attraction of this form of representation, despite its 
problematic dimensions. 
 The Band Aid phenomenon is ultimately crucial to understanding this period. 
Band Aid's populist appeal and slick, celebrity-driven presentation of charity worked to 
further fuel the long-running professionalisation of humanitarian marketing practices. In 
the process, Band Aid contributed to a further tilting of international aid towards 
emergency relief, and away from long-term development and advocacy. However, as this 
chapter has argued, humanitarian NGOs were also implicated in this process, which they 
exacerbated through deliberate short-termist decisions. In retrospect, this titling can also 
be interpreted as a reflection of broader societal shifts of the 1980s. The successful 
implementation of neoliberal public policies by the Thatcher government shifted 
responsibility for welfare from the state to the individual. This rationale also contributed 
to substantial increases in official funding for NGOs. As the neoliberal project involved a 
deliberate effort to construct its principles as ‘common-sense’, this approach to welfare 
also arguably impacted upon the legitimacy of the entire practice of voluntary action. This 
could be detected in the increased public support for individual, consumer-driven 
philanthropy (as embodied by Band Aid), and the corresponding decline in support for 
more structural, statist solutions. While the rise of a neoliberal approach to long-term 
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development and humanitarian aid would impact much more forcefully upon NGOs in the 
1990s, its effects were visible in the 1980s. 
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Conclusions 
 
This investigation has documented how the expansion and rise to prominence of the 
modern British humanitarian NGO sector was driven by a perpetual cycle of major 
disasters in the global South. Responding to these emergencies granted the leading aid 
agencies access to the media, pubic visibility, and a popular fundraising base. Over time, a 
complex and technocratic infrastructure for humanitarian aid emerged in Britain, in which 
NGOs were embedded as suppliers of humanitarian aid in close collaboration with the 
state. This growth of NGOs on the basis of emergency also overlapped with a number of 
principal agencies taking up the cause of international development, beginning in the early 
1960s. In their attempts to address hunger and poverty in the global South, these 
organisations came to realise that aid projects alone would not bring about long-term 
change.  
 Instead, development NGOs gradually accepted the need for an overt political 
advocacy role, targeting the structural forces which created and perpetuated global 
inequality. The articulation of a distinctive NGO advocacy agenda also encouraged a 
critique of humanitarian aid from within the development community, for not addressing 
the root causes of distant suffering, and arguably preventing political solutions from being 
articulated altogether. The humanitarian NGO sector thus came to be characterised by a 
paradox over the course of this period. While many aid agencies self-identified with long-
term development programming and campaigning, their expansion and public recognition 
was the result of continued involvement in responding to major disasters. 
 Previous chapters have systematically set out the contradictory trajectories of 
NGOs towards both emergency relief and development, and discussed why the sector 
acted in this Janus-faced manner. Clearly, the institutional and technological development 
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of the mass media was of crucial importance, especially television. The spread of 
television ownership, coupled with advances in communications and filming technologies, 
brought a new immediacy to distant suffering and stimulated humanitarian empathy 
within Britain. The fundraising reach of the DEC reflected how the leading aid agencies 
could harness this power of the media for material gain. However, television news and 
current affairs programmes also significantly simplified overseas disasters and crises. 
Dramatic, visual images of human suffering received considerable attention, while the 
broader political context and structural causes of this suffering were obscured. The impact 
of such images upon the public ensured a constant stream of income for humanitarian 
NGOs. Indeed, at times the DEC mechanism amounted to little more than ‘putting up an 
address’, as the Committee responded to public sympathy already generated by television 
news coverage.
1
 By contrast, aid agencies engaged in long-term development found it 
immensely challenging to generate any substantial media interest in their less glamorous 
development programmes and advocacy campaigning. The television broadcasters played 
an active role in this through their own interventions in the sector, to prevent the 
transmission of any content they deemed to be unacceptably ‘political’ in televised 
appeals. 
 These trends reinforced a widely held public conception of aid agencies as being 
concerned solely with disaster interventions. For all the efforts of NGOs in pursuing an 
alternative path to development, throughout this period the British public was simply far 
more responsive to evocative depictions of large-scale human suffering, especially when 
these involved starving children. Development agencies were aware of this constraint on 
their activities from very early on. For instance, the massive public reactions to 
emergencies in Biafra and Bangladesh in the late 1960s and early 1970s also coincided 
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with lukewarm reactions to advocacy campaigns by the Haslemere Group and the World 
Development Movement. Similarly, War on Want's descent into financial crisis after 
exiting the DEC in 1979 revealed how the organisation had been overly reliant on disaster 
appeal income for a number of years, failing to build a sufficient fundraising base through 
its public campaigning and development work. Indeed, opinion polling undertaken from 
1969 onwards indicated that public support for overseas aid was largely motivated by 
moral and humanitarian concerns, and understanding of development issues was 
comparatively low.
2
 Large sections of the public assumed development aid to be the same 
as humanitarian aid, a blurring that was recognised by both NGOs and government 
officials as early as the 1960s and 1970s. This lack of popular enthusiasm also suggested 
that the educational and advocacy initiatives of development NGOs were ineffective at the 
national level. While the principal NGOs were apt to bemoan this state of affairs, they 
were also complicit in reinforcing this public ignorance through their simplistic appeals 
and publicity. 
 Crucially, the role of NGOs in providing disaster relief was extended and 
consolidated by the British government. There is a long history of collaboration between 
the state and the humanitarian sector, and in the 1970s this relationship was formalised 
and rationalised through new institutional structures and co-financing arrangements. 
Under pressure to visibly respond more effectively to overseas emergencies, the 
government created a specialist Disaster Unit within the Ministry of Overseas 
Development in 1974 to function as a focal point for relief. The Disaster Unit deliberately 
targeted closer integration with the leading NGOs, using the DEC as a vehicle, and in 
subsequent years channelled significant financial and logistical support through the 
Committee. While this support granted increased authority to the DEC at the 
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governmental level, it also enrolled its members as instruments for the delivery of relief in 
an integrated and technocratic humanitarian infrastructure. This channelling of official aid 
through the DEC became more overt in the 1980s, as the Conservative government 
downgraded the significance of long-term development and increasingly contracted out 
services to voluntary organisations. This all worked to consolidate a depoliticised 
approach to humanitarianism which contradicted the political advocacy agenda also being 
articulated within the sector. 
 These interconnected factors all collectively shaped, fuelled and restricted the 
development of the humanitarian sector. However, the leading NGOs also exacerbated 
these trends further, through their own deliberate and short-termist decision making. 
Despite a discernible will within the development community to move away from 
charitable relief, the DEC agencies all recognised that dramatic emergency appeals in the 
media were unrivalled at provoking a public reaction. Provocative images of suffering 
children may have been unethical and exploitative, but they were also a highly effective 
and efficient method of driving fundraising and organisational growth within a 
competitive humanitarian marketplace. The long-standing resistance of the DEC agencies 
to admit other organisations into the Committee also suggests that, while many of its 
members may have been uncomfortable with the characteristics of disaster relief, it also 
provided them with valuable institutional benefits. War on Want's sustained critique of the 
DEC throughout the 1970s, which called for the Committee to take up development 
education and advocacy, was revealingly not supported by the other organisations. Indeed, 
NGOs such as Christian Aid and Oxfam arguably recognised that public association with 
apolitical disaster relief was a largely uncontroversial activity, which deflected attention 
away from the problematic issues connected to becoming more overtly political. 
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 The Ethiopian famine and Band Aid fundraising events were followed by a rapid 
financial and institutional expansion of the humanitarian sector in the late 1980s. This 
marked the culmination of a long-running trajectory of NGOs towards building up their 
capacity and popular appeal on the basis of major, high-profile emergencies. This trend 
both continued and intensified in the period that followed, as aid agencies further 
professionalised and proliferated, developed more sophisticated media techniques, and 
gained increased prominence within the international system. In this regard, NGOs 
benefitted from a broader shift to a new stage of international humanitarianism 
inaugurated by the end of Cold War (what Michael Barnett has termed the age of ‘liberal 
humanitarianism’).3 The collapse of the bipolar system triggered rapid economic and 
political globalisation, as well as unleashing a flurry of violent conflicts and ‘complex 
emergencies’ in former superpower client states. In this new global environment, 
conceptions of security have emerged which grant less authority to state sovereignty. The 
international community has gradually demonstrated a new willingness to intervene in the 
internal affairs of nation states on the grounds of human rights abuses and humanitarian 
crises.
4
 As a result, total international expenditure on emergency relief has increased 
dramatically since the early 1990s, substantial proportions of which have been channelled 
through NGOs, who have increasingly become the preferred channel for donor publics, 
western governments, and UN agencies.
5
 A recent account of the contemporary aid 
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industry thus describes NGOs as forming ‘the backbone of the delivery mechanism of the 
international humanitarian system’.6 
 For all that the humanitarian landscape has changed in the post-Cold War period, 
the key issues raised by this study are however still very much apparent. Competition 
between aid agencies remains a major issue, regularly highlighted in contemporary 
publications. The number of individual relief NGOs has mushroomed since the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, fuelled by the increasing availability of funding, the creation of niche 
agencies for specific humanitarian needs, and the internationalisation of many leading 
NGOs. Major global actors such as CARE, MSF and World Vision all notably established 
British entities during this period. Proliferation of aid agencies was also driven by 
advancements in media technologies, especially the advent of live satellite broadcasting 
from disaster zones, which increased the fundraising potential of any agencies visibly 
involved in relief efforts. While these trends have offered new opportunities for NGOs to 
expand in size and influence, proliferation has also heightened competition within the 
sector, fostering concerns over the maintenance of ethical and technical standards.
7
 As this 
study has shown, these concerns over competition have a longer history stretching back to 
the professionalisation of NGO advertising and the spread of television ownership in the 
early 1960s. 
 The long-standing critique of the DEC as a self-interested cartel lacking in 
accountability or transparency, voiced from within the sector as early as the 1960s, 
eventually culminated in a number of significant changes to the Committee. The catalyst 
for this was a DEC broadcast appeal for the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which raised £10 
million for a region where few of the member agencies had an established capacity or 
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comparative advantage. Criticism of the DEC became more public as a result, and a 
process of internal review and reform was initiated in 1995. This independent review 
examined all aspects of the DEC's operations, and resulted in the barriers to DEC 
membership being relaxed. The previously strict criteria was replaced by a principle of 
inclusion which rendered most British relief agencies eligible to join. The Committee was 
also formally established as a non-profit organisation with full charitable status, which 
was intended to further professionalise its operations and enhance its transparency. The 
‘New DEC’ was officially relaunched in 1997, comprised of 15 members with an 
independent Council and more sophisticated evaluation procedures.
8
 This reconfiguration 
of the DEC affirmed the intensive expansion of the humanitarian NGO sector which had 
taken place since the Committee was originally set up in the early 1960s.  
 The power of the media to influence the public, generate funding, and shape 
humanitarian action has also further developed in recent decades. This has been driven by 
advances in communications technology, as well as innovative new fundraising 
technologies such as the use of phone networks and websites. The power of the media is 
particularly evident in the work of the DEC, which has continued to extend its fundraising 
reach at a phenomenal rate (graph 6.1). This was emphatically illustrated by a DEC appeal 
for the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, which raised a staggering record sum of £392 
million from the British public. There is no current indication that this trend will slow 
down; as recently as November 2013, a DEC appeal for a devastating typhoon in the 
Philippines raised £68 million from the public in less than three weeks.
9
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Graph 6.1: Disasters Emergency Committee total fundraising income by decade, 1980-2013, 
adjusted for inflation.
10
 
 
In the process, the leading NGOs have continued to expand and build up an apparatus for 
disaster relief, increasing their humanitarian budgets and becoming more overtly 
instrumentalised in their relationships with official donors. Crucially, many NGOs have 
done so despite their stated commitments to addressing the structural, long-term causes of 
global poverty and suffering. Indeed, the rise of emergency relief aid in the post-Cold War 
period has ran concurrently with the continued professionalisation of NGO development 
advocacy. In Britain, this has been aided by a relaxation of charity laws since the 1990s, 
which now permit some degree of political activity by registered charities.
11
 NGOs now 
increasingly come together in transnational alliances and networks to campaign on 
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specific global justice issues, directed at specific global actors such as the World Bank or 
the G8.
12
 The problematic relationship between emergency relief and political advocacy 
set out in this investigation is therefore arguably more pronounced today than ever before. 
Despite the successful grassroots mobilisations by iconic advocacy campaigns such as 
Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History, the continued public purchase of disaster 
imagery has consistently brought NGOs back to more simplistic, short-term emergency 
assistance. 
 The deliberate building up of an expansive and depoliticised apparatus for 
emergency relief by NGOs, despite a discernible will within the sector to move beyond 
charitable relief, raises challenging questions about non-state humanitarianism as a whole. 
Firstly, it implies that all the work of NGOs has been driven by the spectacle and appeal 
of disaster relief. For all that aid agencies aimed to promote an alternative vision of 
development, they have grown and proliferated on the basis of what Mark Duffield has 
termed the state of ‘permanent emergency’ which exists among the world's most 
vulnerable populations.
13
 Indeed, the history set out in this study suggests that 
organisations such as Oxfam and Save the Children are inherently susceptible to the 
particular dynamics and pressures generated by dramatic media coverage of disaster and 
human suffering. Successive NGO disaster relief efforts have legitimised a certain form of 
intervention in the developing world, which perpetuates the disaster relief industry while 
fundamentally depoliticising global inequality and suffering. To put it bluntly, the leading 
NGOs would have been unable to acquire the prominence and high levels of public 
visibility that they enjoy today, without the continuous cycle of severe suffering that has 
impacted upon the developing world. 
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 The substantial, largely ahistorical literature that addresses contemporary 
humanitarianism highlights a number of major issues affecting the sector today. The 
substantial sums of official aid channelled through NGOs, for both humanitarian and 
development aid, has raised concerns that aid agencies have become overly reliant on 
donor funding, to the detriment of their accountability, independence, legitimacy, and 
performance. Many observers now interpret the integration of agencies with donors as 
evidence of NGOs becoming sub-contractors for neoliberal policy change, functioning as 
basic service providers while states roll back their commitments.
14
 For humanitarian aid 
specifically, the closer enmeshing of NGOs with donor governments, militaries and UN 
agencies since 2001 has been interpreted as a further instrumentalisation of non-
governmental humanitarianism, as assistance has increasingly been subsumed within a 
broader anti-terror agenda. This process has been described as a ‘securitisation’ of 
international aid.
15
 The expansive aid industry that this funding has helped stimulate has 
also been linked with NGOs operating in a more competitive and business-like manner, 
jostling among themselves for market share and losing their sense of mission and 
legitimacy in the process.
16
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 While these are all deeply important challenges facing the sector today, this 
investigation has shown that they have a much longer history than suggested in the 
contemporary literature. The British government was channelling official aid through the 
DEC members in the 1960s, which also brought the Committee members more closely 
into the orbit of government. This laid the groundwork for a closer integration of aid 
agencies and the state in the 1970s, as the government forged a more formalised and 
instrumentalised relationship with the sector (reflecting broader shifts in how the state and 
the voluntary sector interacted). The incorporation of NGOs into a broader system of 
humanitarian governmentality in the post-Cold War period was thus actually set in motion 
two decades earlier. Indeed, the long history of interaction between the state and non-state 
set out in this thesis suggests that concerns over whether donors and NGOs have become 
‘too close for comfort’ are misleading. In practice, the two have been intertwined for 
decades, to the extent that they have arguably been mutually co-constitutive. The crucial 
importance of the state to the history of the sector also emphasises the limitations of 
viewing humanitarian NGOs through a social movement perspective. NGOs may have 
defined themselves as  ‘non-governmental’, but in practice they have always been shaped 
by the state to some extent. 
 Similarly, the rise of a competitive aid industry can also be traced back further 
back than the 1990s. The contours of the modern NGO sector can be seen as crystallising 
in the 1950s, especially after the UN World Refugee Year (WRY) initiative of 1959. 
WRY brought humanitarian organisations more closely together on the national stage, and 
elevated Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want into principal agencies. From this point 
on, competitive forces were constantly at play within the sector, exacerbated by the spread 
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of television and more sophisticated publicity practices. Indeed, the creation of the DEC 
in 1963 was a deliberate attempt to mitigate this competition among its members, and in 
the years that followed it regularly acted in a manner resembling a humanitarian cartel. 
The huge funding that entered the sector as a result of the Ethiopian famine in 1984-85 
(including Band Aid) further fuelled and exacerbated these competitive tendencies. 
 This thesis has shown how the expansion of NGOs has been closely linked with 
strong popular enthusiasm for emergency relief. Furthermore, this enthusiasm has both 
persisted and increased over time, despite the concerns often expressed within the sector 
over the prospect of ‘compassion fatigue’.17 While this enduring public support has 
fuelled the growth of aid agencies, it has been based on simplistic images and narratives 
of human suffering which restrict public awareness of the structural causes of global 
underdevelopment. The perpetuation of this mode of representation by NGOs reflects the 
competitive environment in which they operate. It also reflects the relationship these 
organisations have constructed between themselves and the general public. Recent 
research indicates that public trust in NGOs has remained very high over time, despite a 
widespread decline of public trust in political parties and established institutions over the 
same period.
18
 For humanitarian NGOs, this trust is integral to their operations, as it 
grants them legitimacy and brand loyalty in a congested market. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that this trust has been based on a popular conception of aid agencies as 
apolitical relief charities, and a corresponding lack of awareness of their broader political 
agendas. This contradiction has long been acknowledged within the sector. As Christian 
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Aid observed in 1975, there was ‘always a problem in interpreting one's actions to the 
wider public because there was not necessarily the understanding and background which 
applied to our own constituency... there were many people who felt that we only dealt 
with the symptoms and not the causes’.19 
 An awareness that the public viewed them as only dealing with ‘symptoms’ has 
historically acted as a formidable constraint on NGOs entering the political arena. Aid 
agencies have long fretted that to become openly associated with radical campaigning and 
propaganda could alienate their public supporter base. For instance, Save the Children's 
expression of ‘dismay and concern’ at the lobbying of government by its VCOAD 
partners in the 1960s, which was interpreted as potentially ‘causing disillusionment 
amongst many of [Save the Children's] supporters, to the serious detriment of their fund-
raising’.20 One consequence of this public misconception is that moderate and 
uncontroversial bodies have tended to attract more support than their radical counterparts. 
The history of War on Want demonstrates how this trend unfolded in practice. Despite 
taking up a more overt campaigning role in the 1970s, and openly critiquing the entire 
practice of humanitarian aid, the organisation was unable to build up a sufficient 
fundraising base outside of the DEC.  
 Similarly, the leading NGOs rushed to ape the publicity strategies of Band Aid in 
the 1980s, despite simultaneously critiquing the Live Aid phenomenon for having set back 
years of development education projects. What this ultimately suggests is that, while 
many principal NGOs self-identify as development agencies, they have found it 
convenient to remain immersed in an expansive humanitarian industry. Popular demand 
for disaster relief is stimulated by media coverage of distant suffering and charitable 
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appeals, and satisfied by the highly visible interventions of leading NGOs. This in turn 
reinforces a one-sided relationship between aid agencies and their supporters, further 
associating NGOs in the public imagination with disasters. Therefore, the humanitarian 
sector has played an active and important role in creating a persistent problem of public 
engagement.   
 The enduring orientation of the public towards simplistic relief, rather than 
political campaigning and lobbying, raises further implications about the nature of 
political and social engagement in modern Britain. In particular, it suggests that while 
global hunger, poverty and suffering affects and mobilises the public, it has only ever 
done so in a charitable sense. This hypothesis appears to be supported by surveys of the 
British population. Indeed, a 2009 Parliamentary Select Committee report argues that 
public opinion does not even equate ‘helping poor people’ with development, due to a 
misconception of overseas aid as a whole as ‘short-term charity for humanitarian relief’.21 
This suggests that the growth of support for humanitarian NGOs largely represents a lack 
of political engagement by the public and a form of  ‘chequebook activism’, as NGOs 
have offered simplistic philanthropic solutions to distant suffering while casting 
themselves as altruistic saviours. In the process, media-driven humanitarianism has also 
arguably undermined more radical political projects of social transformation.  
 While both NGOs and the mass media are complicit in this process, it may also 
indicate that the public as whole fundamentally does not want a revolutionary 
transformation in the existing capitalist order, which is the implied end-goal of all NGO 
development advocacy. Such a hypothesis requires more sustained empirical research into 
the relationship between international aid NGOs and the public, and popular attitudes to 
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aid and development, before it can be developed and elaborated further. Further research 
could also be conducted into how television has represented global hunger and poverty, as 
well as development issues more generally. This would ideally provide a more nuanced 
understanding of how mediation promotes and restricts different types of public 
engagement with the wider world. 
 The growth of public support for NGO humanitarianism also sheds light on how 
the end of empire impacted upon British society, as the rise of the modern NGO sector 
overlapped with decolonisation. The abrupt end to colonial rule generated considerable 
public anxiety and debate concerning Britain's place and relevance in a post-imperial 
world, captured in Dean Acheson's famous comment in 1962 that Britain had ‘lost an 
empire and... not yet found a role’.22 Clearly, humanitarian philanthropy has offered one 
possible vision of what this role could entail. In their interventions to alleviate distant 
suffering, NGOs regularly reproduced and reworked familiar colonial discourses which 
cast Britain as a benevolent, paternal, and inherently internationalist power in its 
relationship with the wider world. In particular, the heavy use of starving children in NGO 
appeals can be viewed as a modern reproduction of traditional missionary portrayals of 
Africa.
23
 Growing public support for NGO emergency relief in this period can thus be 
interpreted as a modern re-imagining of imperial charity, offering (to paraphrase Anna 
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Bocking-Welch) a new ‘narrative of national purpose in the wake of decolonisation’.24 
The populist appeal of humanitarian rhetoric also points to a longer lineage of ‘morally-
inspired protest’ in British political culture, which signals the lasting legacy of imperial 
philanthropy.
25
 The acquisition of a moral authority by NGO humanitarianism indicates 
how the potential for radical, structural solutions to global hunger and poverty has been 
undermined by aid agencies systematically intervening in a non-political manner. 
 Indeed, the rise of humanitarianism as a principal way of engaging with the wider 
world has arguably filled a void created by the collapse of the imperial project, and the 
atomisation and fragmentation characteristic of late capitalist society. Jordanna Bailkin 
argues that the end of empire was reborn in a ‘globally manufactured welfare state’, as 
decolonisation also worked to reconfigure social life, both at home and abroad, through an 
expanding notion of welfare.
26
 In this context, the rise to prominence of humanitarian 
NGOs can be interpreted as aid agencies positioning themselves as symbols of global 
morality, mediating between donors at home and aid recipients abroad.
27
 This would 
explain the wide acceptance of humanitarian discourses in contemporary Britain. Vanessa 
Pupavac observes how humanitarianism now often comes to the fore in official statements 
to promote a sense of ‘Britishness’, as governments struggle to articulate shared national 
values when trust has declined in national institutions.
28
 Again, further research is 
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required to explore and unpick the continuities between the imperial and post-imperial in 
British humanitarian thought and action. 
 These implications raise a number of avenues for further investigations. Firstly, 
the history set out in this thesis could be extended to cover the post-Cold War era, which 
is widely depicted as a break in humanitarian action. While this investigation has 
cautioned against this perspective, there is a need to locate the period within a longer 
history of NGO humanitarianism. To do so would require different historical methods, 
given the relative lack of available material in governmental, NGO and media archives for 
the years after 1985. Instead, such an investigation could be undertaken using published 
NGO evaluations and reports, as well as oral history interviews of key personnel in the 
humanitarian aid system. Furthermore, while this study has focused primarily upon 
disaster relief, this approach could be inverted to instead undertake a systematic 
exploration of  the British NGO sector and international development. In this context, the 
advocacy and ‘development education’ work of aid agencies clearly warrants systematic 
historical investigation. Such studies could be expected to provide further insights on the 
major themes raised here, such as the professionalisation of NGOs, the nature of their 
political engagement, and their positioning within broader systems of governance. There 
is also a pressing need for investigation into how aid operations were actually 
implemented on the ground, not only to test the effectiveness of NGOs in the field, but to 
also understand how aid recipients have conceptualised and reworked humanitarian 
assistance at the local level.  
 This thesis has focused solely on the British humanitarian sector. The implications 
discussed here, however, raise further questions about how distinct the British case is in a 
global context. It would be illuminating to explore whether the findings of this 
investigation correlate or contrast with other national NGO sectors. It has been shown that 
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the British government played a crucial role in shaping the emergence of a humanitarian 
industry in Britain. The Department for International Development (DFID) is now a 
leading international donor of both development aid and emergency relief, and has been 
an influential voice in shaping international disaster policy.
29
 Examining the historical 
emergence of humanitarian NGOs in countries with less interventionist states may shed 
further light on the nature of non-governmental activism.  
 Furthermore, the Disasters Emergency Committee was notably described by 
Jonathan Benthall in 1993 as a ‘unique system... characteristic of the British 
“Establishment”’.30 However, similar umbrella organisations do operate in Canada, Japan 
and across Europe, a number of which have been explicitly modelled on the DEC's 
structure and co-ordinating methodology.
31
 Additionally, the two largest NGOs in the 
British sector - Oxfam and Save the Children - have long engaged in internationalising 
their operations, setting up global federations made up of numerous national entities.
32
 
This raises the possibility that the processes and trends which have shaped the rise of the 
British sector have also been exported through the global aid network. The history of 
British humanitarianism may therefore also contribute more broadly to understanding how 
international NGOs as a whole have become such major players in the global 
humanitarian aid industry, despite the long-standing convictions of many agencies to de-
emphasise charitable relief and adopt a more overtly political role instead. 
 It has been observed that the British public has widely supported and trusted 
NGOs for a number of decades. In the humanitarian field, aid agencies have historically 
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been perceived as heroic altruists and superior alternatives to official actors, which has 
largely insulated them from criticism. There are signs that these perceptions are beginning 
to change. International NGOs are now increasingly being implicated as part of official 
bureaucracies and systems of governance, rather than the alternative ‘compassionate 
critics’.33 This shift can be attributed to the rampant expansion and professionalisation of 
the humanitarian sector, which has resulted in aid agencies increasingly resembling 
corporate entities and official donors. While the emergence of a public critique may 
negatively impact upon the material interests of  humanitarian NGOs, this thesis 
ultimately suggests that it may also be essential to prompting a re-examination of their 
prominence in the technocratic disaster relief industry. 
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